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RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION:
THE YEAR 2005
by
Ira B. Shepard
Martin J. McMahon, Jr.
This recent developments outline discusses, and provides context to
understand, the significance of the most important judicial decisions and
administrative rulings and regulations promulgated by the Internal Revenue
Service and Treasury Department during the most recent twelve months -
and sometimes a little farther back in time if we find the item particularly
humorous or outrageous. Most Treasury Regulations, however, are so
complex that they cannot be discussed in detail and, anyway, only a devout
masochist would read them all the way through; just the basic topic and
fundamental principles are highlighted. Amendments to the Internal Revenue
Code generally are not discussed except to the extent that (1) they are of
major significance, (2) they have led to administrative rulings and
regulations, (3) they have affected previously issued rulings and regulations
otherwise covered by the outline, or (4) they provide Marty the opportunity
to mock our elected representatives. The outline focuses primarily on topics
of broad general interest [to the two of us, at least] - income tax accounting
rules, determination of gross income, allowable deductions, treatment of
capital gains and losses, corporate and partnership taxation, exempt
organizations, and procedure and penalties. It deals summarily with
qualified pension and profit sharing plans and generally does not deal with
international taxation or specialized industries, such as banking, insurance,
and financial services. Please read this outline at your own risk; we take no
responsibility for any misinformation in it, whether occasioned by our
advancing ages or our increasing indifference as to whether we get any
particular item right. See VIII. C. for restrictions on your use of this Outline.
i.e., readers are not permitted to use anything contained in this outline for
purposes of giving advice to clients on any tax avoidance technique.
I. ACCOUNTING
A. Accounting Methods
1. Rev. Proc 2006-11, 2006-3 I.R.B. 309 (12/21/05).
This revenue procedure provides procedures by which taxpayers may request
accounting method changes so they can comply with § 263A cost
capitalization under the simplified service cost method and the simplified
production method contained in regulations set forth in T.D. 9217.
2006]
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2. T.D. 9217, Guidance Regarding the Simplified
Service Cost Method and the Simplified Production Method, 70 F.R. 44467
(8/3/05). Temp. Regs §§ 1.263-1T and 1.263-2T have been amended.
B. Inventories
There were no significant developments regarding this topic
during 2005.
C. Installment Method
There were no significant developments regarding this topic
during 2005.
D. Year of Receipt or Deduction
1. Hightower v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2005-274
(11/28/05). Funds received pursuant to arbitrator's decision regarding
forced-buyout of corporate stock were includable in income, even though
taxpayer continued to contest the decision, because he accepted the check,
endorsed it, and deposited the proceeds in an interest bearing account under
his sole control. Taxpayer's creation of a separate account did not evidence
unconditional renunciation of the right to funds.
2. The writer of a put option does not have income
until the year the option expires unexercised. Fed. Home Loan Mortgage
Corp. (Freddie Mac) v. Commissioner, 125 T.C. 248 (11/21/05). The Tax
Court (Judge Ruwe) held that nonrefundable commitment fees that loan
originators pay to Freddie Mac are not income in the year of receipt by
Freddie Mac; instead, they are premiums for put options and should be
treated as such for tax purposes, i.e., they reduce taxpayer's basis in the loans
purchased if the option is exercised and they are income in the year the
option lapses if the option is not exercised. The premium received by the
writer of a put option that is not exercised is ordinary income for the taxable
year in which the failure to exercise the option becomes final; if a put option
is exercised, the premium received by the writer is an offset against the
option price, which reduces the basis of the property acquired pursuant to the
put option.
0 The Commissioner argued that the
nonrefundable portion of commitment fees were income in the year of receipt
under the all events test of § 451.
3. Anticipated warranty expenses are not deductible
in the year taxpayer sold warranted motor vehicles. Chrysler Corp. v.
[Vol. 8:SI
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Commissioner, 436 F.3d 644 (6th Cir. 2/8/06), aff'g T.C. Memo. 2000-283
(8/31/00). Taxpayer was not permitted to deduct anticipated warranty
expenses in the year it sold warranted motor vehicles to its dealers because
the warranty claims had not yet been made. The court followed United States
v. General Dynamics Corp., 481 U.S. 239 (1987), and distinguished United
States v. Hughes Properties, Inc., 476 U.S. 593 (1986), when it followed the
tax court in holding that the last event in the fixing of petitioner's liability
occurred no sooner than when a warranty claim was filed with petitioner by
one of its dealers or by the retail customer.
II. BUSINESS INCOME AND DEDUCTIONS
A. Income
1. The IRS changes position on the tax
treatment of rebates. Rev. Rul. 2005-28, 2005-19 I.R.B. 997 (4/25/05).
This ruling holds that a payment made by a seller to a purchaser, the purpose
and intent of which is to reach an agreed-upon net selling price, is treated as
an adjustment to the sales price rather than a deduction item. Therefore,
Medicaid rebates incurred by a pharmaceutical manufacturer are purchase
price adjustments that are subtracted from gross receipts in determining gross
income.
Rev. Rul. 76-96, 1976-1 C.B. 23,
which held that an automobile manufacturer's rebates paid to retail customers
are deductible as ordinary and necessary business expenses under § 162, is
suspended in part because the issue is being reconsidered by the IRS.
2. If he didn't destroy the daily cash register
tapes, it would have been much harder for him to skim. Kikalos v. United
States, 408 F.3d 900 (7th Cir. 5/24/05). Taxpayer owned three liquor stores
that did not accept credit cards. Most of his sales were cash sales. The
problem as put by Judge Posner is "Kikalos's stubborn refusal to retain the
[daily cash register] tapes has engendered a protracted (since at least 1998)
struggle with the Internal Revenue Service." What taxpayer does daily is to
manually record the total receipts from each store in a log book, and then
destroys the tape. The government used the "percentage markup" method to
estimate his income based on taxpayer's purchase invoices.
* Taxpayer sought to use expert
testimony as to his income based upon both the "bank deposits" method and the
"increase in net worth" method but the district court ruled that once the
government chose the method to base income upon, taxpayer could not
introduce evidence of another method.
* The Seventh Circuit reversed the
district court's judgment denying a refund of income taxes in the years 1998 and
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1999, and held that taxpayer could introduce expert testimony as to his income
based upon a method other than the one selected by the government. Judge
Posner's opinion also stated that taxpayer could also introduce his log books
into evidence. Additionally, Judge Posner found fault with the jury instructions:
These instructions were incorrect (as well as
confusing - what would a term like "without any rational
basis" mean to the average juror?) .... The judge was telling
the jury that it was not enough for the plaintiffs to prove that
the government's estimate of their tax deficiencies was
incorrect. They had to prove that it was irrational. In so
ruling, the judge added an element to the statutory
entitlement to a refund. All the statute requires is that the
taxpayer prove that he overpaid his taxes. It doesn't require
him to prove that the government's assessment was not only
inaccurate but irrational. Suppose Nick Kikalos was a highly
credible witness and the jury believed he'd been scrupulous
about transferring the data in the Z tapes to his log book, a
belief the jury might find corroborated by the results of the
alternative indirect methods used by the plaintiffs' expert.
We do not see on what basis a jury would be required to
disbelieve Kikalos's testimony in favor of a rough method of
estimation, just because the estimation could not be deemed
irrational. There is nothing in the Internal Revenue Code or
its implementing regulations to suggest the imposition of so
insuperable a burden on a refund plaintiff.
a. Meanwhile the Seventh Circuit affirms
the Tax Court judgment sustaining his deficiency for 1997 income taxes.
Kikalos v. Commissioner, 434 F.3d 977 (7th Cir. 1/19/06). After the audits
for years 1990-1992, taxpayer and the IRS executed an "Agreement to
Maintain Adequate Books and Records," which specified the retention of
daily cash register tapes. The audit focused on the cigarette sales by
Kikalos's stores and his treatment of "buydown" payments from cigarette
companies for discounts that were supposed to have been passed on to
customers. This IRS audit was triggered by a bank reporting to the IRS that
Kikalos purchased thirty-one cashier's checks in 1997 in the total amount of
$809,734.51 using cash and third-party checks that the Tax Court found had
not been included in income by taxpayer and were largely unreported
"buydown" payments. Taxpayer had not told his accountant about these
"buydown" checks, and the Tax Court found that they did not overlap with
the "buydown" checks that were included in income. The 20 percent
negligence penalty was also upheld.
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3. When is an advance includable in income, as
opposed to it being excludable debt? Kams Prime & Fancy Food, Ltd. v.
Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2005-233 (10/5/05). A $1.5 million advance
received by the taxpayer-retailer from a supplier that was evidenced by a
promissory note with the proper indicia of debt nevertheless was not a true
debt, because the parties concurrently entered into a supply agreement
pursuant to which the debt would be forgiven if the taxpayer purchased the
quantity of product required under the supply agreement over its term; in
substance, there was no unconditional obligation to repay the advance
because the amounts under the note were due only if the supply agreement
was materially breached by taxpayer.
4. Coburn v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2005-283
(12/5/05). Debtor's release of collateral to creditor did not give rise to
income from discharge of indebtedness income because taxpayer-debtor
remained liable for the balance of the debt.
B. Deductible Expenses versus Capitalization
1. How to change accounting methods for the 2003
year to comply with the final regulations. Rev. Proc. 2004-23, 2004-16
I.R.B. 785. This revenue procedure provides an exclusive administrative
procedure for taxpayers to obtain automatic consent to change to a method of
accounting pursuant to Reg. §§ 1.263(a)-4, 1.263(a)-5, and 1.167(a)-3(b), the
final capitalization of intangible regulations for the 2003 tax year.
a. Changing accounting methods for years
after 2003 to comply with the final regulations. Rev. Proc. 2005-9, 2005-2
I.R.B. 303 (12/13/04). This procedure is similar to, but not identical with,
Rev. Proc. 2004-23.
b. Rev. Proc. 2005-17, 2005-13 I.R.B. 797
(3/8/05). This revenue procedure modifies Rev. Proc. 2005-9 to provide
guidance for a taxpayer's second year ending on or after 12/31/03 [for a
calendar year taxpayer, the 2005 year]. This makes the five-year prior change
scope limitation inapplicable to that year.
2. IRS identifies issues to be addressed in
forthcoming proposed regulations on tangible property costs. Notice
2004-6, 2004-3 I.R.B. 308 (12/22/03). These issues include [using the
numbering from the Notice]: (1) What general principles of capitalization
should be applied? (2) What is the appropriate "unit of property"? (3) What
is the starting point for determining whether property value is increased or
useful life is prolonged? (11) Should the regulations provide "repair
allowance" type rules? (12) Should the regulations provide a de minimis
2006]
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rule? (13) When should the "plan of rehabilitation" doctrine be applied? (15)
Are there circumstances where tax treatment should follow financial or
regulatory accounting treatment?
a. Would you like to fly on a jet without its
engines? FedEx Corp. v. United States, 91 A.F.T.R.2d 2003-1940, U.S.T.C.
50, 91 (W.D. Tenn. 4/8/03). The district court denied the taxpayer's motion
for summary judgment that expenditures for its off-wing engine maintenance
program were deductible repairs under Reg. § 1.162-4. The court found that
there was a genuine issue of fact regarding whether the appropriate unit of
property for measuring whether the expenditures added value or materially
prolonged life was (1) the entire aircraft, as argued by FedEx, or (2) the jet
engines and auxiliary power units, as argued by the government. The court
concluded that there is no 'entire vehicle' rule of law requiring that repairs be
measured against the entire vehicle rather than against components.
b. You don't have to, at least in Memphis.
FedEx Corp. v. United States, 291 F. Supp. 2d 699 (W.D. Tenn. 2003).
Taxpayer was permitted to deduct the costs of engine shop visits for jet
aircraft engine inspection, heavy maintenance, and repair because the
relevant unit of property was held to be the entire aircraft, not the engine.
c. Affirmed by the Sixth Circuit in an
unpublished opinion, which holds that engines are part of a jet plane
even when they are "off wing." FedEx Corp. v. United States, 412 F.3d 617
(6th Cir. 2/16/05). The $70 million in taxes and accrued interest determined
by the IRS having capitalized the costs incurred for "off-wing maintenance"
of its jet aircraft engines and auxiliary power units in 1993 and 1994 were
improperly collected because FedEx was entitled to deduct "such
maintenance costs" as incidental repairs that did not appreciably prolong the
life of the aircraft.
3. Just when you thought you were safe from
capitalization under § 263(a), § 263A rears its ugly head. Rev. Rul. 2004-
18, 2004-8 I.R.B. 509 (2/23/04). Costs incurred to clean up land that a
taxpayer contaminated with hazardous waste by the operation of its
manufacturing plant must be capitalized under § 263A and included in
inventory costs. Rev. Rul. 98-25, 1998-1 C.B. 998, and Rev. Rul. 94-38,
1994-1 C.B. 35, are clarified by providing that the otherwise deductible
amounts at issue are subject to capitalization to inventory under § 263A.
a. Allocating environmental remediation
costs of a manufacturer. It's easy - just allocate them to inventory
produced during the year in which the costs are incurred. Rev. Rul.
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2005-42, 2005-28 I.R.B. 67 (6/20/05). This ruling extends Rev. Rul. 2004-18
and sets forth five situations of groundwater cleanup costs which it finds to
be allocable under § 263A to the inventory produced during the taxable year
the costs are incurred. The ruling also provides for an automatic change of
method of accounting.
4. Rev. Rul. 2004-17, 2004-8 I.R.B. 516 (2/6/04).
Costs paid or incurred in the taxable year to remediate environmental
contamination that occurred in prior taxable years do not qualify for
treatment under § 1341.
a. Reynolds Metals Co. v. United States, 389
F. Supp. 2d 692 (E.D. Va. 8/22/05). Section 1341 does not apply to
environmental remediation expenses relating to prior years' income because
in incurring the remediation expenses there is no "restoration of an item of
income to an entity from whom the income was received or to whom the
item of income should have been paid."
5. Ti&rett v. United States, 96 A.F.T.R.2d 2005-5649
(W.D. Tenn. 8/3/05), as amended, Sept. 2, 2005. Amounts paid to
corporation by president/minority shareholder of a corporation in satisfaction
of his contractual obligation to indemnify corporation against losses from a
specific venture that he advocated corporation undertake constituted a capital
contribution, not a business expense, because taxpayer had no possibility of
personal business profit from the specific venture by the corporation.
6. Rev. Rul. 2005-47, 2005-32 I.R.B. 261. Credit card
issuers treat third-party ATM surcharge fees incurred by their cardholders as
additional amounts loaned to those cardholders.
C. Reasonable Compensation
1. Tax Court distinguishes Exacto Spring in case
appealable to Seventh Circuit. Menard. Inc. v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo.
2004-207 (9/16/04), reconsideration denied, T.C. Memo. 2005-3 (1/6/05). In
this decision, appealable to the Seventh Circuit and presumably governed by
the "hypothetical independent investor" test of Exacto Spring Corp. v.
Commissioner, 196 F.3d 833 (1999), the Tax Court (Judge Marvel)
nevertheless applied the traditional factor of compensation for CEOs of
comparable publicly-traded corporations to disallow deduction of $13
million of the $20 million of compensation (which included 5 percent of pre-
tax profits) paid to John R. Menard, the CEO and owner of 89 percent of
taxpayer's stock rather than applying solely the hypothetical independent
20061
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investor test. The court focused on language in Reg. § 1.162-7(b)(3), which
was not discussed in Exacto Spring, and which provides as follows:
In any event the allowance for the compensation paid may
not exceed what is reasonable under all the circumstances. It
is, in general, just to assume that reasonable and true
compensation is only such amount as would ordinarily be
paid for like services by like enterprises under like
circumstances.
a. On reconsideration, makes clear that two
prongs are required, i.e., (1) that the amounts paid are intended as
compensation and (2) that they are reasonable in amount. T.C. Memo.
2005-3 (1/6/05). In denying taxpayer's motion for reconsideration, Judge
Marvel reiterated - as an alternative ground for her decision - that the
taxpayer did not intend that its payment be for services in light of (1) it never
having paid dividends, (2) the CEO's contractual obligation to repay any
portion of the compensation found to be excessive, and (3) the failure of the
board of directors to make any effort to evaluate whether the compensation
was excessive.
D. Miscellaneous Expenses
1. The IRS never seems able to catch up with the
movements in the price of gasoline, and more tinkering is in store for
2005. Rev. Proc. 2004-64, 2004-49 I.R.B. 898 (11/17/04), superseding Rev.
Proc. 2003-76, 2003-43 I.R.B. 924. The optional standard mileage rate for
business use of automobiles will increase on 1/1/05 from 37.5 cents per mile
to 40.5 cents per mile; the mileage rate for medical and moving will increase
from 14 cents per mile to 15 cents per mile; and the mileage rate for giving
services to a charitable organization will remain at 14 cents per mile.
Query whether increasing the
deduction for driving to the doctor so it is now greater than the deduction for
driving to the charitable board meeting - in 2003, the deduction for medical
mileage was less than charitable mileage - is because many more taxpayers
deduct charitable miles than medical miles?
a. The IRS noticed that fuel prices went up
recently, so a 9/1/05 increase in mileage rates is announced.
Announcement 2005-71, 2005-41 I.R.B. 714 (9/12/05). On 9/1/05, the
optional standard mileage rate for business use of automobiles will increase
to 48.5 cents per mile, and the standard mileage rate for medical and moving
expenses will increase to 22 cents per mile. The rate for charitable miles
remains at the statutory [§ 170(i)] 14 cents per mile.
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b. Under the Katrina Tax Act, the charitable
standard mileage rate would be 70 percent of the standard mileage rate for
businesses if the use of the vehicle is for the purpose of providing relief
related to Hurricane Katrina. Effective for the use of a passenger automobile
between 8/25/05 and 12/31/06.
c. Splitting the difference between the first
eight months of 2005 and the last four for 2006. Rev. Proc. 2005-78,
2005-51 I.R.B. 1177 (12/2/05). Mileage rates effective on or after 1/1/06 are
as follows: business, 44.5 cents per mile; medical and moving, 18 cents per
mile; general charitable contribution deduction, 14 cents per mile (statutory);
Hurricane Katrina charitable contribution deduction, 32 cents per mile (with
a Hurricane Katrina charitable use of automobile reimbursement rate
permitted without income effect of up to 44.5 cents per mile).
2. Section 201 of the Jobs Act of 2004 amends § 179
to extend the $100,000 amount for expensing for small businesses through
years beginning before 2008.
a. Rev. Proc. 2004-71, 2004-50 I.R.B. 970
(11/19/04). The amount is indexed for inflation, and for 2005, the indexed
amounts are $105,000 and $420,000, respectively.
b. Rev. Proc. 2005-70, § 3.18, 2005-47 I.R.B.
979 (10/29/05). For taxable years beginning in 2006, the inflation adjusted
amount a taxpayer may elect to expense under § 179 cannot exceed
$108,000, and the phase-out threshold begins at $430,000.
c. Final § 179 regulations. T.D. 9209, Section
179 Elections, 70 F.R. 40189 (7/13/05). The regulations are amended to take
into account the increased limits of the Jobs Act.
3. Section 907 of the Jobs Act of 2004 amends
§ 274(e) to limit the deduction in regard to expenses incurred with respect to
personal use by "specified individuals" of corporate aircraft or other
corporate facilities to the amount treated as compensation and included in the
individual's income as wages. Specified individuals are those who are
subject to the requirements of § 16(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934
or would be subject to such requirements if the taxpayer were subject to the
Act, which generally means they are officers, directors, or own 10 percent or
more of the corporation's stock. This reverses the holding to the contrary in
Sutherland Lumber-Southwest, Inc. v. Commissioner, 114 T.C. 197 (2000),
aft'd, 255 F.3d 495 (8th Cir. 2001).
2006]
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The amendment is applicable to
expenses incurred after the date of enactment (10/22/04).
a. Implementing the limitation on deduction
of airplane costs. Notice 2005-45, 2005-24 I.R.B. 1228 (5/27/05). This
notice provides interim guidance to taxpayers on the limitation under
§ 274(e) on the deductible amount of trade or business expenses for use of a
business aircraft for entertainment, i.e., personal use, and provides a
methodology and examples as to how expenses are to be allocated to flights.
Applicable to expenses incurred after 6/30/05.
4. This deduction should prove so effective that it
will be extended to all business income. Section 102 of the Jobs Act of
2004 adds new § 199 to provide a nine percent deduction for U.S.
manufacturing income, i.e., "income attributable to domestic production
activities." For corporations, the deduction allowed by § 199 is a percentage
of the lesser of "qualified production activities income" or taxable income.
For individual taxpayers engaged in manufacturing, the taxable income
limitation is replaced by a limitation based on adjusted gross income. The
deduction will be phased in over six years, beginning with 2005. The
percentage begins at three percent for 2005 and rises to nine percent after
2009, but in no event can the deduction exceed 50 percent of the W-2 wages
paid by the taxpayer during the year for which the deduction is sought. IRC
§ 199(d)(5). Thus, the deduction is unavailable to a sole proprietor or
partnership with no employees. Although the deduction is available to
individuals, corporations, and pass through entities, only items attributable to
the conduct of a trade or business can be taken into account;
Section 199(d)(5).
* Qualified production activities
income is defined as the excess of "domestic production gross receipts" over the
sum of (1) the cost of goods sold allocable to domestic production gross
receipts, (2) other deductions, expenses, or losses directly allocable to domestic
production gross receipts, and (3) a ratable portion of other deductions,
expenses, and losses not directly allocable to domestic production gross receipts
or to any other class of income. IRC § 199(c)(1). Domestic production gross
receipts are gross receipts derived from (1) the lease, rental, license, or sale,
exchange, or other disposition of (a) "qualifying production property," defined
as tangible personal property, computer software, and sound recordings,
produced (in whole or in significant part) by the taxpayer in the United States,
(b) a "qualified film" produced by the taxpayer, or (c) electricity, natural gas, or
potable water produced by the taxpayer in the United States; (2) construction
performed within the United States, or (3) architectural or engineering services
performed in the United States for United States construction projects. Section
199(c)(4)(B) excludes from the definition of domestic production gross receipts
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any receipts from (1) the sale of food and beverages prepared by the taxpayer at
a retail establishment, or (2) the transmission or distribution (as contrasted with
the production) of electricity, natural gas, or potable water.
0 Because the deduction is a percentage
of a specified type of net income, rather than an allowance for actual expenses
incurred by the taxpayer, its effect can be viewed as reducing the effective tax
rate on qualified production activities income. (Indeed, it originated in a
proposal to reduce the corporate tax rate generally, but through the legislative
process metamorphosed into its current structure.) Suppose a taxpayer has
$100,000 of qualified production activities income and sufficient income from
other sources to be subject to a marginal rate of 35 percent (the highest statutory
rate for both individuals and corporations). The § 199 deduction reduces the
taxpayer's taxable income derived from qualified production activities from
$100,000 to $91,000. At 35 percent, the tax on $91,000 is $31,850, which is an
effective tax rate of only 31.85 percent on the $100,000 of qualified production
activities income.
* Section 199 is unique in allowing a
deduction equal to a portion of net income generated by a general type of
business activity. Most tax expenditures for businesses accelerate deductions,
provide deductions for amounts not otherwise deductible, allow a deduction
related to gross income from a specified activity, or take the form of a credit.
Most tax experts believe the provision to be so complex, and the distinctions
and pigeon-holing of sources of income and the purpose for which deductible
expenditures were incurred that are required to calculate the amount of the
deduction to be so difficult to ascertain, that the provision cannot be reasonably
and consistently administered. A footnote in the conference committee report on
the 2004 Jobs Act unintentionally illustrates the problem even in a simple
context.
The conferees intend that food processing, which generally
is a qualified production activity under the conference
agreement, does not include activities carried out at [a] retail
establishment. Thus, under the conference agreement while
the gross receipts of a meat packing establishment are
qualified domestic production gross receipts, the activities of
a master chef who creates a venison sausage for his or her
restaurant menu cannot be construed as a qualified
production activity.
The report goes on to state:
The conferees recognize that some taxpayers may own
facilities at which the predominant activity is domestic
production as defined in the conference agreement and other
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facilities at which they engage in the retail sale of the
taxpayer's produced goods and also sell food and beverages.
For example, assume that the taxpayer buys coffee beans and
roasts those beans at a facility, the primary activity of which
is the roasting and packaging of roasted coffee. The taxpayer
sells the roasted coffee through a variety of unrelated third-
party vendors and also sells roasted coffee at the taxpayer's
own retail establishments. In addition, at the taxpayer's retail
establishments, the taxpayer prepares brewed coffee and
other foods. The conferees intend that to the extent that the
gross receipts of the taxpayer's retail establishment represent
receipts from the sale of its roasted coffee beans to
customers, the receipts are qualified domestic production
gross receipts, but to the extent that the gross receipts of the
taxpayer's retail establishment represent receipts from the
sale of brewed coffee or food prepared at the retail
establishment, the receipts are not qualified domestic
production gross receipts. However, the conferees intend
that, in this case, the taxpayer may allocate part of the
receipts from the sale of the brewed coffee as qualified
domestic production gross receipts to the extent of the value
of the roasted coffee beans used to brew the coffee. The
conferees intend that the Secretary provide guidance
drawing on the principles of section 482 by which such a
taxpayer can allocate gross receipts between qualified and
nonqualified gross receipts. The conferees observe that in
this example, the taxpayer's sales of roasted coffee beans to
unrelated third parties would provide a value for the beans
used in brewing a cup of coffee for retail sale. (H. Rep. No.
108-755, at 13, n. 27 (2004))
* One is left to wonder whether
Starbucks is pleased that its lobbyists did such a good job in obtaining as much
of a benefit as Starbucks gets from this obvious direction to the Treasury
Department regarding what the to-be-promulgated regulations will provide for
Starbucks or whether Starbucks is displeased that it did not get even more
advantageous treatment.
• This provision resulted from efforts
to retain some of the tax expenditure benefits provided to exporters by the
extraterritorial income ("ETI") regime that, like the domestic international sales
corporation ("DISC") and the foreign sales corporation ("FSC") regimes before
it, were found to violate U.S. obligations under international trade agreements.
Because the objectionable feature of the ETI, FSC, and DISC regimes was that
they provided tax benefits only for certain export activity and were thus found
by the World Trade Organization to provide for prohibited export subsidies, the
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new deduction applies regardless of whether the manufactured goods are
exported. The deduction of extraterritorial income (ETI) will be eliminated in
2007 after being phased out in 2005 [80 percent deduction] and 2006 [60
percent deduction]. A WTO panel has found the phase-out to be itself in
violation of international trade agreements.
a. If the statute appears to have a short
shelf-life, the guidance under it should be even more ephemeral. Notice
2005-14, 2005-7 I.R.B. 498 (1/19/05). Lengthy guidance on the new
manufacturing deduction. Pending promulgation of what surely will be
voluminous regulations governing the allocation of deductions, expenses,
and losses for the purpose of calculating qualified production activities
income, Notice 2005-14 provides interim guidance.
b. Proposed regulations. REG-105847-05,
Income Attributable to Domestic Production Activities, 70 F.R. 67220
(11/4/05). Massive [224 pages] proposed regulations [§ § 1.199-1 through -8]
deal with the deduction for U.S. manufacturing income under § 199. The
"shrinking back" concept of taking the deduction for only the value of the
beans in a cup of brewed coffee, or for the value of the U.S.-manufactured
shoelaces on a pair of foreign-manufactured sneakers is being much
discussed.
5. The IRS attempts to define "insurance" in terms
of risk shifting and risk distribution, which means that the insurance
company must insure more than one person. Note how twelve single-
member LLCs may or may not be more than one person. Rev. Rul. 2005-
40, 2005-27 I.R.B. 4 (6/17/05). This ruling provides guidance to clarify that
the elements of risk shifting and risk distribution must be present for an
arrangement to be considered insurance for federal income tax purposes,
citing Helvering v. Le Gierse, 312 U.S. 531 (1941). Four situations are set
forth. The first three situations are held to be "not insurance" and they
involve an unrelated person receiving premiums to insure the risk of a single
taxpayer that operates a large fleet of automotive vehicles in the courier
transport business, including (in Situation 3) twelve single-member LLCs of
approximately equal size owned by the same person which are classified as
disregarded entities. In Situation 4, each of those LLCs elects to be classified
as an association, and the arrangement is held to be "insurance."
* Compare the different view of
insurance in Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Commissioner, 972 F.2d 858, 861-62
(1992), where Judge Easterbrook stated:
What is "insurance" for tax purposes? The Code lacks a
definition. Le Gierse mentions the combination of risk
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shifting and risk distribution, but it is a blunder to treat a
phrase in an opinion as if it were statutory language ...
Corporations accordingly do not insure to protect their
wealth and future income, as natural persons do, or to
provide income replacement or a substitute for bequests to
their heirs (which is why natural persons buy life insurance).
Investors can "insure" against large risks in one line of
business more cheaply than do corporations, without the
moral hazard and adverse selection and loading costs: they
diversify their portfolios of stock. Instead corporations
insure to spread the costs of casualties over time.
6. Tool allowance is not paid under an accountable
plan. Rev. Rul. 2005-52, 2005-35 I.R.B. 423 (8/3/05). A tool allowance paid
by an employer in the automobile repair and maintenance business to its
service technicians based upon the numbers of hours worked by each service
technician is not an accountable plan such that the payments are excluded
from the employees' gross income and exempt from the withholding and
payment of employment taxes because it fails to meet both the
"substantiation" and the "return of excess" requirements (although it does
meet the "business connection" requirement). The set amount for each hour
worked paid by the automobile repair business to the employee-mechanics,
who were required to purchase their own tools, as a "tool allowance" was
includable in gross income as an itemized employee business expense
deduction, because employees were not required to provide any
substantiation of expenses incurred for tools and employer did not require
employees to return any portion of the tool allowances that exceeded their
actual expenses.
a. To the same effect. Namyst v. Commis-
sioner, T.C. Memo. 2004-263 (11/17/04). Reg. § 1.62-2(f) conditions
application of the netting rule [permitting an above-the-line deduction of
employee business expenses pursuant to an accountable plan] on the
employee being required to return excess advances to the employer. The
taxpayer, instead, was required to include expense reimbursements in gross
income because although he was required to [and did meticulously] account
to the employer for his expenses, the taxpayer was not obligated to return
any excess advances to the employer.
(1) Affirmed. Namyst v. Commis-
sioner, 435 F.3d 910, 2006-1 U.S.T.C. 50,163 (8th Cir. 1/27/06). These
payments did not meet the standards set forth in Reg. § 1.62-2 for payments
to qualify as being part of an "accountable plan" because the payments were
not differentiated between reimbursements of expenses and for payments
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with respect to tools. The court affirmed the Tax Court's refusal to treat
substantiated payments as made under a qualified accountable plan while
treating unsubstantiated payments as payments under a nonaccountable plan
because the plan as a whole must meet the requirements of an accountable
plan for such treatment.
7. The deduction for the cost of clothing purchased
under a "once-wear" policy was disallowed because the clothing was not
unsuitable for personal wear. Deihl v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2005-
287 (12/15/05). The Tax Court (Judge Wherry) held inter alia that clothing
to be worn only once at conventions or other promotional meetings was not
deductible under the test that it must be "not suitable for general or personal
wear" as applied objectively. The clothing would not meet that test under a
subjective methodology because the court found taxpayer's testimony to that
effect "overly broad and exaggerated." Pevsner v. Commissioner, 628 F.2d
467 (5th Cir. 1980), followed.
E. Depreciation & Amortization
1. Maguire/Thomas Partners Fifth & Grand, Ltd. v.
Commissioner, T.C. Memo 2005-34 (2/28/05). The Tax Court (Judge
Colvin) held that the costs incurred to obtain a zoning change with respect to
land are not depreciable, but the costs to obtain a zoning variance relating to
a specific building to be constructed on a specific parcel of land are
depreciable as part of the cost of the building.
2. Section 1245(b)(8), added to the Code by the
Energy Tax Incentives Act of 2005, provides that if a taxpayer disposes of
several § 197 intangibles in one transaction, or in a series of related
transactions, all the intangibles are treated as a single asset for purposes of
calculating § 1245 recapture.
F. Credits
1. Arevalo v. Commissioner, 124 T.C. 244 (5/18/05).
Taxpayer's $10,000 investment in pay phones gave him merely legal title but
did not give him the benefits and burdens of ownership with respect to the
pay phones; he was therefore not entitled either to depreciation or to the § 44
disabled access credit. In particular, he was not entitled to the credit because
the investment in pay phones was not an eligible access expenditure.
Taxpayer who "purchased" unidentified pay phones that he never possessed
or controlled, which continued to be operated and serviced by a corporation
related the seller, with respect to which the taxpayer bore no risk of loss and
never paid taxes, insurance, or license fees, and from which the taxpayer was
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guaranteed a minimal fixed return, did not have a depreciable interest in the
telephones because he did not have the benefits and burdens of ownership.
2. The Katrina Tax Act provides a "Work
Opportunity Tax Credit" for Hurricane Katrina employee survivors and an
"employee retention credit" for employers affected by Hurricane Katrina.
3. Section 41(b)(3)(D), added to the Code by the
Energy Tax Incentives Act of 2005, permits taxpayers to take into account
100 percent of contract research expenses paid to eligible small businesses,
universities, and federal laboratories.
4. Section 41(a)(3), added to the Code by the Energy
Tax Incentives Act of 2005, provides a credit equal to 20 percent of a
taxpayer's share of the expenses of an "energy research consortium." To be
qualified, a consortium must be an organization described in § 501(c)(3), and
must have received payments (including contributions) from at least five
unrelated persons during the calendar year (with no more than half of the
payments coming from any single person). In contrast with the usual rule
under § 41, the energy research consortium credit applies to all described
expenditures, rather than only to expenditures in excess of some base
amount.
G. Natural Resources Deductions & Credits
1. The Energy Tax Incentives Act of 2005 classified
natural gas gathering lines as seven-year property. IRC § 168(e)(3)(C)(iv).
2. Iowa 80 Group, Inc. v. IRS, 406 F.3d 950 (8th Cir.
5/4/05), aff'g 371 F. Supp. 2d 1036 (S.D. Iowa 2004). Floor space of truck
stop occupied by a movie theater, arcade, television lounge, restaurant,
showers, and laundromat was not devoted to petroleum marketing sales
because such features are not normally associated with a service station;
taxpayer failed 50 percent test of § 168(e)(3)(E)(iii)).
3. The Energy Tax Incentives Act of 2005 added two
new classes of fifteen-year property: (1) section 1245 property used in the
transmission of electricity at sixty-five or more kilovolts, and (2) certain
natural gas distribution lines. IRC §§ 168(e)(3)(E)(vii), 168(e)(3)(E)(viii).
4. Energy efficient commercial buildings. Section
179D, added to the Code by the Energy Tax Incentives Act of 2005,
provides a deduction for the cost of "energy efficient commercial building
property" placed in service during 2006 or 2007. Qualified property must be
installed in a building within the United States as part of (1) the interior
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lighting systems, (2) the heating, cooling, ventilation, and hot water systems,
or (3) the building envelope, and must be certified as being installed pursuant
to a plan designed to reduce the building's total annual energy and power
costs by at least 50 percent in comparison to a hypothetical reference
building. The deduction may not exceed $1.80 per square foot of the
property. The statute directs the Treasury Department, in consultation with
the Department of Energy, to promulgate regulations setting forth methods of
calculating and verifying energy and power costs. In the case of an
expenditure made by a public entity (such as a public school), the statute
directs the Treasury Department to promulgate regulations allocating the
deduction to the designer of the property in lieu of the owner.
0 If a building does not satisfy the
overall 50 percent reduction standard, a partial deduction (limited to $0.60 per
square foot) is allowed for system-specific energy efficient property, if a
specific system (i.e., (1) interior lighting, (2) heating, cooling, ventilation and
hot water, or (3) building envelope) satisfies system specific targets to be
established by regulations (with the statute providing an interim target, in the
case of lighting system retrofits).
5. The Energy Tax Incentives Act of 2005 liberalized
§ 613A(d)(4); the new limit is 75,000 barrels per day, and it is based on
average daily production for the entire year rather than maximum daily
production on any day.
6. Under § 167(h), added to the Code by the Energy
Tax Incentives Act of 2005, amounts incurred in connection with geological
and geophysical exploration within the United States may be amortized
ratably over a 24-month period.
7. The Energy Tax Incentives Act of 2005 extended
the carryback period to five years with respect to a portion of the NOLs of
certain electric utility companies arising in taxable years ending in 2003,
2004, and 2005. IRC § 172(b)(1)(I).
8. The Energy Tax Incentives Act of 2005 added two
new components to the energy credit: (1) a credit equal to 30 percent of the
cost of "qualified fuel cell property," and (2) a credit equal to 10 percent of
the cost of "qualified microturbine property." The new components of the
credit are available only for property placed in service in 2006 or 2007. In
addition, the Act increases the credit rate to 30 percent for solar energy
property, for 2006 and 2007. Also for only those two years, the Act provides
a 30 percent credit for the cost of fiber-optic solar lighting systems.
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9. A credit under § 45 is allowed under the Energy
Tax Incentives Act of 2005 for the production of "Indian coal," defined as
coal produced from reserves which were owned by (or held in trust by the
United States for the benefit of) an Indian tribe or its members on June 14,
2005. To qualify for the credit, the coal must be produced by a facility placed
in service before January 1, 2009. The credit is available for coal produced
during the years 2006 through 2012, and sold by the taxpayer to unrelated
persons during the same time frame. The credit amount is $1.50 per ton of
Indian coal during the years 2006 through 2009, and $2.00 per ton thereafter.
10. The Energy Tax Incentives Act of 2005
redesignated § 29 as § 45K, and made it part of the general business credit. It
also added a credit for qualified facilities producing coke or coke gas. A
qualified facility must have been placed in service before 1993, or after June
30, 1998, and before January 1, 2010. The credit amount is $3.00 (adjusted
for post-2004 inflation) per barrel-of-oil equivalent, subject to a ceiling of an
average barrel-of-oil equivalent of 4,000 barrels per day. With respect to
production from a particular facility, the credit is available only for the four-
year period beginning on the later of January 1, 2006, or the date the facility
is placed in service.
11. The Energy Tax Incentives Act of 2005 added a
third credit to the § 40A mix, the "small agri-biodiesel credit." The credit
equals 10 cents per gallon of qualified agri-biodiesel production (which is
limited to 15 million gallons per year). It is available only to producers with
an annual productive capacity of no more than 60 million gallons. The 2005
Act also provides that "renewable diesel" is treated in the same manner as
biodiesel for purposes of the BMC and the BC, except that the credit amount
is increased to $1.00 per gallon. Renewable diesel is defined as diesel fuel
derived from biomass using a thermal depolymerization process. All credits
under § 40A are scheduled to expire at the end of 2008.
12. Credit for production from advanced nuclear
power facilities. Section 45J, added to the Code by the Energy Tax
Incentives Act of 2005, provides a credit of 1.8 cents per kilowatt-hour of
electricity produced at a qualifying advanced nuclear power facility during
the eight-year period beginning on the date the facility is placed in service.
For a facility to qualify, the taxpayer must have received an allocation of
megawatt capacity from the IRS, and the facility must have been placed in
service before January 1, 2021. If the megawatt allocation to the facility by
the IRS is less than the facility's rated nameplate capacity, the otherwise
allowable credit per kilowatt hour produced by the facility is proportionately
reduced. For example, if the megawatt allocation were one-third of the rated
nameplate capacity, the credit would be 0.6 cents per kilowatt hour. A
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taxpayer's annual credit during the eight-year period may not exceed $125
million per 1,000 megawatts of allocated capacity. Thus, for example, the
credit ceiling for a taxpayer with 200 megawatts of allocated capacity would
be $25 million.
13. Credits for investments in clean coal facilities.
The Energy Tax Incentives Act of 2005 introduced two new credits for
investments in clean coal facilities. Section 48A provides a credit for
investments in "qualifying advanced coal projects," defined as projects using
integrated gasification combined cycle (IGCC) and other advanced coal-
based technologies for generating electricity. The credit rate is 20 percent of
qualifying investments for IGCC projects, and 15 percent for other projects.
The credit is available only for projects certified by the IRS, following
consultation with the Energy Department. Aggregate credits allowed for
certified projects may not exceed $800 million for IGCC projects, and $500
million for other projects. Section 48B provides a 20 percent credit for
investments in "qualifying gasification projects," defined as projects
involving the conversion of coal, petroleum residue, biomass, or certain other
materials into a synthesis gas composed primarily of carbon monoxide and
hydrogen. Like its companion credit, this credit is available only for projects
certified by the IRS, in consultation with the Department of Energy. Total
credits allocable by the IRS are limited to $350 million, of which no more
than $130 million may be allocated to any single gasification project.
14. New energy efficient home credit. Section 45L,
added to the Code by the Energy Tax Incentives Act of 2005, provides a
credit, in the amount of either $2,000 or $1,000, to an eligible contractor
(including the producer of a manufactured home) who constructs and sells an
energy efficient home to a person who will use the home as a residence. To
qualify for the $2,000 credit, the home must be certified (in accordance with
guidance to be prescribed by the Treasury Department) as having a level of
annual heating and cooling energy consumption at least 50 percent below the
level of a comparable hypothetical reference dwelling unit, with at least one-
fifth of the energy savings attributable to the building envelope. The $1,000
credit, which applies only to manufactured homes, requires at least a 30
percent reduction in energy consumption, of which at least one-third must be
attributable to the building envelope. Manufactured homes are also eligible
for the $2,000 credit, if they satisfy the usual requirements for that credit.
The credit is available only with respect to homes the construction of which
is substantially completed after 2005, and which are purchased during 2006
or 2007. The credit is part of the general business credit.
15. Energy efficient appliance credit. Section 45M,
added to the Code by the Energy Tax Incentives Act of 2005, provides a
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credit to the manufacturer of certain energy efficient dishwashers, clothes
washers, and refrigerators. The credit applies only to appliances produced in
2006 and 2007. In the case of dishwashers, the credit is available only for
dishwashers satisfying the (not yet known) Energy Star standards for 2007.
The per-dishwasher credit amount is the product of $3 and the percentage by
which the 2007 standards exceed the 2005 standards, subject to a $100
ceiling. In the case of clothes washers, the credit amount is $100 for each
washer manufactured in 2006 or 2007 which meets the 2007 Energy Star
standards. For refrigerators, the credit amount rules are rather complex: $75
for a refrigerator manufactured in 2006 and exceeding 2001 energy
conservation standards by at least 15 percent, $125 for a refrigerator
manufactured in 2006 or 2007 and exceeding 2001 standards by at least 20
percent, and $125 for a refrigerator manufactured in either year and
exceeding 2001 standards by at least 25 percent. The credit applies only to
appliances which constitute "excess production," which is defined as the
excess of the number of appliances produced by the taxpayer in the United
States during the calendar year (2006 or 2007) over the taxpayer's average
production during the preceding three years (or over 110 percent of the
average production over the preceding three years, in the case of
refrigerators). The total amount of credits a taxpayer may claim under §
45M, for the two years combined, is limited to $75 million, and the credit
allowed in any one year may not exceed 2 percent of the taxpayer's annual
average gross receipts for the three preceding taxable years. The credit is part
of the general business credit.
16. Alternative motor vehicle credit. Section 30B,
added to the Code by the Energy Tax Incentives Act of 2005, provides a
credit for certain "alternative motor vehicles." The credit is available in the
year a qualifying vehicle is placed in service-for either business or personal
use - by the taxpayer. The credit is generally allowed to the owner of the
vehicle, including the lessor of a vehicle subject to a lease. If a vehicle is sold
to a tax exempt user, the person who sold the vehicle to the user may claim
the credit, but only if the seller clearly discloses the amount of the credit to
the user. IRC § 30B(h)(6). A taxpayer claiming the credit must reduce his
basis in the vehicle by the amount of the credit. The credit has four
components: (1) the new qualified fuel cell motor vehicle credit, (2) the new
advanced lean bum technology motor vehicle credit, (3) the new qualified
hybrid motor vehicle credit, and (4) the new qualified alternative fuel motor
vehicle credit.
A qualifying fuel cell vehicle is a
vehicle, the original use of which commences with the taxpayer, which is
propelled by power derived from one or more cells which convert chemical
energy into electricity by combining oxygen with hydrogen fuel, and which
satisfies certain emission standards established by the Environmental Protection
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Agency (in the case of cars and light trucks). The basic fuel cell credit amount
depends on the gross vehicle weight rating, and ranges from $8,000 for a
vehicle with a rating of 8,500 pounds or less (but only $4,000 for a vehicle
placed in service after 2009), to $40,000 for a vehicle with a rating of more than
26,000 pounds. The credit is increased, by amounts ranging from $1,000 to
$4,000, if the vehicle satisfies specified fuel economy standards.
0 A qualifying advanced lean bum
technology vehicle must (1) have an internal combustion engine designed to
operate using more air than is necessary for complete combustion, (2) use direct
injection, (3) achieve at least 125 percent of 2002 model year city fuel
economy, and (4) have been certified as satisfying certain emission standards
established by the Environmental Protection Agency. The original use of the
vehicle must commence with the taxpayer. The credit for lean bum vehicles has
two components. The fuel economy component depends on the vehicle's fuel
economy as a percentage of 2002 model year city fuel economy, and ranges
from a low of $400 (for at least 125 percent of the 2002 standard) to a high of
$2,400 (for at least 250 percent of the 2002 standard). The conservation
component depends on the vehicle's gallons of lifetime fuel savings, and ranges
from $250 (for savings of at least 1,200 gallons) to $1,000 (for savings of at
least 3,000 gallons). The savings are based on an assumption of 120,000
lifetime miles, and are calculated relative to a comparable 2002 model year
vehicle.
* A new qualified hybrid motor vehicle
is a vehicle, the original use of which commences with the taxpayer, which uses
both an internal combustion engine and a rechargeable battery system, which
meets specified emission standards, and which meets specified minimum
standards for maximum available power. For cars and light trucks, the credit
amount is the sum of the fuel economy component and the conservation
component, determined under the same rules applicable to lean bum vehicles.
For other vehicles, the credit is a percentage of the excess of the manufacturer's
suggested retail price (MSRP) for the vehicle over the MSRP of a comparable
non-hybrid vehicle - 20 percent if the vehicle achieves at least a 20 percent
increase in city fuel economy relative to a comparable non-hybrid vehicle, 30
percent for an increase of at least 40 percent, and 40 percent for an increase of at
least 50 percent.
* A new qualified alternative fuel
motor vehicle is a vehicle, the original use of which commences with the
taxpayer, which is capable of using only an alternative fuel (natural gas,
liquefied petroleum gas, hydrogen, or any liquid consisting of at least 85 percent
methanol by volume). The credit is a percentage of the excess of the MSRP of
the vehicle over the MSRP of a comparable non-alternative fuel vehicle -
generally 50 percent, but increased to 80 percent if the vehicle has been certified
as meeting certain emissions standards. A reduced credit is available for
vehicles which use a mix of gasoline and an alternative fuel. If a vehicle uses at
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least 75 percent alternative fuel the credit is 70 percent of the credit which
would be available if the vehicle used only an alternative fuel, and if the vehicle
uses at least 90 percent alternative fuel the credit is 90 percent of the credit
which would be available for a vehicle using only an alternative fuel.
* The alternative motor vehicle credit
applies to vehicles placed in service after 2005 and purchased before 2015 (for
fuel cell vehicles), 2011 (for lean bum vehicles and alternative fuel vehicles), or
2010 (for hybrid vehicles). In the case of hybrid vehicles and lean bum vehicles,
the amount of the credit is phased down - first to 50 percent of the otherwise
available credit, then to 25 percent, and finally to nothing - for vehicles sold
after the manufacturer has sold 60,000 hybrid and/or lean bum vehicles for use
in the United States. As Congress surely realized and intended, this phasing
down of the credit is likely to impact certain Japanese manufacturers sooner
than it impacts any American manufacturers.
* For business taxpayers the credit is
part of the general business credit. When claimed as a personal credit, the credit
is allowable only to the extent of the excess of the regular tax (as reduced by
specified other credits) over the tentative minimum tax.
17. Alternative fuel vehicle refueling property credit.
Section 30C, added to the Code by the Energy Tax Incentives Act of 2005,
provides a credit equal to 30 percent of the cost of any qualified alternative
fuel vehicle refueling property placed in service by the taxpayer. Qualifying
fuels are ethanol, natural gas, compressed natural gas, liquefied natural gas,
liquefied petroleum gas, hydrogen, and mixtures of diesel and biodiesel
containing at least 20 percent biodiesel. For a business taxpayer, the credit
may not exceed $30,000. The credit is also available to a taxpayer installing
a refueling facility on the grounds of his personal residence for personal use,
but the maximum amount of the nonbusiness credit is $1,000. The business
credit is part of the general business credit, and the personal credit is allowed
only to the extent of the excess of the regular tax (reduced by certain other
credits) over the tentative minimum tax. The credit is not available for
property placed in service after 2009 (or after 2014, in the case of property
relating to hydrogen).
18. Nonbusiness energy property credit. Section 25C,
added to the Code by the Energy Tax Incentives Act of 2005, provides a
nonrefundable credit for certain expenditures to improve the energy
efficiency of a taxpayer's principal residence. In the case of "qualified
energy efficiency improvements" (QEEls), the credit equals 10 percent of the
cost of the improvements. A QEEI is any energy efficient building
component (i.e., insulation, exterior windows and doors, and certain coated
metal roofs) satisfying criteria established by the 2000 International Energy
Conservation Code, if the original use of the component commences with the
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taxpayer and the component is expected to remain in use for at least five
years. The other category of credit-eligible costs is "residential energy
property expenditures" (REPEs). REPEs are expenditures for the following
types of property, if they are installed in the taxpayer's principal residence
and satisfy energy efficiency standards to be promulgated by the Secretary of
the Treasury pursuant to detailed statutory instructions: (1) main air
circulating fans, (2) natural gas, propane or oil furnace or hot water boilers,
and (3) "energy efficient building properties" (electric heat pump water
heaters, electric heat pumps, geothermal heat pumps, central air conditioners,
and water heaters using natural gas, propane, or oil). For REPEs the credit
amount is established by schedule: the first $50 of the cost of a main air
circulating fan, the first $150 of the cost of a natural gas, propane, or oil
furnace or hot water boiler, and the first $300 of the cost of any item of
energy-efficient building property. There is a lifetime limit of $500 on the
aggregate credits a taxpayer may claim under § 25C, of which no more than
$200 may be based on expenditures for windows. The credit is available only
for property placed in service in 2006 or 2007.
19. Credit for residential energy efficient property.
Section 25D, added to the Code by the Energy Tax Incentives Act of 2005,
provides a nonrefundable credit for certain expenditures on residential
energy efficient property. Qualifying property is of three types: photovoltaic
property (which uses solar energy to generate electricity), solar water heating
property, and fuel cell property (which converts a fuel into electricity using
electrochemical means). The property must be installed in a dwelling unit
located in the United States and used by the taxpayer as a residence
(principal residence, in the case of fuel cell property). Expenditures allocable
to a swimming pool or hot tub are not eligible for the credit. The credit
equals 30 percent of qualifying expenditures, subject to annual ceilings (on
the credit amounts, not on credit-eligible expenditures) of $2,000 for
photovoltaic property, $2,000 for solar water heating property, and $500 per
half kilowatt of capacity of fuel cell property. The credit is available only for
property placed in service in 2006 or 2007.
H. Loss Transactions, Bad Debts, and NOLs
1. Malone v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2005-69
(4/4/05). Parent who provided funds to pay expenses of business conducted
by his minor children could not deduct expenses because they were not
incurred in his business.
20061
Florida Tax Review
I. At-Risk and Passive Activity Losses
1. Rabinowitz v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2005-188
(7/27/05). Apparel design and distribution business conducted through an S
corporation and jet chartering activity conducted as a sole proprietorship,
which chartered the jet to the apparel business, as well as to other customers,
were two separate activities because there was no organizational relationship
other than common ownership, no close economic relationship, and the
activities were dissimilar.
2. Hubert Enterprises. Inc. v. Commissioner, 125 T.C.
72 (9/21/05). A member of a limited liability company (LLC) taxed as a
partnership is not at-risk for any amount borrowed by the LLC with full
recourse against the LLC because under relevant state law LLC members
were not liable for LLC's debts and the member did not guarantee the debt.
0 The aggregation of § 1245 property
leasing activities of a partnership under § 465(c)(2)(B)(i) applies only to leases
in which the property is placed in service in the same year; activities involving
leased property placed in service in different years may not be aggregated.
3. Rev. Rul. 2005-64, 2005-39 I.R.B. 600 (9/26/05). If
the owner of an aircraft leases it to others for transportation but provides the
services of the pilot and crew with the aircraft, the use of the aircraft by the
lessee is incidental to its receipt of the extraordinary personal services
provided the lessor, and the activity therefore is not a rental activity for
purposes of § 469; if the owner of the aircraft does not provide the services
of the pilot and crew the activity is a rental activity for purposes of § 469.
4. D'Avanzo v. United States, 67 Fed. Cl. 39 (7/26/05),
appeal dismissed, No. 05-5174, 2006 U.S. App. LEXIS 4545 (Fed. Cir.
2/14/06). Taxpayer did not offer a contemporaneous written record of the
number of hours he spent performing personal services with respect to rental
properties; noncontemporaneous log book of hours claimed to have been
devoted to real estate activities and testimony at trial, alone, are inadequate
evidence to establish that taxpayer devoted requisite number of hours to real
estate business activities.
5. Ramsburg v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2005-252
(10/31/05). Section 469(g)(1) does not apply to permit deduction of
suspended passive activity losses following the distribution by the
partnership to taxpayer-partner [in a tax-free distribution under § 731] of
assets used by partnership in an activity with respect to which the taxpayer-
partner was passive.
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6. Misko v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2005-166
(7/6/05). A lawyer practicing through a C corporation had nonpassive losses
from renting computer and other equipment to the corporation. Temp. Reg. §
1.469-1T(e)(3)(i)(D) excludes from the definition of rental activities that are
per se passive any rental that is "incidental," as defined in Temp. Reg.
§ 1.469-1T(e)(3)(vi), to a nonrental activity of the taxpayer. To qualify for
the incidental activity exception the property must predominantly be used in
the taxpayer's active trade or business - which may be conducted
individually, through a closely held corporation in which he is a shareholder,
or through a partnership in which he is a partner - during the taxable year or
during at least two of the five immediately preceding taxable years, and the
gross rental income from the property for the taxable year must be less than 2
percent of the lesser of the unadjusted basis or fair market value of the
property. This rule can be a sword for the taxpayer. An individual who
conducts a business through a corporation, and who owns and leases to the
corporation equipment used by the corporation in the conduct of its business,
can recharacterize losses from the rental activity as nonpassive losses and
deduct those losses against the salary received from the corporation.
7. Assaf v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2005-14
(1/31/05). This case applied the exception contained in Temp. Reg. § 1.469-
1T(e)(3)(i)(D) where the taxpayer leased office space to attorneys and
provided to its tenants various support services - a paralegal, a legal intern, a
law clerk, an up-to-date law library, a computer with legal research
capabilities, two conference rooms, staff who performed client intake,
answered phones, took messages, filed documents at the courthouse and state
capitol, typed briefs, took dictation, referred cases, scheduled depositions and
court reporters, arranged travel, managed a file room and file storage, and
performed legal research - because the tenants "leased space exclusively so
that they would have the benefit of those services." The regulations provide a
special exception to the per se rule where "extraordinary personal services"
are provided by (or on behalf of) the lessor in connection with "making such
property available for use by customers (without regard to the average period
of customer use). Temp. Reg. § 1.469-1T(e)(3)(ii)(C). This exception applies
only where the use by customers of the rented property is incidental to their
receipt of services. Temp. Reg. § 1.469-1T(e)(3)(v).
III. INVESTMENT GAIN
A. Capital Gain and Loss
1. Vision Information Services, LLC v. Commissioner,
419 F.3d 554 (6th Cir. 8/22/05). Outsourcing agreement for use of taxpayer's
"business plan" and conditional "exclusive" license of taxpayer's software to
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Fox Video, under which taxpayer could "sell" its business model to others if
the use of the model was limited to certain products not covered by the
taxpayer's agreement with Fox Video in exchange for fixed installment
payments was not a sale or exchange; agreement was for the taxpayer to use
its know-how and the software to provide direct-to-retail services on Fox
Video's behalf. The arrangement is merely a nonexclusive license, there has
been no sale or exchange and the licensor realizes ordinary income.
Although § 1235 can apply to an exclusive software license, a conditional
"exclusive" license of taxpayer's software to implement a "business plan" to
Fox Video, under which taxpayer retained rights to license use to others if
the use of the software and business plan was limited to certain products not
covered by the taxpayer's agreement with Fox Video did not qualify as a
transfer of all substantial rights because it did not cover "all practical fields-
of-use."
2. House sales by transferred employees. Rev. Rul.
2005-74, 2005-51 I.R.B. 1153 (11/30/05). This Ruling sets forth three
situations relating to whether a transferred employee sold his home to his
employer (via the relocation company retained by the employer), or whether
he sold it to a third party. The first two were held to be a sale to the
employer, either pursuant to an appraisal (Situation 1) or an appraisal with an
"amended value option" that increases the sale price if a third-party buyer
makes a higher offer (Situation 2). The third was held to be a sale to a third
party buyer, where the relocation company merely pays the employee the
value of his equity based on the higher amended value only if the sale to the
third party buyer closes (Situation 3). The ruling applied a transfer of
benefits and burdens of ownership analysis to the various structures of
employer sponsored relocation programs involving the purchase of the
employee's home by the employer through the employer's agent or to a third
party facilitated by the employer's agent. Execution of blank deed by
employee and delivery to employer's agent company may be consistent with,
but does not necessarily evidence, closed sale. A price adjustment contingent
on management relocation company receiving a bona fide third party offer at
a higher price subsequent to closing with employee does not necessarily
mean benefits and burdens of ownership have not passed. A price adjustment
contingent on management relocation company entering into contract to
resell at a higher price subsequent to closing with employee indicates that
benefits and burdens of ownership have not passed.
0 Query whether the employee has
income because he apparently pays no brokers' commissions on the sale of his
house.
3. Questioning the collar. IRS Tech. Advice Mem.
200604033 (10/20/05), first discussed in a David Cay Johnston story in the
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New York Times, 12/30/05. He discusses a then-unreleased TAM that says
that a loan of shares subject to a prepaid variable forward results in a sale for
tax purposes because the agreement provided that the shares that were the
subject of the forward contract would be lent to the forward contract
counterparty. It also provided that § 1058, which provides for the
nonrecognition of gain in some securities lending transactions, does not
apply because the taxpayer had given up all indicia of ownership, including
most risk of loss and opportunity for gain. The TAM distinguished the
transaction at issue from the type permitted under Rev. Rul. 2003-7.
a. This collar just plain clean works. Rev.
Rul. 2003-7, 2003-5 I.R.B. 363 (1/16/03). The IRS ruled that a shareholder
has neither sold stock currently nor caused a constructive sale of stock under
§ 1259 where he (1) receives a fixed amount of cash, (2) simultaneously
enters into an agreement to deliver on a future date a number of shares of
common stock that varies significantly depending on the value of the shares
on the delivery date [but which does provide a "collar" on the number of
shares of stock to be delivered, in effect providing a "collar" on the ultimate
sale price], (3) pledges the maximum number of shares for which delivery
could be required, (4) has the unrestricted right to deliver the pledged shares
or to substitute cash or other shares on the delivery date, and (5) is not
economically compelled to deliver the pledged shares.
0 There was not a sale of the pledged
shares because the shareholder was not required to relinquish the pledged shares
but had an unrestricted right to reacquire them by delivering cash or other
shares. There was not a constructive sale under § 1259(c)(1)(C) because due to
the variation in the number of shares that might be delivered, the agreement was
not a contract to deliver a substantially fixed amount of property for purposes of
§ 1259(d)(1).
4. IRS backs down on its effort to have tax return
preparers enter all security sales transactions on Schedule D or Schedule
D-1. On 1/9/06, the IRS published on its web site the following Notice of
Clarification of the 2005 Instructions for Schedule D (Form 1040):
The IRS has received many inquiries about a new instruction
that was added on page D-6 of the 2005 Schedule D
instructions for completing lines 1 and 8. The new
instruction states:
You must enter the details of each
transaction on a separate line. If you have
more than five transactions to report on line
1 or line 8, report the additional transactions
on Schedule D-1. Use as many Schedules D-
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1 as you need. Enter on Schedule D, lines 2
and 9, the combined totals from all your
Schedules D-1. Do not enter "see attached"
and summary totals from an attachment in
lieu of reporting the details of each
transaction directly on Schedule D or D-1.
The new instructions on page D-6 were meant to highlight
and clarify [the existing] rules, not to change them.
Therefore, taxpayers may continue to use a substitute
statement to provide all of the same information and in a
similar format to lines 1 and 8 of Schedules D and D-1. They
are not required to use the official version of Schedules D
and D-1 to provide the details on each transaction. However,
the details of each transaction still must be provided with the
tax return and not just upon request.
a. One of the inquiries was a 12/23/05 letter
from the Chair of the AICPA Tax Executive Committee, which stated that
tax-return preparers traditionally reported the summary totals found on year-
end brokerage statements directly onto the Schedule D, with a notation to
"see attached" brokerage statements [for taxpayers who are involved with
numerous security sales transaction during the course of the calendar year].
The letter noted that large corporations that use summary form procedures
may state on their return that transactional data details will be made available
upon request.
5. David Taylor Enterrises. Inc. v. Commissioner,
T.C. Memo. 2005-127 (5/31/05). "Classic cars" sold by automobile dealer
whose primary sales were new automobiles were ordinary assets, not capital
assets; although the "classic cars" were physically segregated from the new
car inventory because sales of classic cars were frequent and substantial, the
dealership's accounting treatment of the classic cars did not differ from its
accounting treatment of the inventory of new and used cars, and it advertised
and otherwise marketed the classic cars for sale.
B. Section 1031
1. Exclusion of gain under §§ 121 and 1031 when a
single property is both a personal residence and a business or investment
property, either sequentially or simultaneously. Rev. Proc. 2005-14,
2005-7 I.R.B. 528 (2/3/05) (as corrected). This revenue procedure provides
guidance on how a homeowner can exclude gain on the sale or exchange of a
home under § 121 and also defer gain from a like-kind exchange on the same
property under § 1031. This guidance also clarifies that the property can be
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used consecutively or concurrently as a home and a business, i.e., use as
rental property or an office in the home, respectively. Detailed examples are
included.
2. Nonrecognition denied - Caught by a targeted
anti-abuse rule. Rev. Rul. 2002-83, 2002-49 I.R.B. 927 (11/26/02).
Individual A owned highly appreciated real property held for investment
(Property 1) and individual B, related to individual A within the meaning in
§ 267(b), owned real property (Property 2), which was not appreciated. In a
multiparty like-kind exchange A and B each transferred their properties to a
qualified intermediary. C, an unrelated purchaser of Property 1, transferred
cash to the qualified intermediary, who transferred Property 2 to A, Property
1 to C, and the cash to B. The IRS ruled that pursuant to § 1031(0, a
taxpayer - A - who transfers relinquished property to a qualified
intermediary in exchange for replacement property formerly owned by a
related party is not entitled to nonrecognition treatment under § 1031 (a) if, as
part of the transaction, the related party receives cash or other non-like-kind
property for the replacement property. Based on the legislative history [H.R.
Rep. No. 101-247 at 1340 (1989)], the IRS reasoned that the purpose of §
1031 (f) is to deny nonrecognition treatment for transactions in which related
parties make like-kind exchanges of high basis property for low basis
property in anticipation of the sale of the low basis property. Accordingly,
the IRS applied § 1031 (0(4) because the multi-party exchange was "part of a
transaction (or a series of transactions) structured to avoid the purposes of §
103 1(f)(1)."
a. Reality overtakes Rev. Rul. 2002-83.
Teruya Brothers, Ltd. v. Commissioner, 124 T.C. 45 (2/9/05). Taxpayer
transferred properties to a qualified intermediary, who sold them to unrelated
third parties and used the proceeds to purchase like-kind replacement
property from a related party. Judge Thornton held that the transactions were
economically equivalent to direct exchanges between the taxpayer and
related party, followed by the related party's sale of the properties to
unrelated third parties, and that they were structured to avoid the purposes of
§ 1031(0. It further held that taxpayer failed to prove that avoidance was not
one of the principal purposes of the transactions under the § 1031(0(4)
exception because even though more gain was recognized by the related
party on some of the properties, the only tax consequences of the gain
recognition were reduction of the related party's net operating loss - as
opposed to current taxation for taxpayer.
3. New rules on like-kind personal property classes.
T.D. 9202, Additional Rules for Exchanges of Personal Property Under
Section 1031(a), 70 F.R. 28818 (5/19/05). Final regulations replace the use
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of the Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) system with the North
American Industry Classification System (NAICS) for taxpayers that engage
in like-kind exchanges of depreciable tangible personal property to determine
what properties are of a like class for purposes of § 1031.
0 The regulations are effective to
transfers of property made on or after 8/12/04, but may be elected for property
transfers made on or after 1/1/97 (open years only). Additionally, taxpayers may
use the old SIC rules for property transfers made on or before 5/19/05.
C. Section 1033
1. Payments made by a state agency to reimburse
losses that a "qualifying business" incurred for damage or destruction of
real and personal property on account of a disaster. Rev. Rul. 2005-46,
2005-30 I.R.B. 120 (7/8/05). Disaster relief grants under a state
reimbursement program are not excludible from gross income under the
general welfare exclusion, nor as a gift, nor as a qualified disaster relief
payment under § 139, nor as a contribution to the capital of a corporation
under § 118; instead, they may be deferred under § 1033. The payments are
included in amount realized on the involuntary conversion of the property
destroyed and any gain is thus eligible for § 1033 treatment provided that
qualified replacement property is acquired.
a. Amounts received from employer may be
excluded as § 139 qualified disaster relief; amounts received from a state
agency are excluded as gifts. Rev. Rul. 2003-12, 2003-3 I.R.B. 283
(12/19/02). Amounts received by an individual from an employer to
reimburse the individual for necessary medical, temporary housing, or
transportation expenses incurred as a result of a flood are not excludable as a
gift under § 102, but are excluded from gross income as qualified disaster
relief under § 139 if the flood was a Presidentially declared disaster. Similar
amounts received from a state agency are excludable under the
administrative general welfare exclusion; and similar amounts received from
a charity are excluded under § 102.
IV. COMPENSATION ISSUES
A. Fringe Benefits
1. Guidance on Health Savings Accounts. Notice
2004-2, 2004-2 I.R.B. 269 (12/23/03). The IRS has issued guidance in Q&A
form on Health Savings Accounts under new § 223 (added by § 1201 of the
Medicare Prescription Drug Improvement, and Modernization Act of
2003). This guidance provides basic information about HSAs. This new
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provision offers health spending accounts without the "use it or lose it"
requirement of health FSAs.
a. Notice 2004-23, 2004-15 I.R.B. 725
(3/30/04). The notice provides a safe harbor for preventive care benefits
allowed to be provided by a high deductible health plan ("HDHP") without
satisfying the § 223(c)(2) minimum deductible. Preventive care under the
safe harbor includes "annual physicals" (including tests and diagnostic
procedures), routine prenatal and well-child care, child and adult
immunizations, tobacco cessation programs, obesity weight-loss programs
and a long list of "screening services" (for cancer, heart and vascular
diseases, infectious diseases, mental health conditions and substance abuse,
metabolic, nutritional and endocrine conditions, musculoskeletal disorders,
obstetric and gynecologic conditions, pediatric conditions, and vision and
hearing disorders); however, it does not generally include any service or
benefit intended to treat an existing illness, injury or condition.
0 This notice also provides that the
definition of "preventive care" is a question of federal tax law, and not a
question of state law. Therefore, a service required by state law to be provided
on a first-dollar basis is not necessarily a "preventive service," and a plan that
complies with state law may well be disqualified from being an HDHP.
b. Notice 2004-43, 2004-27 I.R.B. 10
(6/18/04). This notice provides transition relief for plans that include state-
mandated first-dollar coverage. These plans would not be disqualified for
that reason alone for months before 1/1/06, provided that the state law was in
effect on 1/1/04.
c. Transition relief for plans with
noncalendar year renewal dates. Notice 2005-83, 2005-49 I.R.B. 1075
(11/8/05). This notice permits the Notice 2004-43 period to extend beyond
12/31/05 until the plan's next renewal date (but not beyond 12/31/06)
because health plans may not reduce existing benefits before the plan's
renewal date.
d. Notice 2004-50, 2004-33 I.R.B. 196
(7/23/04). This notice provides that any treatment that is incidental or
ancillary to a preventive care service or screening described in Notice 2004-
23 also falls within the safe harbor for preventive care.
e. Notice 2004-25, 2004-15 I.R.B. 727
(3/30/04). This notice provides general transition relief for 2004 from the
rule that medical expenses may be paid or reimbursed by an HSA only if
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they were incurred after the HSA had been established for eligible
individuals who establish an HSA before 4/16/05.
f. The inability to get general prescription
drug coverage is the sticking point for many potential users of HSAs.
Rev. Rul. 2004-38, 2004-15 I.R.B. 717 (3/30/04). An individual who had
prescription drug coverage that was not subject to the annual deductible of
the HDHP is not eligible to make contributions to (or have his employer
make contributions to) an HSA.
g. Rev. Proc. 2004-22, 2004-15 I.R.B. 727
(3/30/04). This revenue procedure provides transition relief for the months
before 2006 for an individual who is covered by both an HDHP and a
separate plan or rider that provides drug benefits on a co-pay basis or in
some other manner before the minimum annual deductible of the HDHP is
met.
h. Rev. Rul. 2004-45, 2004-22 I.R.B. 971
(5/11/04). This ruling provides guidance on the interactions of the HSA rules
with the rules concerning health flexible spending arrangements ("health
FSA") (under Prop. Reg. § 1.125-1, Q&A 7) and health reimbursement
arrangements ("HRA") (under Notice 2002-45, 2002-2 C.B. 93). An
individual can be eligible for making HSA contributions while being covered
by a limited-purpose health FSA or HRA, a suspended HRA, a post-
deductible health FSA or HRA, or a retirement HRA.
2. Notice 2005-8, 2005-4 I.R.B. 368 (1/24/05). This
notice provides guidance regarding a partnership's contributions to a
partner's HSA and an S corporation's contributions to a 2-percent
shareholder-employee's HSA. Generally, the contributions are included in
the income of the partner or shareholder-employee and are deductible by him
or her as HSA contributions.
a. Rev. Rul 2005-25, 2005-18 I.R.B. 971
(4/13/05). A married individual who otherwise qualified as an eligible
individual under § 223(c)(1)(A) can contribute to an HSA even if his spouse
has nonqualifying family coverage provided that he is not covered under the
spouse's plan.
3. REG-138647-04, Employer Comparable
Contributions to Health Savings Accounts Under Section 4980G, 70 F.R.
50233 (8/26/05). These proposed regulations provide guidance for employer
comparable contribution to HSAs under § 4980G, which provides an excise
tax on the failure of an employer to make "comparable contributions" to the
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HSAs of all comparable participating employees [employees in the same
category of "self-only" or "family"] when it makes a contribution to any
employee's HSA.
4. If the only thing the employee or his family could
receive are medical expense reimbursements, then reimbursements
under the plan qualify for the § 105(b) exclusion. Rev. Rul. 2005-24,
2005-16 I.R.B. 892 (4/5/05). Reimbursements under an employer-sponsored
§ 125 salary-reduction medical reimbursement arrangement are not
excludable from the employee's gross income under § 105(b) where unused
benefits could be paid to the employee in cash or other benefits. However,
reimbursements do qualify for the § 105(b) exclusion where they are made
under a plan where unused benefits are made available for future medical
care expenses of the employee [both before and after retirement] as well as
those of the employee's spouse and dependents.
5. In the future, employees may be able to avoid the
late December rush at the optometrist's office and have until March
15th to buy eyeglasses. Notice 2005-42, 2005-23 I.R.B. 1204 (5/18/05).
This notice extends the "use it or lose it" rules for flexible spending
arrangements by allowing employers to extend the deadline for
reimbursement of health and dependent care expenses up to two and one half
months after the end of a cafeteria plan year.
6. Rev. Rul. 2005-60, 2005-37 I.R.B. 502 (8/25/05).
The employer subsidy for maintaining prescription drug coverage is not
considered in computing the applicable employer cost when determining
whether the minimum cost requirement of § 420(c)(3) is met with respect to
transfer of the excess pension assets of a defined benefit plan to a health
benefits account which is part of the plan.
B. Qualified Deferred Compensation Plans
1. "Mr. Gotbucks, meet Senator Roth." REG-
152354-04, Designated Roth Contributions to Cash or Deferred
Arrangements Under Section 401(k), 70 F.R. 10062 (3/2/05). The IRS has
published proposed regulations relating to an election under § 402A that will
be available beginning in 2006 for employees to designate contributions to a
401(k) plan made under a qualified cash-or-deferred arrangement as Roth
contributions. These contributions will be currently includible in gross
income, but qualified distributions will be excludable from gross income.
a. Final regulations on Roth contributions
under qualified cash or deferred arrangements under § 401(k). T.D.
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9237, Designated Roth Contributions to Cash or Deferred Arrangements
under Section 401(k), 71 F.R. 6 (1/3/06). These final regulations require a
pre-tax alternative elective contribution to the Roth contribution. They also
require an irrevocable designation to be made by the employee at the time of
the cash or deferred election, and they require that Roth contributions be
maintained by the plan in a separate designated Roth account for the
employee. A matching contribution will not be permitted to be allocated to a
designated Roth account. The regulations are effective for taxable years
beginning after 12/31/05, but under current law the Roth 401(k) provisions
do not apply to years beginning after 12/31/10.
2. REG-146459-05, Designated Roth Accounts Under
Section 402A, 71 F.R. 4320 (1/26/06). These proposed regulations provide
comprehensive guidance on the taxation of distributions from designated
Roth accounts. There is no inclusion in income if the distribution is a
qualified distribution, which is a distribution that is made after a 5-taxable-
year period of participation and that is either made after the employee attains
59-1/2, made after the employee's death, or is attributable to the employee's
being disabled.
3. "Hercules! Hercules! Hercules!"' Stepnowski v.
Commissioner, 124 T.C. 198 (4/26/05). In this declaratory judgment case,
Judge Cohen held that an amendment made by petitioner's employer,
Hercules Incorporated, to its pension plan's lump-sum option did not violate
the anti-cutback rule of § 411 (d)(6). The amendment was made in 2001
during the GUST amendment period and permitted the plan sponsor to use
the higher 30-year Treasury bond discount rate permitted under
§ 417(e)(3)(A) in computing the lump sum, as opposed to the lower PBGC
rate that was required by that Code provision prior to its amendment by the
Uruguay Round Agreements Act of 1994, Pub. L. 103-465.
4. More work for benefits lawyers - this time under
§ 415. REG-130241-04, Limitations on Benefits and Contributions Under
Qualified Plans, 70 F.R. 31214 (5/31/05). These proposed regulations
provide comprehensive guidance on § 415 limitations on benefits and
contributions under qualified plans that are effective for plan years beginning
in 2007. They are long.
5. Final regulations crack down on abusive § 412(i)
plans that understate the value of life insurance contracts distributed
from a qualified retirement plan to employees, and require that they be
taxed at their full fair market value. T.D. 9223, Value of Life Insurance
1. "Show me muscle again, oh, Hercules! Hercules! Hercules!" Mama
Klump in "The Nutty Professor" (1996).
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Contracts When Distributed From a Qualified Retirement Plan, 70 F.R.
50967 (8/29/05), making final proposed regulations published at 69 F.R.
7384 (February 2004). A tax-qualified retirement plan funded entirely by a
life insurance contract of an annuity is a "section 412(i) plan." Such plans
permit employer contributions to the plan to be deducted, with the
contributions used to purchase a specially designed life insurance contract,
with the cash surrender value temporarily depressed well below the
premiums paid at the time the policy is distributed or sold to the employee
for the amount of the temporarily depressed cash surrender value. After the
transfer, the cash surrender value then increases significantly.
6. Under the Katrina Tax Act, withdrawals of up to
$100,000 from retirement plans made between 8/29/05 and 12/31/06 for
relief relating to Hurricane Katrina would not be subject to the 10 percent
premature withdrawal tax under § 72(t). This exception applies to
withdrawals from IRAs as well.
7. Under the Katrina Tax Act, recontributions of
withdrawals for home purchases cancelled due to Hurricane Katrina would
be treated as rollovers if made before 3/1/06.
8. Under the Katrina Tax Act, loans of up to
$100,000 from qualified plans made between 9/24/05 and 12/31/06 for relief
relating to Hurricane Katrina will receive favorable treatment.
9. The principle of Poe v. Seaborn applies whenever
under state community property law a nonemployee spouse has
ownership rights in the employee spouse's salary or benefits. Dunkin v.
Commissioner, 124 T.C. 180 (4/22/05, as amended, 5/31/05). The taxpayer
reached eligibility for retirement and had he retired his former spouse would
have been entitled to receive one-half of his pension. Because he continued
working and delayed receipt of his pension benefits, under community
property law he was required to pay his former wife an amount equal to one-
half of the pension benefits that he had earned during the marriage. The court
held that Poe v. Seaborn rather than Lucas v. Earl controlled, and thus he
was entitled to exclude from gross income the amounts paid to his former
wife.
C. Nonqualified Deferred Compensation, Section 83, and
Stock Options
1. Section 409A adds a new layer of rules for
nonqualified deferred compensation. Section 885 of the Jobs Act of 2004
adds new § 409A which modifies the taxation of nonqualified deferred
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compensation plans for amounts deferred after 2004. Section 409A has
changed the tax law governing nonqualified deferred compensation by
making it more difficult to successfully avoid current inclusion in gross
income of unfunded deferred compensation. Nevertheless, § 409A has not
completely supplanted prior law. The fundamental principles of prior law
continue in force but have been modified in certain respects. This was later
reiterated in Notice 2005-1, 2005-2 I.R.B. 274, which reminded taxpayers
that
although the statute makes a number of fundamental
changes, § 409A does not alter or affect the application of
any other provision of the Code or common law tax doctrine.
Accordingly, deferred compensation not required to be
included in income under § 409A may nevertheless be
required to be included in income under § 451, the
constructive receipt doctrine, the cash equivalency doctrine,
§ 83, the economic benefit doctrine, the assignment of
income doctrine or any other applicable provision of the
Code or common law tax doctrine.
0 In order to qualify under § 409A, a
plan must require that distributions may be allowed only upon separation from
service, disability, death, a specified time (or pursuant to a fixed schedule),
change of control in a corporation (to be defined in regulations), occurrence of
an unforeseeable emergency, or if the participant becomes disabled;
distributions may not be allowed other than upon the permissible distribution
events and the plan may not permit acceleration of a distribution except as
provided in regulations. In the case of officers, directors and ten percent
shareholders of publicly-held corporations and to persons holding the same
positions in non-publicly held corporations, distributions upon separation from
service may not be made earlier than six months after the date of separation
from service.
* The plan must provide that
compensation for services performed during a taxable year may be deferred
only if the election is made before the beginning of the year in which the
services are performed (or, if contingent compensation, at least six months
before the end of the year in which the services are performed).
* A plan may permit changes in the
time and form of distribution, so-called "second [deferral] elections" will have
to be made at least twelve months before the payment was to have been made,
and must postpone the payment for at least five years from the date it otherwise
would have been made. Additionally, offshore rabbi trusts are not permitted.
Generally, any such subsequent election to extend the deferral must extend the
first payment date by at least five years and cannot be made or take effect within
twelve months of the due date of the first payment.
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* Violations of these rules would make
immediately taxable all amounts not subject to a substantial risk of forfeiture,
plus interest at one percentage point above the underpayment rate plus
additional tax of 20 percent of the amount improperly deferred.
* These new rules do not apply to
nonqualified stock options, incentive stock options and employee stock
purchase plans, but apparently do apply to stock appreciation rights.
* Benefits earned through the end of
2004 are grandfathered if the plan complied with prior law and it was not
materially modified after 10/3/04.
a. Section 409A guidance provides
transition rules and excludes stock appreciation rights from the purview
of that section. Notice 2005-1, 2005-2 I.R.B. 274 (12/20/04). This notice
provides in Q&A form guidance with respect to the application of § 409A. It
answers a variety of interpretive questions regarding the application of
§ 409A by providing various definitions, including a definition of substantial
risk of forfeiture, and guidance on the application of § 409A to various kinds
of plans as well as to stock appreciation rights and arrangements between
partners and partnerships. The notice provides that § 409A applies whenever
a service provider is (a) an individual, (b) a personal service corporation (as
defined in § 269A(b)(1)), or a noncorporate entity that would be a personal
service corporation if it were a corporation, or (c) a qualified personal service
corporation (as defined in § 448(d)(2)), or a noncorporate entity that would
be a qualified personal service corporation if it were a corporation. (Q&A-8).
However, § 409A does not apply if both (a) the service provider is actively
engaged in the trade or business of providing substantial services, other than
as an employee or as a director of a corporation, and (b) the service provider
provides such services to two or more service recipients to which the service
provider is not related and that are not related to one another. (Q&A-8).
* A plan provides for deferral of
compensation only if, "under the terms of the plan and the relevant facts and
circumstances, the service provider has a legally binding right during a taxable
year to compensation that has not been actually or constructively received and
included in gross income, and that, pursuant to the terms of the plan, is payable
to (or on behalf of) the service provider in a later year." (Q&A-4) Compensation
is not treated as deferred compensation, however, if it is received after the last
day of the service provider's taxable year pursuant to the service recipient's
normal payroll period. (Q&A-4). Furthermore, compensation is not treated as
deferred if it is required to be paid and is actually or constructively received by
the service provider by the later of: (i) the date two and one half months after
the end of the service provider's first taxable year in which the amount is no
longer subject to a substantial risk of forfeiture or (ii) the date two and one-half
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months after the end of the service recipient's first taxable year in which the
amount is no longer subject to a substantial risk of forfeiture.
* Stock options, stock appreciation
rights, and other equity-based compensation generally are considered to be
deferred compensation subject to § 409A, unless certain specified conditions
have been meet. (Q&A-4(d)) A nonstatutory stock option is not considered to
be deferred compensation for purposes of § 409A if the folowng ,vmd itons
have been met: (1) the exercise price may never be less than the fair market
value of the underlying stock on the date the option is granted, (2) the option is
subject to taxation under § 83, and (3) the option does not include any deferred
compensation feature other than deferred income recognition until the later of
the exercise or disposition of the option. A stock appreciation right is not
deferred compensation if the following conditions are met: (1) the value of the
stock the excess over which the right provides for payment upon exercise may
never be less than the fair market value of the underlying stock on the date the
right is granted, (2) the stock is traded on an established securities market,
(3) only such stock may be delivered in settlement of the right, and (4) the right
does not include any deferred compensation feature other than the deferral of
recognition of income until the exercise of the right. (Q&A-4(d)).
0 The notice provides the following
standards regarding the existence of a substantial risk of forfeiture:
Compensation is subject to a substantial risk of forfeiture if
entitlement to the amount is conditioned on the performance
of substantial future services by any person or the
occurrence of a condition related to a purpose of the
compensation, and the possibility of forfeiture is substantial.
[A] condition related to a purpose of the compensation
must relate to the service provider's performance for the
service recipient or the service recipient's business activities
or organizational goals (for example, the attainment of a
prescribed level of earnings, equity value or a liquidity
event). Any addition of a substantial risk of forfeiture after
the beginning of the service period to which the
compensation relates, or any extension of a period during
which compensation is subject to a substantial risk of
forfeiture, in either case whether elected by the service
provider, service recipient or other person (or by agreement
of two or more of such persons), is disregarded for purposes
of determining whether such compensation is subject to a
substantial risk of forfeiture. An amount is not subject to a
substantial risk of forfeiture merely because the right to the
amount is conditioned, directly or indirectly, upon the
refraining from performance of services. For purposes of §
409A, an amount will not be considered subject to a
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substantial risk of forfeiture beyond the date or time at
which the recipient otherwise could have elected to receive
the amount of compensation, unless the amount subject to a
substantial risk of forfeiture (ignoring earnings) is materially
greater than the amount the recipient otherwise could have
elected to receive. For example, a salary deferral generally
may not be made subject to a substantial risk of forfeiture.
However, where an election is granted to receive a
materially greater bonus amount in a future year rather than
a materially lesser bonus amount in an earlier year, the
materially greater bonus may be made subject to a
substantial risk of forfeiture.
b. Proposed regulations incorporate much
of the guidance in Notice 2005-1. REG-158080-04, Application of Section
409A to Nonqualified Deferred Compensation Plans, 70 F.R. 57930
(10/4/05). These proposed regulations incorporate much of the guidance
provided in Notice 2005-1, as well as "substantial additional guidance."
They identify the plans and arrangements covered by § 409A and describe
the requirements for deferral elections and the permissible timing for
deferred compensation payments. They also extend the deadline for
"documentary compliance" to 12/31/06, but 1/1/05 remains as the effective
date for statutory compliance (although there are transition rules applicable
for 2005). Prop. Reg. §§ 1.409A-1 (definitions and covered arrangements);
1.409A-2 (deferral elections); 1.409A-3 (permissible payments); 1.409A-6
(statutory effective dates). (Prop. Reg. § 1.409A-3(g)(3) defining
unforeseeable emergency as: (1) a severe financial hardship resulting from an
illness or accident of the service provider or the service provider's spouse or
dependent (as defined in § 152(a)); (2) loss of property due to casualty
(including the need to rebuild a home following damage to a home not
otherwise covered by insurance, for example, not as a result of a natural
disaster), or other similar extraordinary and unforeseeable circumstances
arising as a result of uncontrollable events; (3) medical expenses; and (4)
funeral expenses of a spouse or a dependent); Prop. Reg. § 1.409A-1(i)
(generally, a qualifying accelerated payment either (1) must be due on an
objectively determinable date or according to an objectively determinable
fixed schedule at the time the event occurs, or (2) must be within an
objectively determinable calendar year following the year in which the event
occurs; payment may be upon the earliest or latest of more than one qualified
event). Prop. Reg. § 1.409A-3(h) (permitting acceleration in the event of a
conflict of interest, to satisfy a qualified domestic relations order (QDRO)),
described in 36.09[5], main volume, pursuant to § 414(p)(1)(B), as a de
minimis cash-out, or to pay FICA taxes. The proposed regulations are
proposed to be effective as of January 1, 2007.
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c. IRS gives employers a pass on reporting
and wage withholding requirements for 2005. Notice 2005-94, 2005-52
I.R.B. 1208 (12/8/05). The Notice suspends employers' and payers'
reporting and wage withholding requirements for calendar year 2005 with
respect to deferrals of compensation within the meaning of § 409A, but
FICA must be properly paid under § 3121(v)(2). It does not affect a service
provider's filing requirements, individual income tax liability and interest on
underpayments of tax but the IRS will not assert late-payment, failure to pay
estimated taxes or accuracy-related penalties against the service provider if
he reports and pays any taxes due with in accordance with future published
guidance.
2. Rev. Rul. 2005-39, 2005-27 I.R.B. 1 (6/16/05).
Unvested shares of restricted stock for which an election under § 83(b) has
been made are treated as outstanding stock for purposes of the change of
control provisions of § 280G, the golden parachute provisions.
3. Rev. Rul. 2005-48, 2005-32 I.R.B. 259 (8/2/05). If
an employee exercises a nonstatutory stock option more than six months
after grant, but it is subject to restrictions on his ability to sell the stock so
obtained under rule lOb-5 under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and
during a contractual "lock-up period," then upon exercise of the option he is
required under § 83 to include in his compensation income an amount
determined without regard to the share-transfer restrictions imposed because
these are "lapse restrictions" that are ignored under § 83(a) in valuing the
shares.
4. Merlo v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2005-178
(7/20/05). If an employee exercises a stock option outside the period covered
by § 16 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 but is subject to restrictions
on his ability to sell the stock obtained through exercise of the option by
contractual provisions imposed by the employer, the stock is not subject to a
substantial risk of forfeiture, because full enjoyment of the shares is not
conditioned on any obligation to provide future services.
D. Individual Retirement Accounts
1. The Supreme Court holds that IRAs are exempt
from the bankruptcy estate. Rousey v. Jacoway, 544 U.S. 320 (4/4/05).
Inasmuch as rights to the funds in an IRA are on account of the holder's age
and an IRA is similar to any other retirement plans, the assets in the plan are
exempt from the holder's Chapter 7 bankruptcy estate. Justice Thomas held
that the § 72(t) tax penalty of 10 percent on amounts withdrawn before age
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59-1/2 makes the IRA one in which the right to receive payments effectively
limits their right to payment of the IRA balance until that age is reached.
0 The amounts in the Rouseys' IRA in
this case were rolled over from a qualified plan, but the Court's decision was not
based on that factor.
a. Bankruptcy Act changes on protection of
IRAs. Section 224 of the Bankruptcy Act of 2005, 11 U.S.C. § 522, protects
from creditors (1) assets in qualified plans, (2) assets in IRAs that were rolled
over from qualified plans, and (3) other assets in IRAs of not more than $1
million (indexed).
2. What a way to mess up! Coppola v. Beeson (In re:
Joseph C. Copola), 419 F.3d 323 (5th Cir. 7/25/05). In a per curiam
opinion, the court held that a faculty member's pledging of his § 403(b)
retirement account as security for alimony payments to his ex-wife totaling
$220,000 caused that amount to be deemed distributed and no longer entitled
to the exemption from bankruptcy under Texas law.
3. Rev. Proc. 2006-13, 2006-3 I.R.B. 315 (12/29/05).
This Revenue Procedure provides safe harbors for determining the fair
market value of an annuity contract in the conversion of a traditional IRA to
a Roth IRA.
4. Thomas v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2005-258
(11/1/05). IRA distributions before age 59-1/2 to a taxpayer whose disability
required scaling back from full-time to part-time work did not qualify for an
exception to the § 72(t) penalty under § 72(t)(2)(A)(iii) because the taxpayer
was not disabled as defined in § 72(m)(7), which requires that a taxpayer be
"unable to engage in any substantial gainful activity."
V. PERSONAL INCOME AND DEDUCTIONS
A. Rates
There were no significant developments regarding this topic
during 2005.
B. Miscellaneous Income
1. Prejudgment interest in a personal injury lawsuit
is not excluded from income. Chamberlain v. United States, 401 F.3d 335
(5th Cir. 2/18/05). Prejudgment interest recovered in a personal injury
lawsuit is not excluded from income under § 104(a)(2) because it was
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compensation for the lost time value of money and is not received "on
account of' the personal injury.
May prejudgment interest be
excluded if there is a settlement? More specifically, post-judgment interest
exclusion is permitted by the exclusion of the entire amount of any future
payment received pursuant to a structured settlement. Does this create a
difference between a recovery by way of settlement and a recovery by way of
judgment?
2. Lindsey v. Commissioner, 422 F.3d 684 (8th Cir.
9/2/05). Although the taxpayer's physician testified that the taxpayer
"suffered from hypertension and stress-related symptoms, including periodic
impotency, insomnia, fatigue, occasional indigestion, and urinary
incontinence" as a result of the emotional distress inflicted by the defendant,
the settlement agreement identified the taxpayer's claims as tort claims for
damage to his emotions, reputation and character. Physical symptoms that
are merely manifestations of the underlying emotional distress for which
damages are received do not result in the damages being treated as received
on account of personal injury if there is no "direct causal link between any
physical sickness suffered by [the taxpayer] and [any] damages paid out to
him."
3. Rivera v. Baker West, Inc., 430 F.3d 1253 (9th Cir.
6/17/05). No portion of settlement of claim for unlawful workplace
discrimination and unlawful termination was compensation for physical
personal injuries where settlement agreement was silent regarding the nature
of the injuries addressed, and the only evidence of the payor's intent
regarding the claims settled was a statement that the defendant would pay
taxpayer a sum of money "less all lawfully required withholdings." The
inference was that the defendant considered that some or all of the payment
represented back pay.
4. Annuity death benefits are IRD. Rev. Rul. 2005-
30, 2005-20 I.R.B. 1015 (4/28/05). If the owner-annuitant of a deferred
annuity contract dies before the annuity starting date, any amounts received
by a beneficiary in excess of the owner-annuitant's investment in the contract
are includible in gross income as income in respect of a decedent under
§ 691. These amounts are also subject to the rules of § 72 if the beneficiary
receives an annuity rather that a lump-sum.
C. Profit-Seeking Individual Deductions
1. The alternative minimum tax ("AMT") trap for
attorneys' fees on large recoveries will continue to be an issue despite
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legislation and a Supreme Court decision. The Supreme Court decides
the AMT trap issue in favor of the government, following the majority of
courts that have faced this issue. Commissioner v. Banks, 543 U.S. 426
(1/24/05) (eight to zero). Justice Kennedy's unanimous opinion held that a
contingent fee agreement should be viewed as an anticipatory assignment of
income to the attorney by the client. He relied on the assignment of income
doctrine cases, e.g., Lucas v. Earl, 281 U.S. 111 (1930) and Helvering v.
Horst, 311 U.S. 112 (1940), and found this doctrine to be relevant in arm's
length transactions as well as family transactions, stating: "We hold that as a
general rule, when a litigant's recovery constitutes income, the litigant's
income includes the portion of the recovery paid to the attorney as a
contingent fee." The Court ruled that the attorney-client relationship was
governed by agency law and not by partnership law (although, later in the
opinion, it refused to rule on the partnership argument because it was raised
too late).
* The Court did not rule on whether
attorneys' fees awarded pursuant to claims brought under federal statutes that
authorize fee awards to prevailing plaintiffs, noting that Banks settled his
discrimination case and the fee paid to his attorney was based upon the
contingent fee agreement, and was not awarded by a court.
a. Congress grants relief for civil rights
plaintiffs, but not for all clients of plaintiffs' lawyers. AMT trap to be
closed, but only prospectively and not with respect to taxable recoveries
not listed in new § 62(e). Section 703 of the Jobs Act of 2004 added new
paragraph (19) to § 62(a) which would permit above-the-line deductibility of
contingent attorneys' fees in lawsuits for unlawful discrimination (which is
defined in § 62(e) to include 18 separate categories of civil rights-type
lawsuits, but not simple defamation, consumer fraud and punitive damages).
The provision applies to judgments and settlements occurring after the date
of enactment.
• Congress did not address attorney's
fees relating to recoveries for consumer fraud, defamation and possibly
employment contract disputes, as well as punitive damages and taxable interest
in personal injury cases.
b. Banks followed for a contingent
attorney's fee. Allum v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2005-177 (7/20/05).
No part of a $500,000 payment received in 1999 for a civil rights claim may
be excluded from gross income because it was not for a personal physical
injury or physical sickness. The Tax Court (Judge Marvel) further held that
the contingent fee the taxpayer paid to his attorney from the settlement
proceeds is also included in gross income, based upon the Banks case,
because general references in a complaint to unspecified physical injuries in
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a suit for wrongful discharge of employment do not support exclusion of any
portion of the settlement under § 104(a)(2).
2. Fees paid for MBA were deductible because the
degree did not qualify the taxpayer for a new trade or business.
Allemeier v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2005-207 (8/31/05), motion for fees
denied, T.C. Memo 2006-28 (2/16/06). Orthodontic appliance salesman who
was promoted to a management position after starting MBA could deduct
cost of MBA; education was not a "minimum requirement" because
promotion was not contingent on beginning or completing MBA program,
and it did not qualify taxpayer for a new trade or business because the basic
nature of taxpayer's work activities did not change as a result of additional
education, even though taxpayer was awarded new titles and positions and
advanced more rapidly; the MBA merely improved pre-existing skills.
May an employer avoid both the
§ 127 dollar limit on reimbursement of the costs of an employee's MBA
program and the § 127 nondiscrimination requirement by treating payment of
such costs as § 132(a)(3) working condition fringe benefit?
D. Hobby Losses and § 280A Home Office and Vacation
Homes
There were no significant developments regarding this
topic during 2005.
E. Deductions and Credits for Personal Expenses
1. When will trust investment advisory fees get up
off the § 67 floor? Rudkin Testamentary Trust v. Commissioner, 124 T.C.
304 (6/27/05) (reviewed, 18-0). The Tax Court (Judge Wherry), in a case
appealable to the Second Circuit, found that amounts paid for investment
management advice by trusts set up by a family involved in the founding of
the Pepperidge Farm food products company (which was sold to Campbell
Soup Company in the 1960s) are not subject to the § 67(e) exception to the
§ 67(a) floor of 2 percent of AGI (which limits the deductibility of employee
business expenses and miscellaneous itemized deductions to amounts
exceeding that floor). The court follows the Fourth and Federal Circuits, and
adheres to its earlier opinion in the O'Neill v. Commissioner, 98 T.C. 227
(1992), which was reversed by the Sixth Circuit, 994 F.2d 302 (1993).
. The Sixth Circuit's rationale was stated as
follows:
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The Tax Court reasoned that "individual investors routinely
incur costs for investment advice as an integral part of their
investment activities." Nevertheless, they are not required to
consult advisors and suffer no penalties or potential liability
if they act negligently for themselves. Therefore, fiduciaries
uniquely occupy a position of trust for others and have an
obligation to the beneficiaries to exercise proper skill and
care with the assets of the trust. (994 F.2d at 304)
2. No 10-percent-of-AGI floor for the deduction of
Katrina losses. Under the Katrina and GO Zone Acts, new § 1400S(b) is
added, under which individual taxpayers would be permitted to claim
casualty or theft losses attributable to Hurricanes Katrina, Rita and Wilma
regardless of whether the loss exceeds $100, and in addition, these personal
casualty or theft losses would be deductible without regard to whether the
loss exceeds 10 percent of a taxpayer's adjusted gross income.
3. Lofstrom v. Commissioner, 125 T.C. 271
(11/22/05). A third-party debt instrument transferred in satisfaction of a state
court ordered alimony payment is not "cash" and thus is not alimony for
purposes of § 71. (Applying Reg. § 1.71-IT(b), Q&A-5 requiring payment
solely by cash, check or money order; denying § 215 deduction to
transferor).
4. We now have a uniform definition of "child" but
it is not very user-friendly. Sections 201-208 of the Working Families Tax
Relief Act of 2004 provide a uniform definition of "child" for head of household,
dependent care credit, child tax credit, earned income tax credit, and dependent
exemption purposes. This changes prior law by making irrelevant the fact that
Forms 8332 were signed by the custodial parent. Instead, what would be
required to shift the dependency deduction to the non-custodial parent is a
provision in the divorce decree or separation agreement.
0 Under the pre-2004 version of
§ 152(e)(2), the noncustodial parent was treated as having provided over half of
the child's support for the year if the custodial parent signed a written
declaration that he would not claim the child as a dependent for any tax year
beginning within that calendar year, and the noncustodial parent attached the
declaration to his return for the taxable year in which he claimed the
dependency exclusion. The declaration by the custodial parent could pertain to
only one year, or could specify that it applied to two or more years, and a
permanent declaration might be made at the time of the divorce. Temp. Reg. §
1.152-4T(a) Q & A 4. The actual signature of the custodial spouse on the
declaration was crucial to shifting the exemption to the noncustodial parent. The
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pre-2004 version of § 152(e)(2) also applied to determine which of the
never-married and non-cohabiting parents of a minor child was entitled to the
dependency exemption.
As amended by the Working
Families Tax Relief Act of 2004, § 152(e)(2) now provides that the
noncustodial spouse will be entitled to the dependency exemption for the
couple's minor child if a decree of divorce or separate maintenance or written
separation agreement between the parents provides either (1) that the
noncustodial parent is entitled to the dependency exemption for the child, or
(2) that the custodial parent will sign a written declaration that she will not claim
the child as a dependent for a particular taxable year. The 2004 amendments
change the rules in a number of respects. First, amended § 152(e)(2), rather than
deeming the noncustodial parent to have provided over one-half of the child's
support, now treats the child as a "qualifying child" under § 151 with respect to
the noncustodial parent. This has the effect of assuring (consistently with prior
law) that if the right to the exemption is awarded to the noncustodial spouse,
that spouse also obtains the right to claim the § 24 child credit. Second, under
the amended version of § 152(e)(2), unlike under the pre-2004 version, a
provision in a divorce instrument awarding the exemption to the noncustodial
spouse is effective without any action on the part of the custodial spouse to sign
a waiver. Furthermore, under the strict wording of the statute, if the divorce
instrument does not specifically award the dependency exemption to the
noncustodial spouse but directs the custodial spouse to sign the waiver, it
appears that the right to claim the exemption is effectively transferred to the
noncustodial spouse even if the custodial spouse subsequently refuses or
otherwise fails to sign the waiver. Thus, the divorce instrument is now the key
document, whereas under prior law the written waiver by the custodial spouse
was the key document. Finally, unlike the pre-2004 version of § 154(e), which
permitted parents who were never married to agree that the noncustodial spouse
would be entitled to the dependency exemption through a waiver by the
custodial parent, the current version of § 152(e)(2) requires a provision in a
divorce or written separation agreement. Unless the courts interpret the term
"written separation agreement" to encompass agreements between parents who
were never married, the noncustodial parent of a child whose parents never
married will not be able to obtain the dependency exemption with respect to the
child. In such a case, § 152(e)(1)(A)(iii) always awards the exemption to the
custodial parent.
a. But the definition was completely
changed in Technical Corrections under the GO Zone Act of 2005. The
Gulf Opportunity Zone Act of 2005 contains technical corrections to
previously enacted legislation including the Working Families Tax Relief
Act of 2004 and The American Jobs Creation Act of 2004. The custodial
parent is defined by the GO Zone Act as the parent having custody of the
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child for the greater portion of the calendar year. The Working Families Tax
Relief Act of 2004 had changed the wording of § 152(e) to say that the
custodial parent was "the parent with whom a child shared the same principal
place of abode for the greater portion of the calendar year." This meant that
beginning in 2005, the parent with whom the child lived for the greater
portion of the year was the custodial parent (and therefore "in charge" of the
personal exemption for that child) even though the other parent had been
granted legal custody of the child by the courts. Now, the technical
correction made by the GO Zone Act of 2005 changes the language to say
that the custodial parent "means the parent having custody for the greater
portion of the year." This is identical to the definition of the "custodial
parent" prior to the amendment of § 152(e) by the Working Families Tax
Relief Act of 2004. Therefore, the GO Zone Act of 2005 has changed the
definition of the custodial parent back to the old definition effective as of
January 1, 2005. The effect of this change is that (as for 2004 and previous
years) a parent is the custodial parent if the judge grants the parent legal
custody of the child for the greater portion of the year. However, if the
parents have joint legal custody, then (as under the law before its amendment
by the Working Families Tax Relief Act of 2004) the parent with whom the
child spends the greater portion of the year will be the custodial parent.
5. Rev. Rul. 2005-11, 2005-14 I.R.B. 816 (3/17/05).
Interest paid on a home mortgage that has been refinanced is deductible as
qualified housing interest for AMT purposes if the interest on the mortgage
that was refinanced was qualified housing interest, but only to the extent that
the amount of the mortgage indebtedness was not increased.
F. Education
1. Education expenses for the current year only.
Lodder-Beckert v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2005-162 (7/5/05). Amounts
withdrawn from an IRA in 2001 to pay off credit card debt deriving from the
payment of tuition in previous years was subject to the 10 percent additional
tax of § 72(t)(1). Taxpayer incurred the credit card debt in 1999 and 2000 to
pay education expenses because her former employer, the State of Ohio, was
in the process of significantly increasing the amount in her retirement
account, which was rolled over into the IRA in 2001. The Tax Court (Judge
Laro) held that the exception from penalty tax in § 72(t)(2)(E) applies only to
withdrawals used to pay education expenses for the current taxable year.
2006]
Florida Tax Review
VI. CORPORATIONS
A. Entity and Formation
1. Section 836(a) of the Jobs Act of 2004 adds new
§ 362(e) to provide limitation on the importation, or transfer in § 351
transactions, of built-in losses to corporations. The aggregate basis of the
property so received will be limited to its fair market value immediately after
the transaction. This rule is applied on a transferor-by-transferor basis.
0 Section 362(e)(2) prevents taxpayers
from transmuting a single economic loss into two (or more) tax losses by taking
advantage of the dual application of the substituted basis rules in § 358 for stock
received in a § 351 transaction and in § 362 for assets transferred to a
corporation in a § 351 transaction. If the aggregate basis of the property
transferred to a corporation in a § 351 transaction exceeds the aggregate fair
market value, the aggregate basis of the property must be reduced to its fair
market value. Thus, for example, if A transfers Blackacre, with a basis of
$1,000 and a fair market value of $600 to newly formed X Corporation in
exchange for all of the X Corporation stock, X Corporation's $1,000 basis in
Blackacre, determined under § 362(a), will be reduced to $600 under §
362(e)(2).
* Geriatrics should consider making
an alternative election. A and X Corporation may jointly elect to reduce A's
basis in the X Corporation stock, which is otherwise an exchanged basis of
$1,000 pursuant to § 358, to its fair market value [presumably $600], with the
transferee, X Corporation, taking a normal transferred basis under § 362(a)
[$1,000].
* The operation of § 362(e)(2) is more
complex where multiple assets are involved. When a transferor also transfers
some appreciated property to the corporation, § 362(e)(2) does not necessarily
result in the basis of every item of loss property being reduced to its fair market
value. Section 362(e)(2)(A) requires that the aggregate basis of the transferred
property be reduced by the excess of the aggregate basis over the aggregate fair
market value, and § 362(e)(2)(B) requires that the aggregate basis reduction be
allocated among the transferred properties in proportion to the built-in losses in
the properties before taking into account § 362(e)(2). Assume, for example, that
B transferred three properties to newly formed Y Corporation in exchange for
all of the stock: a copyright, fair market value $4,500, basis $3,000; land, fair
market value $7,000, basis $9,000; and a machine, fair market value $4,000,
basis $5,000. The aggregate fair market value of the three properties is $15,500
and their aggregate basis is $17,000, thus requiring a basis reduction of $1,500
($17,000 - $15,500) with respect to the land and the machine, the two properties
with a basis that exceeds fair market value. The land has a built-in loss of
$2,000 and the machine has a built-in loss of $1,000. The $1,500 basis
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reduction is allocated 2/3 to the land ($2000 / ($2,000 + $1,000)), and 1/3 to the
machine ($1000 / ($2,000 + $1,000)). Thus the basis of the land is reduced by
$1,000 (2/3 x $1,500), from $9,000 to $8,000, leaving an unrealized loss of
$1,000 ($8,000 basis - $7,000 fair market value) inherent in the land and the
basis of the machine is reduced by $500 (1/3 x $1,500), from $5,000 to $4,500,
leaving an unrealized loss of $500 ($4,500 basis - $4,000 fair market value)
inherent in the land.
a. Notice 2005-70, 2005-41 I.R.B. 694.
(9/12/05). Interim guidance on making § 362(e)(2)(C) elections to reduce to
fair market value a transferor's basis in stock received in exchange for loss
property.
2. Net value requirement in § 351 transfers. See
VI.C., below. Proposed amendments to Reg. § 1.351-1 would add a
requirement that there be both (1) a contribution of net value and (2) a
receipt of net value as a prerequisite for § 351 to apply. Prop. Reg. § 1.351-
l(a)(1)(iii)(A) would provide that stock will not be treated as issued for
property if either (1) the fair market value of the transferred property does
not exceed the sum of the amount of liabilities of the transferor that are
assumed by the transferee in connection with the transfer and the amount of
any money and the fair market value of any other property (other than stock
permitted to be received under § 351(a) without the recognition of gain)
received by the transferor in connection with the transfer, or (2) the fair
market value of the assets of the transferee does not exceed the amount of its
liabilities immediately after the transfer. Prop. Reg. § 1.351-1(a)(2), Ex. 4,
illustrates the rule by concluding that a transfer of real property encumbered
by a nonrecourse mortgage in excess of the property's fair market value to a
wholly owned corporation, which remains solvent after the transaction, in
exchange for additional stock is not subject to § 351. Although the example
does not recharacterize the transaction, it presumably is a sale on which gain
must be recognized and which gives rise to a purchase price basis under
§ 1012 for the corporation. Loss recognition would be subject to possible
disallowance under § 267.
3. The member of a single-member LLC that
operated a nursing home is individually liable for the company's failure
to pay withholding and FICA taxes because he failed to check the box, so
the tax liability was that of a disregarded entity. In the process, the
"check-the-box" regulations were held valid. Littriello v. United States,
2005-1 U.S.T.C. 50,385 (W.D. Ky. 5/18/05). The court held that the
"check-the-box" regulations of Reg. 301.7701-1 through -3 were valid, and
found the sole member of a single-member LLC that did not elect to be
treated as a corporation liable for unpaid withholding and FICA taxes,
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because the LLC is considered a disregarded entity for federal tax purposes.
Judge Heyburn granted summary judgment and rejected Littriello's argument
that § 6672 was the government's sole recourse because the IRS imposed
liability upon him as the owner of a sole proprietorship.
a. United States 1, Professor Gregg Polsky
0. Same decision on motion for reconsideration, 96 A.F.T.R.2d 2005-5764
(8/3/05):
Plaintiff has moved to reconsider the Court's Memorandum
Opinion and its Order dated May 18, 2005, on the grounds
that the check-the-box regulations are invalid under
Morrissey v. Commissioner, 296 U.S. 344, 80 L. Ed. 263, 56
S. Ct. 289, 1936-1 C.B. 264 (1935) as argued in a Law
Review article by Professor Gregg D. Polsky of the
University of Minnesota Law School. Polsky, "Can Treasury
Overrule the Supreme Court?," 84 BU. L. Rev. 185 (2004).
Thus, this motion states new grounds for Plaintiff's relief.
The Court will consider the argument even though it
amounts to a renewed motion rather than a true
reconsideration.
When confronted with the question posed by Professor
Polsky's title, one would naturally answer, "No." However,
that is not precisely the question before this Court nor can it
be fairly said that Treasury's check-the-box regulations have
such an effect. The Court has reviewed Morrissey in its
proper context and does not find that it requires invalidating
the check-the-box regulations.
Certainly, the check-the-box regulations are the subject of
academic and theoretical questioning. Professor Polsky has
proposed that the Treasury has gone too far in adopting
regulations concerning corporations and other associations.
However, it is a theory only that the check-the-box
regulations violate the Internal Revenue Code definitions
because those definitions were made in effect permanent by
Morrissey. The Court does not believe that Morrissey
forever incorporated in all future Treasury regulations a
particular definition of an "association."
B. Distributions and Redemptions
1. Pushing the envelope on complete termination.
Hurst v. Commissioner, 124 T.C. 16 (2/3/05). This case illustrates that the
[Vol. 8:SI
Recent Developments in Federal Income Taxation
"prohibited interest" test is based on a formalistic analysis rather than the
totality of the circumstances. All of the taxpayer's stock in a corporation
(HMI) in which his son continued as a 51 percent shareholder was redeemed
for $2.5 million dollars payable quarterly, with 8 percent interest, over
fifteen years. The payment obligation was represented by a promissory note
that was secured by all of the corporation's assets, as well as by a cross-
collateralization pledge of the son's stock and the stock of the unrelated
shareholders. In addition, HMI entered into a ten-year employment contract
with the redeemed shareholder's wife, who personally had not owned any
stock, giving her a small salary and fringe benefits, including medical
insurance, and pursuant to which she performed "various administrative and
clerical tasks." Finally, at time of the redemption the corporation signed a
new lease on the building owned by the redeemed shareholder, in which it
conducted its business, pursuant to which it paid rent of $8,500 per month,
adjusted for inflation. Although the Commissioner "acknowledg[ed] that
each relationship between the Hursts and their old company - creditor under
the notes, landlord under the lease, employment of a non-owning family
member - passes muster, he argue[d] that the total number of related
obligations resulting from the transaction gave the Hursts a prohibited
interest in the corporation by giving Richard Hurst a financial stake in the
company's continued success." The Tax Court (Judge Holmes) rejected this
"holistic view," examining each obligation in turn.
The court first addressed the terms
of the promissory notes:
Neither the amount nor the timing of payments was tied to
the financial performance of HMI. Although the notes were
subordinate to HMI's obligation to its bank, they were not
subordinate to general creditors, nor was the amount or
certainty of the payments under them dependent on HMI's
earnings. . . .All of these contractual arrangements had
cross-default clauses and were secured by the buyers' stock.
This meant that should any of the notes go into default, Mr.
Hurst would have the right to seize the stock and sell it. The
parties agree that the probable outcome of such a sale would
be that Mr. Hurst would once again be in control of HMI...
• But in Lynch v. Commissioner, 83 T.C. 597 (1984), revd.
on other grounds 801 F.2d 1176 (9th Cir.1986), we held that
a security interest in redeemed stock does not constitute a
prohibited interest under section 302. We noted that 'The
holding of such a security interest is common in sales
agreements, and . . . not inconsistent with the interest of a
creditor. . . ." Furthermore, at trial, the Hursts offered
credible evidence from their professional advisers that these
transactions, including the grant of a security interest to Mr.
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Hurst, were consistent with common practice for seller-
financed deals.
* Second,
the lease called for a fixed rent in no way conditioned upon
the financial performance of HMI. Attorney Ron David, who
was intimately familiar with the transaction, testified
convincingly that there was no relationship between the
obligations of the parties and the financial performance of
HMI. The transactional documents admitted into evidence
do not indicate otherwise. There is simply no evidence that
the payment terms in the lease between the Hursts and HMI
vary from those that would be reasonable if negotiated
between unrelated parties. And the Hursts point out that the
IRS itself has ruled that an arm's-length lease allowing a
redeeming corporation to use property owned by a former
owner does not preclude characterization as a redemption.
Furthermore, the court did not find the fact that subsequent to the redemption
the parities modified both the lease and the note in a transaction in which the
corporation surrendered an option to purchase the leased property in
exchange for a reduction in the interest rate on the note issued for the stock
indicated that Hurst's rights under the lease were in fact a retained interest.
* Third,
Mrs. Hurst did not own any HMI stock. Thus, she is not a
"distribute" unable to have an "interest in the corporation
(including an interest as officer, director, or employee), other
than an interest as a creditor... ." The Commissioner is thus
forced to argue that her employment was a "prohibited
interest" for Mr. Hurst. And he does, contending that
through her employment Mr. Hurst kept an ongoing
influence in HMI's corporate affairs. He also argues that an
employee unrelated to the former owner of the business
would not continue to be paid were she to work Mrs. Hurst's
admittedly minimal schedule. And he asserts that her
employment was a mere ruse to provide Mr. Hurst with his
company car and health benefits, bolstering this argument
with proof that the truck used by Mrs. Hurst was the same
one that her husband had been using when he ran HMI.
None of this, though, changes the fact that her compensation
and fringe benefits were fixed, and again - like the notes and
lease - not subordinated to HMI's general creditors, and not
subject to any fluctuation related to HMI's financial
performance. Her duties, moreover, were various
administrative and clerical tasks - some of the same chores
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she had been doing at HMI on a regular basis for many
years. And there was no evidence whatsoever that Mr. Hurst
used his wife in any way as a surrogate for continuing to
manage (or even advise) HMI's new owners.
0 Somewhat surprisingly, perhaps, the
court concluded that the fact that a default by the corporation on its obligations
to Mrs. Hurst under the employment contract, as did a default under the lease,
also constituted a default on the promissory note to Mr. Hurst, thereby
triggering his right to reacquire the stock did not, under all of the facts and
circumstances, constitute a prohibited retained interest. The Commissioner
argued that "intertwin[ing] substantial corporate obligations with the
employment contract of only one of 45 employees . .. [was] proof that the
parties to this redemption contemplated a continuing involvement greater than
that of a mere creditor." The court responded that "the proof at trial
[demonstrated] that there was a legitimate creditor's interest in the Hursts'
demanding [the cross collateralization provisions]. . . . They were, after all,
parting with a substantial asset (the corporations), in return for what was in
essence an IOU from some business associates. Their ability to enjoy retirement
in financial security was fully contingent upon their receiving payment on the
notes, lease, and employment contract.... The value of that security, however,
depended upon the financial health of the company. Repossessing worthless
shares as security on defaulted notes would have done little to ensure the Hursts'
retirement. The cross-default provisions were their canary in the coal mine. If at
any point the company failed to meet any financial obligation to the Hursts, Mr.
Hurst would have the option to retrieve his shares immediately, thus protecting
the value of his security interest instead of worrying about whether this was the
beginning of a downward spiral. This is perfectly consistent with a creditor's
interest, and there was credible trial testimony that multiple default triggers are
common in commercial lending." Accordingly, the court held that "the cross-
default provisions protected the Hursts' financial interest as creditors of HMI,
for a debt on which they had received practically no downpayment, and the
collection of which (though not 'dependent upon the earnings of the
corporation' as that phrase is used in section 1.302-4(d), Income Tax Regs.) was
realistically contingent upon HMI's continued financial health .... The number
of legal connections between Mr. Hurst and the buyers that continued after the
deal was signed did not change their character as permissible security interests.
Even looked at all together, they were in no way contingent upon the financial
performance of the company except in the obvious sense that all creditors have
in their debtors' solvency."
2. The IRS was "buffeted" when it attempted to
show linkage between taxpayer's borrowings and its investments in
portfolio stock. OBH. Inc. (formerly Berkshire Hathaway Inc.) v. United
States, 2005-2 U.S.T.C. 50,627 (D. Neb. 10/28/05). The court held that
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taxpayer is entitled to a full dividends-received deduction because § 246A,
which reduces the dividends-received deduction allowable under § 243(a) for
dividends that are paid on "debt-financed portfolio stock," was not
applicable. The court looked to legislative history (House Report), which
stated that portfolio indebtedness is debt that is "clearly incurred for the
purpose of acquiring dividend paying stock or otherwise directly traceable to
such an acquisition."
0 It found that the proceeds of the four
borrowings in question were not able to be traced to specific purchases of
portfolio stock, i.e., they were not "directly attributable" to portfolio stock
purchases. It further held that "directly traceable" should be given a "plain
meaning" definition, i.e., that "direct" connotes an "immediate result," and the
IRS failed to show an immediate connection between the debt proceeds and the
stocks. The court further found that the IRS tracings do not satisfy the "purpose"
test either.
* The opinion states that the court is
cognizant of the fact that current statutory and regulatory regime makes it
virtually impossible for the Service to trace debt proceeds and thus assess tax
deficiencies under § 246A against companies like OBH who engage in
numerous investment transactions. However, any decision to loosen the "direct"
connection required between debt proceeds and the purchase of dividend-paying
stocks must be made by Congress or the Service, not the courts. In fact, the
Service, apparently recognizing the difficulty in applying § 246A to companies
like Berkshire, has already taken steps to alter the necessary linkage required by
§ 246A. On May 7, 2004, the Service issued an announcement requesting
comments on whether regulations should be adopted that would supplement the
specific tracing rule in § 246A with a pro rata allocation rule to determine the
use of borrowings that are not traceable to a specific use. See 69 F.R. 25534.
C. Liquidations
1. The transfer of something worth nothing (or less
than nothing) on a net basis is not a transfer of property for purposes of
subchapter C. REG-163314-03, Transactions Involving the Transfer of No
Net Value, 70 F.R. 11903 (3/10/05). These proposed regulations deal with
the net value requirement for tax-free transactions under subchapter C, and
provide that exchanges under §§ 351, 332 and 368 do not qualify for tax-free
treatment where there is no net value in the property transferred or received,
with exceptions for E, F and some D reorganizations.
* The proposed regulations note,
however, that even though a liquidation of a subsidiary might not qualify under
§ 332, the transaction nevertheless might qualify as a tax-free reorganization
under § 368. See Prop. Reg. § 1.332-2(e), Ex. 2. The preamble to the proposed
regulations notes that the Treasury adopted the approach in Spaulding Bakeries
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v. Commissioner, 252 F.2d 693 (2d Cir. 1963), affg 27 T.C. 684 (1957), and H.
K Porter Co. v. Commissioner, 87 T.C. 689 (1986), because it concluded that it
is appropriate for a corporation to recognize loss when it fails to receive a
liquidating distribution on a class of its subsidiary because the parent
corporation would recognize such a loss if the distribution qualified as a
reorganization under § 368.
0 The proposed regulations also
provide guidance on the treatment of creditors of an insolvent corporation, who
will be treated as proprietors to determine whether continuity of interest is
preserved.
* Finally, the proposed regulations
provide that the requirements of § 332 are satisfied only if the recipient
corporation receives at least partial payment for each class of stock that it owns
in the liquidating corporation. A distribution in redemption of less than all of the
shares one corporation owns in another corporation, but in which the recipient
corporation receives partial payment for at least one class of stock may qualify
as a reorganization.
D. S Corporations
1. Members of one (greatly extended) family are
treated as one shareholder. Section 231 of the Jobs Act of 2004 amends
§ 1361 to treat members of a family as one shareholder at the election of any
family member. Shareholders with a common ancestor going back six
generations are members of the same family.
* This means that a shareholder and his
fifth cousin are members of the same family. This would have the effect of
making the entire population of Arkansas members of the same family.
a. How many S corporation shareholders
know the name of any of their great-great-great-great grandfathers?
Notice 2005-91, 2005-51 I.R.B. 1164 (11/22/05). This provides advance
notice of what the regulations will say under § 1361(c)(1)(D) election to
aggregate family members for 100 shareholder limit. Lists additional
shareholders who will be counted in aggregation (trust beneficiaries, etc.)
Describes the manner by which the election to treat members of a family as
one shareholder may be made for taxable years of the S corporation
beginning after 12/31/04. "The election is made by notifying the corporation
to which the election applies. The notification shall identify by name the
member of the family making the election, the 'common ancestor' of the
family to which the election applies, and the first taxable year of the
corporation for which the election is to be effective." Members of the family
also include beneficiaries of permitted trusts, etc. A smaller family may be
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subsumed into a larger family, with members of the larger family all being
counted as one shareholder.
2. Coggin Automotive would be reversed by a
proposed regulation. REG-149524-03, LIFO Recapture Under Section
1363(d), 69 F.R. 50109 (8/13/04). Prop. Reg. § 1.1363-2(b)-(d) (2004)
would reverse the rule in Coggin Automotive Corp. v. Commissioner, 292
F.3d 1326 (11th Cir. 2002), for future years and require LIFO recapture
when a corporation that conducts business through an interest in a
partnership makes an S election.
a. The regulation is now final. T.D. 9210,
LIFO Recapture under Section 1363(d), 70 F.R. 39920 (7/12/05), corrected
by, 70 F.R. 46758 (8/11/05), with an effective date of 8/13/04.
b. In the Tax Court, the aggregate theory of
partnership taxation was applied. Coggin Automotive Corp. v.
Commissioner, 115 T.C. 349 (10/18/00). Taxpayer originally was a holding
company that had a number of controlled subsidiaries engaged in the retail
sale of motor vehicles. The subsidiaries maintained their inventories under
the LIFO method, and all of the corporations filed a consolidated return. In
1993, the taxpayer restructured to make an S election. Six new S
corporations were formed to become the general partners in six limited
partnerships. Each subsidiary contributed its dealership assets to a limited
partnership in exchange for a limited partnership interest, following which
the subsidiaries were liquidated and the taxpayer became the limited partner
in each. The Commissioner asserted that the taxpayer's conversion to an S
corporation triggered the inclusion of the affiliated group's pre-S-election
LIFO reserves (approximately $5 million) under § 1363(d). The
Commissioner argued alternatively (1) that the restructuring should be
disregarded because it had no purpose independent of tax consequences, and
(2) that under the aggregate approach to partnerships, a pro rata share of the
pre-S-election LIFO reserves (approximately $4.8 million) was attributable
to the taxpayer as a partner. The Tax Court (Judge Jacobs) rejected the
Commissioner's first argument, holding that the restructuring was a genuine
multiple-party transaction with economic substance, compelled by business
realities and imbued with tax-independent considerations. But Judge Jacobs
accepted the Commissioner's second argument, holding that application of
the aggregate approach [rather than the entity approach] to partnership
taxation furthered the purpose of § 1363(d). Thus, the taxpayer was treated
as owning a pro rata share of the partnerships' inventories and as a result of
its election it was required to include $4.8 million of LIFO recapture.
* In reaching its decision regarding
Subchapter K, the Tax Court followed Casel v. Commissioner, 79 T.C. 424
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(1982), applying the aggregate approach to apply § 267 to disallow losses
between related parties; Holiday Village Shopping Center v. United States, 773
F.2d 276 (Fed. Cir. 1985), applying the aggregate approach for purposes of
determining depreciation recapture when a corporation distributed a partnership
interest to its shareholders; and Unger v. Commissioner, 936 F.2d 1316 (D.C.
Cir. 1991), in determining permanent establishment. It distinguished as
inapposite the entity approach applied in P.D.B. Sports, Ltd. v. Commissioner,
109 T.C. 423, (1997) applying the entity approach for purposes of applying §
1056; Madison Gas & Elec. Co. v. Commissioner, 72 T.C. 521, 564 (1979),
affd, 633 F.2d 512 (7th Cir. 1980), applying the entity approach in determining
whether expenditures are deductible under § 162 or nondeductible start-up
expenditures, and the Eighth Circuit's decision in Brown Group, Inc. v.
Commissioner, 77 F.3d 217 (8th Cir.1996), vacating 104 T.C. 105 (1995),
concluding that the entity approach, rather than the aggregate approach, should
be used in characterizing income (subpart F income) earned by a partnership.
The differences, the court found, were based on the determination of the
relevant Congressional intent in enacting the non-subchapter K provision
involved in each case.
(1) But the Eleventh Circuit sees
things differently, and reverses the Tax Court. "Plain language"
requires application of the entity theory, and the aggressive tax plan put
together by KPMG worked. Coggin Automotive Corp. v. Commissioner,
292 F.3d 1326, 89 A.F.T.R.2d 2002-2826, 2002-1 U.S.T.C. 50,448 (1 1th
Cir. 6/6/02). Expressly applying the Gitlitz "plain language" principle, the
Eleventh Circuit (Judge Hill) reversed the Tax Court. The Court of Appeals
held that § 1363(d) LIFO recapture is triggered only if the corporation
electing S status itself directly owned the LIFO inventory. Since the result
turned on "plain language" rather than the purpose of the statutory pattern,
Judge Hill was spared the need to write a lengthy opinion.
3. Governments have to collect. T.D. 9183,
Modification of Check the Box, 70 F.R. 9220 (2/25/05). These final
regulations under §§ 856, 1361 and 7701 clarify that qualified REIT
subsidiaries, qualified subchapter S subsidiaries and single-owner eligible
entities separate from their owners are treated as separate entities for federal
tax liability purposes.
4. Unincorporated entities making S elections will
be deemed to have checked the box as well. T.D. 9203, Deemed Election
To Be an Association Taxable as a Corporation for a Qualified Electing S
Corporation, 70 F.R. 29452 (5/23/05), corrected by, 71 F.R. 3219
(01/20/06). Final regulations that deem eligible entities that file timely S
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elections to have elected to be classified as associations taxable as
corporations.
* Those making late elections may seek
relief under Rev. Proc. 2004-48, 2004-32 I.R.B. 172. Alternatively, they may
submit a ruling request under Reg. § 301.9100-3 to file a late classification
election and under § 1362 to file a late S corporation election.
* These provisions apply retroactively,
effective back to 7/20/04.
* Forming an LLC that will be taxed as
an association in order to make an S election is a procedure employed in order
to take advantage of the greater flexibility given to LLCs under state law (as
compared with corporations).
E. Affiliated Corporations
1. Loss limitation rules are provided in temporary
and proposed regulations. T.D. 9118, Loss Limitation Rules, 69 F.R.
12799 (3/18/04); REG-153172-03, Loss Limitation Rules, 69 F.R. 12811
(3/18/04). Temporary regulation amendments relate to the deductibility of
losses under the temporary regulations under § 337(d) and the anti-
duplication temporary consolidated returns regulations relating to the
claiming of a worthless stock deduction with respect to a subsidiary's stock.
The proposed regulations cross-reference the temporary regulations.
a. Basis disconformity rule will be
permitted. Notice 2004-58, 2004-39 I.R.B. 520 (8/25/04). The IRS will
permit taxpayers to use the basis disconformity method or other methods,
e.g., tracing, for determining the amount of stock loss or basis that is not
attributable to the recognition of built-in gain on the disposition of an asset;
such stock loss will be allowed. Such amount of stock loss will not be
disallowed and such amount of subsidiary stock basis will not be reduced.
* Under the basis disconformity
method the loss is disallowed or the basis reduced, as the case may be, in an
amount equal to the least of (1) the "gain amount," (2) the "disconformity
amount," or (3) the "positive investment adjustment amount." For this purpose,
the gain amount is the sum of all gains (net of directly related expenses)
recognized on asset dispositions of the subsidiary that are allocable to the share
while the subsidiary is a member of the group. The disconformity amount is the
excess, if any, of the share's basis over the share's proportionate interest in the
subsidiary's "net asset basis." The positive investment adjustment amount is the
excess, if any, of the sum of the positive adjustments made to the share under §
1.1502-32 over the sum of the negative adjustments made to the share under §
1.1502-32, excluding adjustments for distributions under § 1.1502-32(b)(2)(iv).
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b. Regulations are now final. T.D. 9187, Loss
Limitation Rules, 70 F.R. 10319 (3/3/05). These final regulations under
§§ 337(d) and 1502 follow the rules described in Notice 2004-58.
F. Reorganizations
1. COI and COBE are not required for E and F
reorganizations. REG-106889-04, Reorganizations Under Section
368(a)(1)(E) or (F), 69 F.R. 49836 (8/12/04). These proposed regulations
would amend Reg. § 1.368-1(b) to provide that a continuity of interest and a
continuity of business enterprise are not required for a transaction to qualify
as a reorganization under § 368(a)(1)(E) [recapitalization] or (F) [mere
change in form]. They also provide comprehensive definitions of E and F
reorganizations.
a. Now final. T.D. 9182, Reorganizations
Under Section 368(a)(1)(E) and Section 368(a)(1)(F), 70 F.R. 9219
(2/25/05). These final regulations promulgated Reg. § 1.368-2(m),
comprehensively dealing with the definition of a reorganization under
§ 368(a)(1)(F). These regulations had been issued in identical proposed form
in 2004.
2. Net value requirement in reorganizations. See
VI.C., above.
3. Sale vs. reorganization? Tribune Company v.
Commissioner, 125 T.C. 110 (9/27/05), as amended, (10/13/05). In this
attempted reverse triangular merger, taxpayer's predecessor, the Times
Mirror Co. ("TM") wanted to divest its low-basis Matthew Bender subsidiary
("MB"). TM was represented by E&Y, Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher, and
Goldman Sachs. Reed Elsevier ("Reed") was interested in acquiring MB and
was willing to pay $1.375 billion to make the acquisition. Reed was
represented by Price Waterhouse. In the transaction, Reed subsidiaries
organized a special-purpose corporation, MB Parent, and held relatively low
value, nonparticipating preferred stock with 80 percent control. MB Parent,
in turn owns preferred stock and nonvoting common stock in an acquisition
subsidiary that will merge with MB, as well as a nonvoting interest in a
single member LLC that holds the $1.375 billion of cash. As a result of the
merger of MB into the acquisition subsidiary, TM will own all the common
stock and the remaining 20 percent voting power of MB Parent. Even
though, TM will not have voting control over MB Parent, it will control the
LLC by virtue of being the sole (nonequity) manager of the LLC.
* The plan was for the merger of MB
into the acquisition subsidiary in exchange for MB Parent common and
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preferred stock to qualify as a tax free reverse subsidiary merger, even though
the stock received does not carry with it voting control. At some later date, by
mutual agreement, the MB and MB Parent preferred stock could be redeemed at
face value and the nonvoting common could be redeemed at a formula price,
which would leave Reed as the sole owner of MB and TM as the sole owner of
MB Parent, with the ability to liquidate MB Parent and the LLC without a tax
cost.
The Tax Court (Judge Cohen) held
that TM received both common stock in MB Parent and the management
authority over the LLC, which had to be valued separately. Inasmuch as the MB
Parent common stock lacked control over any assets, it was worth far less than
$1.1 billion [80 percent of $1.375 billion], and the transaction failed to qualify
as a reorganization under § 368(a)(2)(E). Moreover, it did not qualify as a "B"
reorganization because TM received consideration other than stock, i.e., the
management authority over the LLC. Judge Cohen based her conclusion on the
facts that TM intended a sale and that MB Parent serves no purpose and
performs no function apart from TM's attempt to secure the desired tax
consequences.
4. When to measure the value of consideration to
determine whether continuity of interest exists. T.D. 9225, Corporate
Reorganizations; Guidance on the Measurement of Continuity of Interest, 70
F.R. 54631 (9/16/05), corrected by, 70 F.R. 60132-02. As amended, Reg.
§ 1.368-1(e)(2) provides that if the consideration to be provided to the target
corporation shareholders is fixed in the binding contract and includes only
stock of the issuing corporation and money, the determination of whether the
continuity of interest requirement is satisfied is based on the value of the
consideration to be exchanged for the proprietary interests in the target
corporation as of the end of the last business day before the first date there is
a binding contract to effect the potential reorganization. The number of
shares of stock of the acquiring corporation that will be exchanged for stock
of the target corporation generally is fixed by agreement. at a time
significantly in advance of the actual closing of the transaction. The
regulation is intended to eliminate uncertainty where the target corporation
shareholders receive cash (or debt instruments) in addition to acquiring
corporation stock and, at the time the transaction is agreed upon, the amount
of the boot equals the value of the agreed upon number of shares of the
acquiring corporation stock to be received. Otherwise, the transaction might
fail to satisfy the continuity of interest requirement if the value of the
acquiring corporation's stock declined between the date the parties agreed to
the terms of the transaction (the signing date) and the date the transaction
closed if the quantitative aspect of the continuity of interest requirement were
tested on the closing date rather than the signing date.
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* Under Reg. § 1.368-1(e)(2)(iii), a
contract that provides for either the percentage of the number of shares of each
class of target corporation stock, or the percentage by value of the target
corporation shares, to be exchanged for issuing corporation stock should be
treated as providing for fixed consideration, as long as the target corporation
shares to be exchanged for issuing corporation stock and the target corporation
shares to be exchanged for consideration other than issuing corporation stock
each represents an economically reasonable exchange. A condition outside the
control of the parties does not prevent an instrument from being a binding
contract. Examples of a condition outside the control of the parties include the
completion of a tender offer being subject to a shareholder vote or the target
corporation's shareholders tendering a sufficient amount of target stock. Reg.
§ 1.368-1(e)(2)(iii)(B)(2) provides that if the target corporation's shareholders
may elect to receive either stock or money and the maximum amount of money
that the target shareholders might receive can be determined, continuity of
interest will be tested by assuming that the minimum number of shares will be
issued and the maximum amount of money will be received, without regard to
the number of shares and amount of money actually exchanged for the target
corporation stock. Reg. § 1.368-1(e)(2)(iii)(C)(2) provides that stock that is
escrowed to secure customary pre-closing covenants and representations or
customary target warranties is not treated as contingent consideration, which
would render the safe harbor unavailable. However, escrowed consideration that
is forfeited is not taken into account in determining whether the continuity of
interest requirement has been met. Reg. § 1.368-1(e)(2)(v), Ex. 2.
* The regulations include an example
that lowers the administratively sanctioned threshold for adequate quantitative
continuity of interest to 40 percent. Reg. § 1.368-1(e)(2)(v), Ex. (1). Conversely,
Reg. § 1.368-1(e)(2)(v), Ex. (2), indicates that stock consideration of 25 percent
is insufficient.
* The number of shares of stock of the
acquiring corporation that will be exchanged for stock of the target corporation
generally is fixed by agreement at a time significantly in advance of the actual
closing of the transaction. Suppose that in a statutory merger the target
corporation shareholders receive cash (or debt instruments) in addition to
acquiring corporation stock and, at the time the transaction is agreed upon, the
amount of the boot equals the value of the agreed upon number of shares of the
acquiring corporation stock to be received. The transaction might fail to satisfy
the continuity of interest requirement if the value of the acquiring corporation's
stock declined between the date the parties agreed to the terms of the transaction
(the signing date) and the date the transaction closed if the quantitative aspect of
the continuity of interest requirement were tested on the closing date rather than
the signing date. Prop. Reg. § 1.368-1(e)(2) (2004) would eliminate this
uncertainty by providing that the determination of whether the continuity of
interest requirement is satisfied is based on the value of the consideration to be
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exchanged for the proprietary interests in the target corporation as of the end of
the last business day before the first date there is a binding contract to effect the
potential reorganization, if the consideration to be provided to the target
corporation shareholders is fixed in such contract and includes only stock of the
issuing corporation and money. A condition outside the control of the parties
would not prevent an instrument from being a binding contract. Examples of a
condition outside the control of the parties include the completion of a tender
offer being subject to a shareholder vote or the target corporation's shareholders
tendering a sufficient amount of target stock. If the target corporation's
shareholders may elect to receive either stock or money and the maximum
amount of money that the target shareholders might receive can be determined,
continuity of interest will be tested by assuming that the minimum number of
shares will be issued and the maximum amount of money will be received,
without regard to the number of shares and amount of money actually
exchanged for the target corporation stock.
5. Merging tax somethings into tax nothings is OK,
but not the opposite! T.D. 9038, Statutory Mergers and Consolidations, 68
F.R. 3384 (1/24/03), and REG-126485-01, Statutory Mergers and
Consolidations, 68 F.R. 3477 (1/24/03). In REG-126485-01, Statutory
Mergers and Consolidations, 66 F.R. 57400 (11/15/01), the Treasury
withdrew the proposed regulations [REG-106186-98, Certain Corporate
Reorganizations Involving Disregarded Entities, 65 FR 31115 (5/16/00)] that
would have provided that neither the merger of a disregarded entity into a
corporation nor the merger of a target corporation into a disregarded entity
was a statutory merger qualifying as a reorganization under § 368(a)(1)(A),
and proposed more liberal regulations [Prop. Reg. § 1.368-2(b)(1)]. Under
the 2001 proposed regulations, a merger of a corporation into a disregarded
entity that is wholly owned by another corporation could qualify as a type
(A) merger. The Treasury Department has now promulgated the 2001
proposed regulations, with some modifications, as Temp. Reg. § 1.368-2T(b)
and simultaneously published new identical proposed regulations.
* The main point of the regulations is
that the merger of a target corporation into an LLC wholly owned by another
corporation (thereby rendering the LLC a disregarded entity) can qualify as a
type (A) reorganization [and under more complex structures as a triangular
reorganization; that the merger of a corporation into a Q-Sub [also a disregarded
entity] can qualify as a type (A) reorganization; and that a merger into a
qualified REIT subsidiary can qualify as a type (A) reorganization.
* Nevertheless, the new regulations
introduce significant definitional jargon. The term "disregarded entity" means a
business entity (as defined in Reg. § 301.7701-2(a)) that is disregarded as an
entity separate from its owner for federal tax purposes, including single member
corporate-owned LLCs, qualified RE1T subsidiaries, and Q-Subs. "Combining
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entity" means a corporation [as defined in Reg. § 301.7701-2(b)] that is not a
disregarded entity. "Combining unit" means a combining entity and all
disregarded entities, if any, the assets of which are treated as owned by such
combining entity for federal tax purposes. Under the proposed regulations, a
statutory merger or consolidation under § 368(a)(1)(A) must be effected
pursuant to the laws of the United States, a state or the District of Columbia.
[Foreign statutory mergers still do not qualify, but the domestic statute no longer
needs to be a "corporate" law.] All of the following events must occur
simultaneously: (1) all of the assets (other than those distributed in the
transaction) and liabilities (except to the extent satisfied or discharged in the
transaction) of each member of one or more combining units (each a transferor
unit) become the assets and liabilities of one or more members of one other
combining unit (the transferee unit); and (2) the combining entity of each
transferor unit ceases its separate legal existence [although its formal existence
can continue under state law for certain limited purposes that are not
inconsistent with the "all of the assets" requirement.]. The examples provide all
of the details of the rules: Divisive mergers [see Rev. Rul. 2000-5, 2000-1 C.B.
436] cannot qualify (Ex. 1); forward triangular mergers (into a disregarded
entity owned by a subsidiary) are allowed (Ex. 2 & 4); the merger of a target S
corporation that owns a Q-Sub into a disregarded entity owned by a C
corporation qualifies as to both the target S corporation and its Q-sub (Ex. 3);
the owner of the disregarded entity must be a corporation (Ex. 5); mergers of
disregarded entities into corporations do not qualify (Ex. 6); none of the
consideration received by the target shareholders may be interests in the
disregarded entity (Ex. 7); and the target can be tailored by selling assets and
distributing proceeds, as long as all of the remaining assets are transferred to the
disregarded entity in the merger (Ex. 8).
a. T.D. 9242, Statutory Mergers and
Consolidations, 71 F.R. 4259 (1/26/06). These final regulations adopt
proposed regulations (REG- 117969-00) issued in 2005 based upon
temporary regulations (T.D. 9038) issued in 2003. The final regulations
replace the requirement in Reg. § 1.368-2(b)(1) that a merger or
consolidation under § 368(a)(1)(A) be effected under the laws of a state, etc.
with more general language that qualifies transactions "effected pursuant to
the statute or statutes necessary to effect the merger or consolidation."
Mergers involving disregarded entities qualify if all the assets and liabilities
of the target are transferred to the acquirer and the target ceases to exist.
G. Corporate Divisions
1. The wrath of General Utilities repeal rewritten.
REG-107566-00, Guidance under Section 355(e); Recognition of Gain on
Certain Distributions of Stock or Securities In Connection with an
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Acquisition, 66 F.R. 67 (1/2/01). The Treasury revised Prop. Reg. § 1.355-7
and withdrew proposed regulations (66 F.R. 76) issued in REG-1 16733-98
(64 F.R. 46155, 8/24/99). The proposed regulations provided that whether a
distribution and an acquisition are part of a plan is determined based on all
the facts and circumstances. They included nonexclusive lists of facts and
circumstances to be considered in making the determination and six safe
harbors.
a. And apparently the government thinks it
did a better job on the regulations the second - or is this the third? -
time around. T.D. 8960, Guidance Under Section 355(e); Recognition of
Gain on Certain Distributions of Stock or Securities in Connection With an
Acquisition, 66 F.R. 40590 (8/3/01). The Treasury has promulgated
temporary regulations identical to the Proposed Regulations, except that the
temporary regulations reserve § 1.355-7(e)(6) (suspending the running of any
time period during which there is a substantial diminution of risk of loss
under the principles of § 355(d)(6)(B)) and Example 7 of the Proposed
Regulations (interpreting the term "similar acquisition" in the context of a
situation involving multiple acquisitions).
b. The third (fourth?) time's the charm.
T.D. 8988, 67 F.R. 20632 (4/26/02) (temporary regulations), and REG-
163892-01, Guidance Under Section 355(e); Recognition of Gain on Certain
Distributions of Stock or Securities in Connection an Acquisition, 67 F.R.
20711 (4/26/02) (proposed regulations). These regulations amend Temp.
Reg. § 1.355-7T and identical Prop. Reg. § 1.355-7, and set forth new
guidelines in the anti-Morris Trust regulations. The 2002 temporary and
proposed regulations disregard the presumption of § 355(e)(2)(B) and
provide that "whether a distribution and an acquisition are part of a plan is
determined based on all the facts and circumstances." However, Temp. Reg.
§ 1.355-7T(b)(2) provides a "super-safe harbor" for an acquisition not
involving a public offering that occurs within two years following the date of
a distribution - the distribution and acquisition "can be treated as part of a
plan only if there was an agreement, understanding, arrangement, or
substantial negotiations regarding the acquisition or a similar acquisition at
some time during the 2-year period ending on the date of the distribution."
[italics added].
C. Is the fifth time the charm? T.D. 9198,
Guidance Under Section 355(e); Recognition of Gain on Certain
Distributions of Stock or Securities in Connection With an Acquisition, 70
F.R. 20279 (4/19/05). Final anti-Morris Trust regulations under § 355(e).
* A perceived need for certainty has
spawned complicated regulations providing guidance for identifying the
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presence of the prohibited plan. These regulations disregard the presumption of
§ 355(e)(2)(B) and provide that "whether a distribution and an acquisition are
part of a plan is determined based on all the facts and circumstances." Reg. §
1.355-7(b)(1). In the case of an acquisition not involving a public offering that
occurs within two years following the date of a distribution, the distribution and
acquisition "can be part of a plan only if there was an agreement, understanding,
arrangement, or substantial negotiations regarding the acquisition or a similar
acquisition at some time during the two-year period ending on the date of the
distribution." Reg. § 1.355-7(b)(2) (italics added). The "super safe harbor"
implicit in this rule trumps all other facts and circumstances. The regulations
add that the existence of an agreement, understanding, arrangement, or
substantial negotiations during the two-year period tends to show that the
distribution and acquisition are part of a plan, and further describe such an
understanding, etc., as merely a factor among the facts and circumstances to be
evaluated. See Reg. § 1.355-7(b)(3)(i). Discussions with an investment banker
regarding the acquisition are listed as a second factor indicating the existence of
a plan. Treas. Reg. § 1.355-7(b)(3)(ii). The regulations add that in the case of an
acquisition involving a public offering after the distribution, the absence of
discussions with an investment banker within the two-year period ending on the
date of the distribution is a factor indicating the absence of a plan. Reg. § 1.355-
7(b)(4)(i)
* Whether there is an agreement,
understanding, or arrangement also is a question of facts and circumstances.
Reg. § 1.355-7(h)(1). A binding agreement is not required, but an agreement,
understanding, or arrangement "clearly exists if a binding contract to acquire
stock exists." Also, an agreement may exist even though the parties have not
reached agreement on all significant economic terms. "Substantial negotiations"
are said to "require discussions of significant economic terms ... by one or
more officers or directors acting on behalf of [the corporation's]... controlling
shareholders" or "another person or persons with the implicit or explicit
permission of one or more of such officers, directors, or controlling
shareholders." Reg. § 1.355-7(h)(1)(iv). A controlling shareholder is a five
percent shareholder who actively participates in the management or operation of
the corporation. Treas. Reg. § 1.355-7(h)(3)(i). In the case of an acquisition
involving a public offering, the existence of an agreement, etc., depends on
discussions with investment bankers by one or more officers, directors, or
controlling shareholders of either the distributing or controlled corporations.
Treas. Reg. § 1.355-7(h)(1)(vi).
* Under Reg. § 1.355-7(e), the
acquisition of stock pursuant to an option will result in the option agreement
being treated as an agreement to acquire the stock as of the date the option was
written, transferred, or modified if the option is more likely than not to be
exercised as of such date.
2006]
Florida Tax Review
* In the case of an acquisition that
follows the distribution, the existence of a plan is indicated if within the two-
year period preceding the distribution there was an agreement, understanding,
arrangement, or substantial negotiations regarding the acquisition or a similar
acquisition. Reg. § 1.355-7(b)(3)(i). If the acquisition involves a public offering
after the distribution, the presence of discussions during the two-year period
preceding the distribution with an investment banker regarding a distribution is
a factor indicating the existence of a plan. Reg. § 1.355-7(b)(3)(ii).
* In the case of an acquisition that
precedes the distribution, the existence of a plan is indicated by discussions
within the two-year period preceding the acquisition by either the controlled or
distributing corporation with the acquirer regarding a distribution. Reg. § 1.355-
7(b)(3)(iii). The absence of discussions regarding a distribution during the two-
year period ending on the earlier to occur of (a) the acquisition, or (b) the first
public announcement regarding the distribution, is a factor indicating that the
acquisition and distribution were not part of a plan. Reg. § 1.355-7(b)(4)(iii). If
the acquisition involves a public offering before the distribution, the presence of
discussions during the two-year period preceding the acquisition with an
investment banker regarding a distribution is a factor indicating the existence of
a plan. Reg. § 1.355-7(b)(3)(iv). A change in the market or business conditions
after the acquisition that results in a distribution that was otherwise unexpected
is a factor that indicates that the acquisition and distribution are not part of a
plan. Reg. § 1.355-7(b)(4)(iv).
* In the case of a distribution either
before or after the acquisition, the regulations provide that the existence of a
corporate business purpose, as defined in Reg. § 1.355-2(b), other than a
business purpose to facilitate the acquisition, is a factor indicating the absence of
a plan. Reg. § 1.355-7(b)(4)(v). Internal discussions and discussions with
outside advisors, with officers and directors of either the distributing or
controlled corporations, provide an indication of a business purpose for the
distribution. Reg. § 1.355-7(c)(1). Similarly, the absence of a plan is indicated if
the distribution would have occurred at approximately the same time and in
similar form regardless of the acquisition. Reg. § 1.355-7(b)(4)(vi). Reg.
§ 1.355-7(c)(2) provides that discussions with the acquirer regarding a
distribution to decrease the likelihood of an acquisition of either the distributing
or controlled corporation by separating it from the corporation that is likely to
be acquired will be treated as having a business purpose to facilitate acquisition
of the corporation that is likely to be acquired. Nonetheless, a distribution that
facilitated trading in the stock of the distributing or controlled corporation will
not be taken into account in determining whether a distribution and acquisition
are part of a plan. Reg. § 1.355-7(c)(3).
* Reg. § 1.355-7(d) provides nine safe
harbors from the stormy seas of prohibited plans.
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H. Miscellaneous Corporate Issues
1. The sale of shares by a taxpayer to his brother in
a closely held corporation claiming a net operating loss deduction
resulted in a § 382 change of control that triggered the limitation on
NOL carryovers. Garber Industries Holding Co. v. Commissioner, 124 T.C.
1 (1/25/05). The Tax Court (Judge Halpern) held that the family aggregation
rule of § 382(1)(3)(A)(i) applies solely from the perspective of individuals
who are shareholders (as determined under the attribution rules of §
382(1)(3)(A)) of the loss corporation. Thus, the sale of stock from one
sibling to another that resulted in a more than 50 percent increase in stock
ownership by the purchasing sibling triggered the application of § 382. The
fact that each sibling and either of their parents would be viewed as a single
shareholder did not result in the siblings being treated as a single shareholder
where neither of their parents was a shareholder. The court recognized the
possibility that the rule it announced might result in arbitrary distinctions
between cases in which a parent of the siblings also was a shareholder and
cases in which the parent was not a shareholder, but concluded that the
announced rule was the one most compatible with the statutory language and
legislative history.
One of the Garber brothers (Charles)
had his interest in the corporation decreased from 68 percent to 19 percent and
the other brother (Kenneth) had his interest increased from 26 percent to 65
percent in a 1986 "D" reorganization. In 1988, Kenneth sold all of his remaining
shares to Charles, with the result that Charles's interest in the corporation
increased from 19 percent to 84 percent. The parents of Charles and Kenneth
were both deceased and, when living, never had any ownership interest in the
corporation.
* The court refused to follow
taxpayers' argument that siblings are treated as one individual under the NOL
aggregation rule, which provides that an individual and all members of his
family described in § 318(a)(1), i.e., spouses, children, grandchildren and
parents, are treated as one individual.
0 Judge Halpern also refused to follow
the Commissioner's argument that the family aggregation rule does not apply
because none of the parents and grandparents of the Garber brothers were alive
at the beginning of the three-year testing period immediately preceding the 1998
transaction. Instead, he concluded that a third interpretation was correct, i.e., that
the family aggregation rule of § 382(l)(3)(A)(i) applies from the perspective of
individuals who are shareholders of the loss corporation (as determined under
the attribution rules of § 382(1)(3)(A)), and that the brothers were unrelated
under this perspective. Judge Halpern held that the family aggregation rule of §
382(1)(3)(A)(i) applies solely from the perspective of individuals who are
shareholders (as determined under the attribution rules of § 382(1)(3)(A)) of the
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loss corporation. Thus, the sale of stock from one sibling to another that resulted
in a more than 50 percent increase in stock ownership by the purchasing sibling
triggered the application of § 382. The fact that each sibling and either of their
parents would be viewed as a single shareholder did not result in the siblings be
treated as a single shareholder where neither of their parents was a shareholder.
The court recognized the possibility that the rule it announced might result in
arbitrary distinctions between cases in which a parent of the siblings also was a
shareholder and cases in which the parent was not a shareholder, but concluded
that the announced rule was the one most compatible with the statutory
language and legislative history.
a. Affirmed by the Fifth Circuit. 435 F.3d
555 (5th Cir. 1/9/06). The Court held that the Tax Court properly interpreted
§ 382 as applied to a sale of stock between two shareholder brothers when no
parent or grandparent was a shareholder of the loss corporation because
§ 382 incorporates the limited family description from § 318 limits the
relatives of a shareholder to spouse, parents, children and grandchildren.
VII. PARTNERSHIPS
A. Formation and Taxable Years
There were no significant developments regarding this topic
during 2005.
B. Allocations of Distributive Share, Partnership Debt, and
Outside Basis
1. REG-128767-04, Treatment of Disregarded Entities
Under Section 752, 69 F.R. 49832 (8/12/04). These proposed regulations
provide that in determining the extent to which a partner bears the economic
risk of loss for a partnership liability, payment obligations of a disregarded
entity are taken into account only to the extent of the net value of the
disregarded entity except where the owner of the disregarded entity is
otherwise required to make a payment with respect to the obligation of the
disregarded entity.
In recent years an increasing number
of partnership interests have been held through limited liability companies
(LLCs) that are treated as disregarded entities under Reg. § 301.7701-1 through
Reg. § 301.7701-3. In such a situation, even though the limited liability
company has an obligation to restore a negative capital account, the owner of
the limited liability company, who is treated as the partner, has no such
obligation under state partnership law. Because only the LLC's assets will be
available to satisfy its payment obligations as a partner, the owner should be
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treated as bearing the economic risk of loss for a partnership liability as a result
of those payment obligations only to the extent of the net value of the
disregarded entity's assets. This result can be reached through a careful reading
and application of the current regulations, but Prop. Reg. § 1.752-2(k) clarifies
this treatment by providing that in determining the extent to which a partner
bears the economic risk of loss for a partnership liability under Reg. § 1.752-2,
payment obligations of a disregarded entity are taken into account only to the
extent of the net value of the disregarded entity (assets, including the
disregarded entity's enforceable rights to contributions from its owner, but
excluding the disregarded entity's interest in the partnership and the fair market
value of property pledged to secure a partnership liability, minus the disregarded
entity's liabilities), except to the extent the owner of the disregarded entity is
otherwise required to make a payment with respect to the disregarded entity's
obligation.
2. Defining the term "liability" in § 752 and fighting
duplication and acceleration of losses through partnerships. REG-
106736-00, Assumption of Partner Liabilities, 68 F.R. 37434 (6/24/03). The
Treasury has proposed extraordinarily complex, verging on
incomprehensible, regulations: (1) defining liabilities under § 752;
(2) dealing with a partnership's assumption of certain fixed and contingent
obligations in exchange for a partnership interest [Prop. Reg. § 1.752-7]; and
(3) providing rules under § 358(h) for assumptions of liabilities by
corporations from partners and partnerships [Prop. Reg. § 1.358-7]. Reg. §
1.752-1 (a)(1)(i) would be amended to include the principles of Rev. Rul. 88-
77, 1988-2 C.B. 128; an obligation is a liability to the extent that incurring
the obligation: (1) creates or increases the basis of any of the obligor's assets
(including cash); (2) gives rise to an immediate deduction; or (3) gives rise to
an expense that is not deductible in computing taxable income and is not
properly chargeable to capital. Prop. Reg. § 1.752-7 deals with the
assumption by a partnership of a partner's fixed or contingent obligation to
make payment that is not one of the three types described in Reg. § 1.752-
l(a)(1)(i) [including accrual method liabilities the deduction for which was
deferred under § 453(h)]. Unlike Temp. Reg. § 1.752-6T, the proposed
regulations do not reduce the partner's outside basis when the partnership
assumes a § 1.752-7 liability. If the partnership satisfies the liability while
the partner remains in the partnership, the deduction with respect to the built-
in loss associated with the § 1.752-7 liability is allocated to the partner,
reducing that partner's outside basis. Alternatively, if one of three events
occurs that separate the partner from the partnership, then the partner's
outside basis is reduced immediately before the occurrence of the event. The
events are: (1) a disposition (or partial disposition) of the partnership interest
by the partner, (2) a liquidation of the partner's partnership interest, and
(3) the assumption (or partial assumption) of the liability by another partner.
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The basis reduction generally is the lesser of (1) the excess of the partner's
basis in the partnership interest over the adjusted value of the interest, or
(2) the remaining built-in loss associated with the liability. (In the event of a
partial disposition, the reduction is pro rated.) Thereafter, to the extent of the
remaining built-in loss associated with the liability, the partnership (or the
assuming partner) is not entitled to any deduction or capital expense upon
satisfaction (or economic performance) of the liability, but if the partnership
notifies the partner, the partner is entitled to a loss or deduction. If another
partner assumed the liability, the partnership must immediately reduce the
basis of its assets by the built-in loss, and upon satisfaction, the assuming
partner must make certain basis adjustments to his partnership interest. There
are exceptions for (1) transfer of the trade or business with which the liability
is associated is transferred to the partnership, and (2) de minimis transactions
(liabilities less that 10 percent of the partnership's assets or $1,000,000).
Unlike under the temporary regulations, there is no exception for transactions
in which substantially all of the assets with which the liability is associated
are contributed to the partnership. When finalized, the regulations will be
effective for transactions occurring after 6/24/03.
a. Finally, final regulations. T.D. 9207,
Assumption of Partner Liabilities, 70 F.R. 30334 (5/26/05). Final and
temporary regulations provide new rules dealing with a partnership's
assumption of certain fixed and contingent obligations in connection with the
issuance of a partnership interest. The regulations also provide rules under
§ 358(h) for assumptions of liabilities by corporations from partners and
partnerships. There are also temporary regulations that provide additional
rules under § 358(h) for assumptions of liabilities in pre-6/24/03 exchanges.
* The regulations ensure that tax losses
cannot be duplicated or accelerated by transferring contingent obligations to
partnerships.
* They also make final temporary
regulations that address the "Son-of-Boss" tax shelter, § 1.752-6T [which were
effective 10/19/99]; these provide that the exception contained in § 358(h)(2)(B)
[where substantially all of the assets with which the liability is associated are
transferred to the person assuming the liability as part of the exchange] do not
apply to transactions described in Notice 2000-44, 2000-2 C.B. 255.
(1) REG-106736-00, Assumption of
Liabilities, 70 F.R. 30380 (5/26/05). Proposed regulations that are identical
to the temporary regulations contained in T.D. 9207.
3. REG-144620-04, Partner's Distributive Share, 70
F.R. 69919 (11/18/05). The IRS published proposed regulations that inter
alia provide rules for testing the substantiality of a § 704(b) allocation where
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the partners are look-through entities or members of a consolidated group
and revise the existing rules for determining the partners' interests in a
partnership. They provide that the interaction of a partnership allocation with
the tax attributes of owners of look-through entities must be taken into
account when testing the substantiality of the allocation to a partner that is a
look-through entity, and, similarly, tax attributes of a consolidated group
must be taken into account with respect to the allocation to a partner that is a
member of the consolidated group.
4. Burke v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2005-297
(12/27/05). A partner is taxable on his share of partnership income even
though he did not receive any of it. Judge Wells stated:
Petitioner argues, however, that the existence of a real
controversy between petitioner and Mr. Cohen rendered the
amount of his distributive share indefinite and that the
partnership receipts in escrow are "frozen" and therefore
unavailable to petitioner. Petitioner cites section 703(a) for
the proposition that the taxable income of a partnership is
computed in the same manner as that of an individual and
cites several cases to support his argument that his dispute
with his former partner postpones the inclusion of his
distributive share because he does not have a claim of right
to the income....
The income was earned by the partnership during 1998, and
there was nothing conditional or contingent about its receipt.
Petitioner, therefore, was taxable on his distributive share of
the partnership's profits for 1998, even though he did not
receive it. See First Mechs. Bank v. Commissioner, 91 F.2d
at 279. It is irrelevant that petitioner still may not know the
full extent of the partnership income because of the deposits
stolen by his partner, Mr. Cohen; the nonappearance of the
deposits on the partnership books is not determinative.... A
partner is taxable on his distributive share of partnership
income when realized by the partnership despite a dispute
among the partners as to their respective distributive shares..
Petitioner does not dispute the facts pertinent to the
calculation of his distributive share of the partnership's
income for the year in issue. Rather, petitioner argues that
the deposits to the partnership's account for that year are not
income to him as a matter of law. As we discussed above, a
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partner must include his distributive share of partnership
income whether or not it is distributed to him. Accordingly,
we conclude that respondent is entitled to summary
judgment on the issue of the calculation of petitioner's
distributive share.
C. Distributions and Transactions Between the Partnership
and Partners
1. Section 833 of the Jobs Act of 2004 amends
§§ 704(c), 734 and 743.
a. Section 734(b) and § 743(b) basis
adjustments will be mandatory with respect to built-in losses or adjustments
that exceed $250,000 at the partnership level. Such adjustments under §§ 734
and 743 had been heretofore optional, and need not have been made in the
absence of a § 754 election. Section 734(b) and § 743(b) basis adjustments
remain elective if the aggregate reduction to the partnership's basis would
not exceed $250,000 or if the adjustment would increase the aggregate basis
of the partnership's assets. The purpose of this amendment is to prevent the
duplication of losses in a manner than allows a partner to recognize for tax
purposes a loss that was not realized economically.
* The amendment to § 743 requires
adjustments under § 743(b) to the basis of the partnership's assets whenever the
aggregate basis of the partnership's assets exceeds the aggregate fair market
value of the partnership's assets by more than $250,000. Section 743(b) basis
adjustments remain elective if the aggregate reduction to the partnership's basis
would not exceed $250,000 or if the adjustment would increase the aggregate
basis of the partnership's assets.
• A special rule for certain "electing
investment partnerships" permits the partnership to avoid making the basis
adjustment but limits the transferee partner's distributive share of any losses
with respect to partnership property to the amount that exceeds the loss
recognized by the transferor partner from whom the partnership interest was
purchased. IRC § 743(e). The definition of a qualifying "electing investment
partnership" in § 743(e)(6) is very restrictive and narrowly limits the application
of the special rule. The election is made at the partnership level. See Notice
2005-32, 2005-16 I.R.B. 895 (4/1/05). The election requires outside basis
adjustments to be made. This special rule for certain "electing investment
partnerships" permits the partnership to avoid making the basis adjustment but
limits the transferee partner's distributive share of any losses with respect to
partnership property to the amount that exceeds the loss recognized by the
transferor partner from whom the partnership interest was purchased. § 743(e).
Section 743(0 provides an exception for "securitization partnerships."
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* The amendment to § 734 requires
adjustments under § 734(b) to the basis of the partnership's assets whenever an
aggregate basis reduction in excess of $250,000 results. Section 734(b) basis
adjustments remain elective if the aggregate reduction to the partnership's basis
would not exceed $250,000 or if the adjustment would result in a basis increase.
Section 734(e) provides an exception for certain "securitization partnerships" as
defined in § 743(f).
(1) Notice 2005-32, 2005-16 I.R.B. 895
(4/1/05). This Notice provides interim procedures for partnerships and their
partners to comply with changes to the mandatory basis provisions of §§ 734
and 743 (with a couple of examples of a transfer of a partnership interest and
a distribution of partnership property). The bulk of the Notice relates to the
interim procedures to be followed for "electing investment partnerships" and
their partners.
b. Section 704(c)(1)(C), provides that built-in
losses are personal to the partner who contributed the loss property. If the
contributing partner ceases to be a partner before the loss is realized, as far as
the remaining partners are concerned the basis of the property is treated as
being equal to its fair market value at the time of the contribution. This
provision is intended to prevent the transfer of built-in tax losses from one
partner (a low tax bracket, tax exempt, or foreign person) to another partner.
Although the statute is silent on the point, if the property is depreciable (or
amortizable) in the hands of the partnership that fair-market-value-at-date-of-
contribution basis presumably must be adjusted for prior depreciation (or
amortization) claimed by the partnership.
* There is no time limit on the
application of § 704(c)(1)(C). Assume, for example, that A, B, and C formed
the ABC Partnership with A and B each contributing cash of $1,000 and C
contributing property with a basis of $7,000 and a fair market value of $1,000.
The $6,000 built-in loss with respect to the property contributed by C can be
allocated only to C. Assume further that eight years later C withdraws from the
partnership, in which A and B continue as equal partners, and the next year the
AB partnership sells the property contributed by C for any price between $1,000
and $7,000. The partnership does not recognize any loss. If, altematively, the
partnership sold the property for $700, the partnership would recognize a $300
loss and A and B each would be allocated a $150 loss. Note that § 704(c)(1)(C)
creates an asymmetrical basis rule. If the property were sold for more than
$7,000, the partnership's gain always would be computed with respect to the
$7,000 § 723 transferred basis. Section 704(c)(1)(C) would operate similarly if
instead of C withdrawing from the partnership, which was continued by A and
B, C sold the partnership interest to D. In the case of a transferred partnership
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interest, the transferee partner does not "step into the shoes" of the transferor
with respect to the § 704(c) built-in loss. The built-in loss is again eliminated.
0 Note that this is the transaction
involved in the Long-Term Capital Holdings case, as well as the Santa Monica
Pictures LLC case.
2. Section 83 rules prevail on transfers of
partnership interests for services. REG-105346-03, Partnership Equity for
Services, 70 F.R. 29675 (5/24/05). Prop. Reg. § 1.83-3(e) and (1) and §
1.721-1(b) will apply § 83 to all partnership interests, without distinguishing
between partnership capital interests and partnership profits interests, when
the proposed regulations are finalized. These proposed regulations would
conform the subchapter K rules to the § 83 timing rules, revise the § 704(b)
regulations to take into account the possibility that allocations with respect to
an unvested interest may be forfeited, and provide that a partnership
generally recognizes no gain or loss on the transfer of an interest in the
partnership in connection with the performance of services for that
partnership.
* Under Prop. Reg. § 1.704-
l(b)(2)(iv)(b)(1), the service provider's capital account is increased by the
amount the service provider takes into income under § 83 as a result of
receiving the interest, plus any amounts paid for the interest. Under § 83, the
economic benefit of receiving a partnership interest in connection with the
performance of services is the amount that is included in the compensation
income of the service provider, plus the amount paid for the interest. This is the
amount by which the service partner's capital account should be increased.
0 Section 706(d)(1) provides generally
that, if, during any taxable year of a partnership, there is a change in any
partner's interest in the partnership, each partner's distributive share of any item
of income, gain, loss, deduction, or credit of the partnership for such taxable
year shall be determined by the use of any method prescribed by regulations,
which takes into account the varying interests of the partners in the partnership
during the taxable year. This ensures that partnership deductions that are
attributable to the portion of the partnership's taxable year prior to a new
partner's entry into the partnership are allocated to the historic partners.
* Section 83(b) allows a person who
receives nonvested property in connection with the performance of services to
elect to include in gross income the difference between: (1) the fair market value
of the property at the time of transfer (determined without regard to a restriction
other than a restriction which by its terms will never lapse); and (2) the amount
paid for such property. Under § 83(b)(2), the election under § 83(b) must be
made within thirty days of the date of the transfer of the property to the service
provider. Consistent with the principles of § 83, the proposed regulations
provide that, if a partnership interest is transferred in connection with the
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performance of services, and if an election under § 83(b) is not made, then the
holder of the partnership interest is not treated as a partner until the interest
becomes substantially vested. If a § 83(b) election is made with respect to such
an interest, the service provider will be treated as a partner. These principles
differ from Rev. Proc. 2001-43, 2001-2 C.B. 191, which provides that if a
partnership profits interest is transferred in connection with the performance of
services, then the holder of the partnership interest may be treated as a partner
even if no § 83(b) election is made.
* Prop. Reg. § 1.83-3(o would also
provide a safe harbor under which a partnership interest received as
compensation for services could be treated as having a fair market value equal
to its liquidation value, which in the case of a profits-only partnership interest is
zero. As under Rev. Proc. 93-27, 1993-2 C.B. 343, the safe harbor would not
apply in the following three specific situations: (1) the partnership's profits are
derived from a substantially certain and predictable stream of income, such as
from high quality debt or a net lease; (2) the partner disposes of the partnership
interest within two years of its receipt; or (3) the interest is a limited partnership
interest in a publicly traded limited partnership as defined in § 7704(b).
* Prop. Reg. §§ 1.83-6(b) and 1.721-
1(b)(2) would provide that a partnership does not recognize any gain or loss
upon the transfer of a partnership interest to a new partner in exchange for
services to the partnership (although the proposed regulations do preserve the
recognition result in McDougal v. Commissioner, 62 T.C. 720 (1974), if the
transfer of property in exchange for services creates a partnership). In
McDougal, the property transferred was half of a horse.
a As a practical matter, upon admission
of a partner it generally is necessary to revalue the partnership's property and
adjust the partners' capital accounts to reflect the revaluation. Reg. § 1.704-
1(b)(2)(iv)(/) specifically allows the partnership to revalue its property and
adjust the existing partners' capital accounts in connection with the grant of an
interest in the partnership (other than a de minimis interest) in consideration of
services to the partnership by an existing partner acting in a partner capacity or
by a new partner acting in a partner capacity or in anticipation of being a
partner.
* Forfeitable interests: When a
transferred partnership interest is subject to a substantial risk of forfeiture, unless
an election is made under § 83(b) the holder of the partnership interest is not
treated as a partner until the interest becomes substantially vested. See Reg. §
1.83-1(a)(1). If a § 83(b) election is made with respect to such an interest, the
service provider will be treated as a partner, even though the interest remains
forfeitable. These rules raise special problems regarding the tax treatment of
allocation of items of gain or loss to a partner during the period in which the
partner's interest remains forfeitable. If the partner who receives a forfeitable
partnership interest in exchange for services does not make a § 83(b) election
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with respect to that interest, the partner cannot be allocated any portion of
partnership income or loss, and any distributions made to the service provider
with respect to the partnership interest are treated as additional compensation
and not partnership distributions. But if a service partner who receives a
substantially nonvested partnership interest makes a valid § 83(b) election, the
service provider is treated as a partner with respect to such an interest, and the
partnership must allocate partnership items to the service provider as if the
partnership interest were substantially vested. See Notice 2005-43, 2005-24
I.R.B. 1221 (5/20/05).
Further complications arise if a
service provider who has received a forfeitable compensatory partnership
interest makes a § 83(b) election, is allocated items of partnership income and
loss and subsequently forfeits the partnership interest. Prop. Reg. § 1.704-
l(b)(4)(xii) would address these issues. The operation of the proposed
regulations is described in the preamble as follows:
If an election under section 83(b) has been made with
respect to a substantially nonvested interest, the holder of the
nonvested interest may be allocated partnership items that
may later be forfeited. For this reason, allocations of
partnership items while the interest is substantially
nonvested cannot have economic effect. Under the proposed
regulations, such allocations will be treated as being in
accordance with the partners' interests in the partnership if:
(a) the partnership agreement requires that the partnership
make forfeiture allocations if the interest for which the
section 83(b) election is made is later forfeited; and (b) all
material allocations and capital account adjustments under
the partnership agreement not pertaining to substantially
nonvested partnership interests for which a section 83(b)
election has been made are recognized under section 704(b).
This safe harbor does not apply if, at the time of the section
83(b) election, there is a plan that a substantially nonvested
interest will be forfeited. All of the facts and circumstances
(including the tax status of the holder of the substantially
nonvested interest) will be considered in determining
whether there is a plan that the interest will be forfeited. In
such a case, the partners' distributive shares of partnership
items shall be determined in accordance with the partners'
interests in the partnership under [Treas. Reg. §] 1.704-
l(b)(3).
Generally, forfeiture allocations are allocations to the service
provider of partnership gross income and gain or gross
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deduction and loss (to the extent such items are available)
that offset prior distributions and allocations of partnership
items with respect to the forfeited partnership interest. These
rules are designed to ensure that any partnership income (or
loss) that was allocated to the service provider prior to the
forfeiture is offset by allocations on the forfeiture of the
interest. Also, to carry out the prohibition under section
83(b)(1) on deductions with respect to amounts included in
income under section 83(b), these rules generally cause a
forfeiting partner to be allocated partnership income to offset
any distributions to the partner that reduced the partner's
basis in the partnership below the amount included in
income under section 83(b).
Forfeiture allocations may be made out of the partnership's
items for the entire taxable year. In determining the gross
income of the partnership in the taxable year of the
forfeiture, the rules of [Treas. Reg. §] 1.83-6(c) apply. As a
result, the partnership generally will have gross income in
the taxable year of the forfeiture equal to the amount of the
allowable deduction to the service recipient partnership upon
the transfer of the interest as a result of the making of the
section 83(b) election, regardless of the fair market value of
the partnership's assets at the time of forfeiture.
In certain circumstances, the partnership will not have
enough income and gain to fully offset prior allocations of
loss to the forfeiting service provider. The proposed revenue
procedure includes a rule that requires the recapture of losses
taken by the service provider prior to the forfeiture of the
interest to the extent that those losses are not recaptured
through forfeiture allocations of income and gain to the
service provider. This rule does not provide the other
partners in the partnership with the opportunity to increase
their shares of partnership loss (or reduce their shares of
partnership income) for the year of the forfeiture by the
amount of loss that was previously allocated to the forfeiting
service provider.
In other circumstances, the partnership will not have enough
deductions and loss to fully offset prior allocations of
income to the forfeiting service provider. It appears that, in
such a case, section 83(b)(1) may prohibit the service
provider from claiming a loss with respect to partnership
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income that was previously allocated to the service provider.
However, a forfeiting partner is entitled to a loss for any
basis in a partnership that is attributable to contributions of
money or property to the partnership (including amounts
paid for the interest) remaining after the forfeiture
allocations have been made. See [Treas. Reg. §] 1.83-2(a).
a. Procedures to be followed in order to
elect safe harbor treatment. Notice 2005-43, 2005-24 I.R.B. 1221
(5/20/05). That the notice contains a proposed revenue procedure issued
concurrently with these proposed regulations would allow a partnership, all
of its partners, and the service provider to elect to treat the fair market value
of a partnership interest as equal to the liquidation value of that interest. If
such an election is made, the capital account of a service provider receiving a
partnership interest in connection with the performance of services is
increased by the liquidation value of the partnership interest received. The
notice provides additional rules that partnerships, partners, and persons
providing services to the partnership in exchange for interests in that
partnership would be required to follow when electing under Prop. Reg.
§ 1.83-3(l) to treat the fair market value of those interests as being equal to
the liquidation value of those interests. For this purpose, the liquidation value
of a partnership interest is the amount of cash that the holder of that interest
would receive with respect to the interest if, immediately after the transfer of
the interest, the partnership sold all of its assets (including goodwill, going
concern value, and any other intangibles associated with the partnership's
operations) for cash equal to the fair market value of those assets, and then
liquidated.
* Section 83 generally provides that the
recipient of property transferred in connection with the performance of services
recognizes income equal to the fair market value of the property, disregarding
lapse restrictions. However, some authorities have concluded that, under the
particular facts and circumstances of the case, a partnership profits interest had
only a speculative value or that the fair market value of a partnership interest
should be determined by reference to the liquidation value of that interest. See
Reg. § 1.704-1(e)(1)(v); Campbell v. Commissioner, 943 F.2d 815 (8th Cir.
1991); St. John v. United States, 84-1 U.S.T.C. 9158 (C.D. I11. 1983). But see
Diamond v. Commissioner, 492 F.2d 286 (7th Cir. 1974) (holding under pre-
section 83 law that the receipt of a profits interest with a determinable value at
the time of receipt resulted in immediate taxation); Campbell v. Commissioner,
T.C. Memo 1990-162 (1990), affd in part and rev'd in part, 943 F.2d 815 (8th
Cir. 1991).
* The proposed revenue procedure
provides that when the regulations are finalized, Rev. Proc. 93-27 and Rev.
Proc. 2001-43, will be revoked.
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* Note: Practitioners should consider
inclusion of provisions in partnership agreements that require all partners to
consent to safe harbor treatment of partnership interests granted for services.
D. Sales of Partnership Interests, Liquidations and Mergers
1. Effect of partnership mergers on gain recognition
under §§ 704(c)(1)(B) and 737(b). Rev. Rul. 2004-43, 2004-18 I.R.B. 842
(4/12/04). This ruling deals with the application of §§ 704(c)(1)(B) and
737(b) in partnership mergers. The ruling holds that § 704(c)(1)(B) applies to
newly created § 704(c) gain or loss in property contributed by the transferor
partnership to the continuing partnership in an assets-over partnership
merger, but does not apply to newly created reverse § 704(c) gain or loss
resulting from a revaluation of property in the continuing partnership.
Similarly, for purposes of § 737(b), net precontribution gain includes newly
created § 704(c) gain or loss in property contributed by the transferor
partnership to the continuing partnership in an assets-over partnership
merger, but does not include newly created reverse § 704(c) gain or loss
resulting from a revaluation of property in the continuing partnership. Thus,
a distribution of property previously held by the disappearing partnership
will trigger gain recognition if the distribution occurs within seven years
after the merger.
a. Rev. Rul. 200443 is revoked, and
forthcoming regulations will be effective for distributions after 1/19/05.
Rev. Rul. 2005-10, 2005-7 I.R.B. 492 (1/19/05), revoking Rev. Rul. 2004-43,
2004-18 I.R.B. 842. The IRS revoked Rev. Rul. 2004-43 and announced that
it intended to promulgate regulations implementing the principles of Rev.
Rul. 2004-43, which will be effective after January 19, 2005.
E. Inside Basis Adjustments
There were no significant developments regarding this topic
during 2005.
F. Partnership Audit Rules
2. AD Global Fund, LLC v. United States, 67 Fed. Cl.
657 (9/16/05). Section 6629(a) provides an extended statute of limitations
rather than a separate period of limitations; issuance of Final Partnership
Administrative Adjustment (FPAA) suspends period of limitations under
IRC § 6501(a)), motion to certify appeal granted, 68 Fed. Cl. 663 (2005).
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G. Miscellaneous
There were no significant developments regarding this topic
during 2005.
VIII. TAx SHELTERS
A. Tax Shelter Cases
1. Significant government victory in tax shelter
case! Partnership's in-house tax counsel should have taken Nancy
Reagan's advice when Don Turlington pitched him a tax planning idea.
Long Term Capital Holdings v. United States, 330 F. Supp. 2d 122, (D.
Conn. 8/27/04). Judge Janet Bond Arterton poured out taxpayers by holding
that the tax shelter transaction [under which preferred stock with an inflated
basis was contributed to a partnership in a carryover basis transaction] lacked
economic substance (or, in the alternative, that the step transaction doctrine
required that it be recast into a direct sale of preferred stocks to taxpayers
with the result that the basis was equal to the amount they paid) and by
upholding the imposition of (in the alternative) both the 40 percent gross
valuation misstatement and the 20 percent substantial understatement
penalties. After that introductory statement, the remainder of the 198-page
opinion was all downhill for taxpayers and their lawyers.
* The inflated basis was the result of
several cross-border lease-stripping transactions which left a foreign entity
holding several million dollars worth of preferred stocks at a basis $385 million
greater than value. The lease-stripping transactions were supported by "should"
tax opinions issued by Shearman & Sterling when they were entered into.
* Taxpayers' in-house tax counsel
became interested in the possible utilization of the losses when approached by
Don Turlington, who suggested that the foreign entity contribute the preferred
stock to one of taxpayers' related partnerships, after which the foreign entity
would have its partnership interest redeemed. King & Spalding agreed to
furnish a "should" tax opinion that taxpayers could utilize the foreign entity's
losses, but did not actually provide the opinion until almost a year after the
partnership filed the return that took the losses.
* Holdings included: (1) the burden of
proof did not shift to the government under § 7491 because taxpayers failed to
provide a PowerPoint presentation and accompanying handout for a
presentation of Myron Scholes to the other eleven of taxpayers' principals and
taxpayers' net worth was not unambiguously shown to be under $7 million; (2)
the transaction lacked economic substance because the reasonably expected
return on it could not have resulted in a profit (with the court calling into
question the credibility of the former King & Spalding lawyer who was the
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primary drafter of the opinion); (3) the "end result" variety of the step
transaction doctrine - the most liberal of the three varieties - was applied to
conclude that taxpayers acquired the preferred stocks by purchase at a fair
market value basis; (4) the gross valuation misstatement resulted from the
claimed adjusted basis of the preferred stocks being more than 400 percent of
the adjusted basis that was found by the court to equal fair market value; (5) the
substantial understatement penalty was applied based upon taxpayers' failure to
show any authority that held a transaction devoid of economic substance could
produce deductible losses; (6) the § 6664(c) "reasonable cause.., and.., good
faith" exception did not apply because taxpayers failed to prove that the King &
Spalding oral advice provided to it before 4/15/98 [the day it filed the relevant
partnership return] satisfied the "reasonable cause" defense because of the
vagueness and lack of credibility of testimony as to the content of the oral
advice; and (7) the 1/27/99 written King & Spalding opinion did not provide
reasonable cause because its facts were unsubstantiated and its legal analysis
unsatisfactory in that it failed to discuss Second Circuit cases. Judge Arterton
summarized the opinion as follows:
Finally, no other evidence such as companion memoranda
discussing the application of the Second Circuit's decisions
in Goldstein, Gilman, Grove, Blake, and Grove, or the Tenth
Circuit's decision in Associated to the actual facts of the
[foreign entity] transaction was offered to show research for
King & Spalding's legal analysis and opinions. Such
background research does not involve obscure or
inaccessible caselaw references, is basic to a sound legal
product, especially for "should" level opinion and a
premium of $400,000. With hourly billing totals exceeding
$100,000 there could not have been research time
constraints.
In essence, the testimony and evidence offered by Long
Term regarding the advice received from King & Spalding
amounted to general superficial pronouncements asking the
Court to "trust us; we looked into all pertinent facts; we were
involved; we researched all applicable authorities; we made
no unreasonable assumptions; Long Term gave us all
information." The Court's role as factfinder is more
searching and with specifics, analysis, and explanations in
such short supply, the King & Spalding effort is insufficient
to carry Long Term's burden to demonstrate that the legal
advice satisfies the threshold requirements of reasonable
good faith reliance on advice of counsel."
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* Myron Scholes and Robert Merton,
who shared the 1997 Nobel prize in Economics were two of taxpayers' twelve
principals. Taxpayers were the component parts of one of the highest-flying
hedge funds until it had to be rescued from collapse by fourteen banks [acting at
the instigation of the Federal Reserve] providing $3.65 billion to take the hedge
fund over.
* Query about where the substantial
authority penalty fits when you have told all to a tax professional and he tells
you that you have substantial authority - but the court finds that the underlying
facts are different from the facts that both you and the tax professional believe to
be true?
* Is there a duty on a client to read and
understand a tax opinion beyond checking that the facts upon which the opinion
is based are correct?
a. On the appeal of the imposition of
penalties, the Second Circuit affirms. Long-Term Capital Holdings, LP v.
United States, 150 Fed. Appx. 40 (2d Cir. 9/27/05) (unpublished). The court
stated that taxpayer was not required to "second-guess the advice of its tax
experts" but instead that it did not receive relevant tax advice upon which it
relied in reporting the $106 million loss, and - even if it had received such
advice - it could not have relied upon the opinion's assumptions of (1) valid
and substantial business purpose independent of federal income tax
considerations, (2) reasonable expectation of a material pre-tax profit, and
(3) no preexisting agreement on the part of Onslow Trading Company to sell
its partnership interest to the Long-Term Capital Management partnership.
The court upheld the 40 percent penalty based upon a basis misstatement
[specifically covered by the statute, but different from the typical valuation
misstatement to which the penalty has been applied in the past] and held that
a misstatement resulting from a legal dispute [as opposed to a factual
dispute] was also covered by the penalty and that the 40 percent penalty
applied where a transaction is "recast" for tax purposes under the economic
substance doctrine.
2. Significant taxpayer victory when its summary
judgment motion was granted; the contingent liability transaction was
upheld despite its being a listed transaction under Notice 2001-17. Black
& Decker Cor. v. United States, 340 F. Supp. 2d 621 (D. Md. 10/20/04,
revised, 10/22/04). Government appeal pending. Judge Quarles held that the
transaction could not be disregarded as a sham because it had economic
implications for the parties to the transaction as well as to the beneficiaries of
taxpayer's health plans.
* Under the Fourth Circuit test in
Rice's Toyota World, Inc. v. Commissioner, 752 F.2d 89 (1985), a transaction
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will be treated as a sham only if the court finds that "the taxpayer was motivated
by no business purposes other than obtaining tax benefits in entering the
transaction, and that the transaction has no economic substance because no
reasonable possibility of a profit exists." Taxpayer conceded for purposes of its
motion "that tax avoidance was its sole motivation." The court held that "[a]
corporation and its transactions are objectively reasonable, despite any tax-
avoidance motive, so long as the corporation engages in bona fide
economically-based business transactions."
* Note how Judge Quarles shifted the
second prong of the test from "reasonable possibility of profit" to "bona fide
business transaction."
* The transaction was a listed tax
shelter under Notice 2001-17, 2001-9 I.R.B. 730.
* In 1998, Black & Decker sold three
of its businesses and realized significant capital gains. That same year, Black &
Decker created Black & Decker Healthcare Management Inc. (BDHMI), to
which it transferred approximately $561 million dollars, with BDHMI assuming
$560 million dollars in contingent employee healthcare claims against Black &
Decker. Black & Decker then sold the BDHMI stock to a third-party for $1
million dollars, and claimed a $560 million loss on the grounds that its basis in
the BDHMI stock was $561 million dollars. The court concluded that
§§ 357(c)(3) and 358(d)(2) applied and that Black & Decker's basis in the
BDHMI stock properly was not reduced by the amount of the contingent
employee healthcare claims. It rejected the IRS contention that the claims had to
be deductible by the transferee (BDHMI), and, based upon the legislative
history of § 357(c)(3), concluded that there was no reduction in basis because
the contingent claims were liabilities that would have been deductible by the
transferor shareholder had it paid the claims.
a. Government's summary judgment
motion had been denied earlier on a pro-taxpayer rationale. Black &
Decker Corp. v. United States, 2004-2 U.S.T.C. 50,359 (D. Md. 8/3/04).
As the facts were stated in the opinion,
In 1998, B & D sold three of its businesses. As a result of
these sales, B & D generated significant capital gains. That
same year, B & D created Black & Decker Healthcare
Management Inc. ("BDHMI"). B & D transferred
approximately $561 million dollars to BDHMI along with
$560 million dollars in contingent employee healthcare
claims in exchange for newly issued stock in BDHMI. B &
D sold its stock in BDHMI to an independent third-party for
$1 million dollars. Because B & D believed that its basis in
the BDHMI stock was $561 million dollars, the value of the
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property it had transferred to BDHMI, B & D claimed
approximately $560 million dollars in capital loss on the
sale, which it reported on its 1998 federal tax return. B & D
applied a portion of the capital loss to offset its capital gains
from selling the three businesses, and carried back and
carried forward the remaining capital loss to offset gains in
prior and future tax years. (citations omitted)
* The court went on to analyze and
conclude that §§ 357(c)(3) and 358(d) applied so the basis of the subsidiary's
stock is not reduced by the amount of the contingent employee healthcare
claims. It rejected the IRS contention that the claims had to be deductible by the
transferee [the subsidiary], and held that (based upon the 1978 legislative
history to § 357(c)(3)) the only requirement is that the claims must be
deductible by taxpayer [the transferor corporation].
* Section 358(h), added in 2000 and
amended in 2002, would preclude this result for assumptions of liability after its
10/18/99 effective date. If the basis of stock received in a § 351 transaction
otherwise would exceed its fair market value, § 358(h) requires that the basis of
the stock be reduced (but not below the fair market value) by the amount
(determined as of the date of the exchange) of any § 357(c)(3) liability that was
assumed by the corporation. For this purpose, "liability" is broadly defined to
include "any fixed or contingent obligation to make payment, without regard to
whether the obligation is otherwise taken into account for purposes of [the
income tax]."
b. Black & Decker in the Fourth Circuit: the
holding that basis was not reduced by contingent deductible liabilities
was affirmed, but the holding that the transaction did not lack economic
substance was reversed and the case was remanded for trial. Black &
Decker Corp. v. United States, 436 F.3d 431 (4th Cir. 2/2/06), affg denial of
government's motion for summary judgment at 2004-2 U.S.T.C. 50,359 (D.
Md. 8/3/04), rev'g grant of taxpayer's motion for summary judgment at 340
F. Supp. 2d 621 (D. Md. 10/22/04), and remanding for trial. Judge
Michael's opinion held that the government motion for summary judgment
was properly denied because the statute in effect at the time of the
transaction permitted taxpayer to do what it did, stating:
The IRS presses two arguments for why Taxpayer cannot
claim the § 357(c)(3) exception. The first argument relies on
legislative history. The IRS focuses on sentences such as the
first of the two from the Senate Report quoted. It contends
that Congress crafted the exception to protect a parent
corporation from a tax double whammy when transferring
both assets and associated liabilities to a subsidiary in
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exchange for stock. From this perspective, Congress wanted
to prevent such parent corporations from being twice
penalized by (1) deprivation of the right to deduct the
transferred liabilities as they accrued and (2) mandatory
reduction of the stock basis by the amount of the liabilities
transferred. Since Taxpayer only transferred the health
claims but not the assets generating those claims, the IRS
argues that Congress did not intend for Taxpayer to benefit
from § 357(c)(3). Further, the IRS reads the quoted phrase
"would have given rise to a deduction," S. Rep. No. 96-498,
at 62, to mean a deduction unavailable to the transferor once
the liability has been transferred.
The legislative history argument does not persuade us. The
prototypical transaction Congress had in mind in drafting
§ 357(c)(3) may well have been one in which a corporation
exchanged liabilities as part of a transfer of an entire trade or
business to a controlled subsidiary, but nothing in the
section's plain language embraces such a limitation. As a
result we find no ambiguity in the statute that requires us to
parse the congressional record and discern what type of
business transactions Congress originally envisioned in
enacting the section. The Senate Report's use of the phrase
"would have given rise" also does not go as far as the IRS
would have us take it. On the contrary, we agree with one
commentator's observation that this language "does not
imply . . . that Congress silently contemplated a case in
which liabilities are transferred but the deduction is retained
by the transferor and [then] concluded that § 357(c)(3)
should not apply." Ethan Yale, Reexamining Black &
Decker's Contingent Liability Tax Shelter, 108 Tax Notes
223, 234 (July 11, 2005).
The IRS's second argument is based on sound
administration of the tax laws, because the Taxpayer should
not be allowed to take the "functional equivalent of a double
deduction." Appellant's Br. at 59. Although Taxpayer has
not claimed the employee health expenses as a deduction
(BDHMI, not a party to this suit, claims them instead), the
IRS argues that Taxpayer has the legal right to seek these
deductions as health care costs accrue. In the IRS's view, the
$560 million loss that Taxpayer reported effectively
accelerates deductions for uncertain future health care costs
through the year 2007. Such acceleration would contravene
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the prohibition against claiming a deduction in a given tax
year for an estimate of liabilities that have not become fixed
by the end of that year. Here, receipt of medical care and
filing of proper claims forms would fix the annual health
care liability. United States v. Gen. Dynamics Corp., 481
U.S. 239, 242-45, 107 S. Ct. 1732, 95 L. Ed. 2d 226 (1987).
Again, we are not convinced that the language of § 357(c)(3)
is so unclear as to permit us to rely on this policy argument
and adopt the IRS's reading. In addition, because BDHMI
files a tax return separate from Taxpayer's and has been
taking the deductions for the health care expenses as the
expenses are incurred, the "double deduction" argument
would only work if we were to treat BDHMI and Taxpayer
as a single entity. We see no justification on the present
record for disregarding the distinct corporate taxpayer
identities of BDHMI and Taxpayer. Rather, we agree with
Taxpayer: "BDHMI pays the claims; BDHMI takes the
deductions - not Taxpayer." Appellee's Br. at 27.
We conclude that the contingent liability Taxpayer
transferred to BDHMI falls within the § 357(c)(3) exception
for "liability the payment of which ... would give rise to a
deduction." Therefore, under § 358(d)(2)'s exception to the
general rule of § 358(d)(1), the liability need not be treated
as "money received" by Taxpayer for basis reduction
purposes. For this reason the district court's denial of the
IRS's summary judgment motion was correct.
0 Judge Michael held that the
government was entitled to a trial on the issue of whether the transaction was a
sham, stating:
The district court's approach to the objective prong
strayed from our precedents. Although the district court
quoted the pertinent language from Rice's Toyota, see 340 F.
Supp. 2d at 623, it went on to assert: "A corporation and its
transactions are objectively reasonable, despite any tax-
avoidance motive, so long as the corporation engages in
bona fide economically-based business transactions." Id. at
623-24. In so reasoning, the district court mischaracterized
the Rice's Toyota test, which focuses not on the general
business activities of a corporation, but on the specific
transaction whose tax consequences are in dispute. "The
second prong of the sham inquiry, the economic substance
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inquiry, requires an objective determination of whether a
reasonable possibility of profit from the transaction existed
apart from tax benefits." Rice's Toyota, 752 F.2d at 94
(emphasis added). Thus, many of the undisputed facts upon
which the district court relied in concluding that Taxpayer
was entitled to summary judgment - including the facts that
BDHMI "maintained salaried employees" and paid health
claims as they came due with BDHMI assets, 340 F. Supp.
2d at 624 - were simply not germane to the proper inquiry
under the second prong of our circuit's sham transaction test.
We do not agree with Taxpayer's contention that the
Supreme Court's decision in Moline Properties, Inc. v.
Commissioner, 319 U.S. 436, 63 S. Ct. 1132, 87 L. Ed.
1499, 1943 C.B. 1011 (1943), supports the district court's
analysis of the objective prong under Rice's Toyota. The
Court in Moline held that a corporate taxpayer, the
petitioner, "had a tax identity distinct from its stockholder,"
an individual, such that gain realized on sales in two tax
years were to be treated as income taxable to the
corporation, not to the individual; 319 U.S. at 440. To reach
this conclusion, the Court examined the purposes for the
individual's establishment of the corporation. Id. at 439-40.
The Court recognized that in some tax cases "the corporate
form may be disregarded where it is a sham or unreal." Id. at
439. Moline is not implicated, however, by the IRS's
allegation that under the objective prong of the sham
transaction test there was no reasonable profit opportunity in
the two-phase transaction Taxpayer executed with BDHMI
in November and December 1998. The IRS is not arguing at
this point that BDHMI's corporate identity separate from
Taxpayer must be disregarded for tax purposes, such that
income earned by one is to be attributed to the other. Shams
under Rice's Toyota are distinct from shams under Moline.
In particular, a shareholder's transaction with a controlled
corporation may be a sham under Rice's Toyota even if the
corporation is entitled to regard its income as distinct from
its shareholder's because the corporation is not itself a sham
under Moline.
Hines illustrates the proper analysis under the objective
prong of the Rice 's Toyota. Hines involved an IRS challenge
to investment interest and depreciation deductions stemming
from a taxpayer's purchase and lease back to the seller of
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used computer equipment. We first noted that the payments
on the transaction would leave the taxpayer "with a loss of
$127,324 over the eight years of the lease" to the seller; 912
F.2d at 739. We next identified all of the possible sources of
revenue on the transaction and weighed them against this
loss. See id. at 739-40. Viewing the evidence in the light
most favorable to the taxpayer, which had won at trial, we
nevertheless concluded that the transaction "failed to yield
any reasonable expectation of a profit." Id. at 739. Hines
clarifies that under this circuit's firmly established Rice's
Toyota standard, the objective prong of the sham transaction
test focuses on reasonable expected profits from a
transaction. There is no basis here for abandoning our
standard by scrutinizing the transaction for its "real
economic effects," despite Taxpayer's argument that we
should do so based on the law of another circuit. See United
Parcel Serv. of Am., Inc. v. Comm'r, 254 F.3d 1014, 1019
(11 th Cir. 2001).
0 As illustrated by Rev. Rul. 95-74,
§ 357(c)(3) applies not only to cash method accounts payable, but also to
liabilities of accrual method transferors that have not yet been allowed as a
deduction under the economic performance rules of § 461(h) or because the
liability is too contingent. As a result, § 358(d)(2) applies and the transferor
shareholder's basis in the stock received in the exchange is not reduced by the
liability. Aggressive tax planners took advantage of this pattern of the
interaction of the various statutory provisions to create artificial double
deductions.
3. A second taxpayer victory in a listed contingent
liability transaction. Coltec Industries, Inc. v. United States, 62 Fed. Cl. 716
(10/29/04), Government appeal pending. Taxpayer transferred its asbestos
liabilities to an asbestos case management entity ["Garrison"], which was
existing shell subsidiary that had no assets, together with a related party note
for $375 million and some other miscellaneous assets. It sold about 6.67
percent of the Garrison stock to two banks for a total of $500,000 and
reported a multimillion dollar loss that saved it over $82 million in taxes.
Judge Susan G. Braden found that this transaction satisfied all the
requirements of existing law.
0 Judge Braden rejected the concept of
a court applying the economic substance doctrine to tax cases on the ground that
taxpayers "must be able to rely on clear and understandable rules established by
Congress to ascertain their federal tax obligations." After discussing the
complexity of the economic substance doctrine, she concluded "that where a
taxpayer has satisfied all statutory requirements established by Congress, as
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Coltec did in this case, the use of the 'economic substance' doctrine to trump
'mere compliance with the Code' would violate the separation of powers."
0 As illustrated by Rev. Rul. 95-74,
1995-2 C.B. 36, § 357(c)(3) applies not only to cash method accounts payable,
but also to liabilities of accrual method transferors that have not yet been
allowed as a deduction under the economic performance rules of § 461(h) or
because the liability is too contingent. As a result, § 358(d)(2) applies and the
transferor shareholder's basis in the stock received in the exchange is not
reduced by the liability. Aggressive tax planners took advantage of this pattern
of the interaction of the various statutory provisions to create artificial double
deductions. Here, in a transaction subject to § 351, one corporation, Garlock,
contributed to another corporation, Garrison, cash, a $375 million promissory
note to Garlock from a related corporation, and certain other property. In
connection with the transfer Garrison assumed $371.2 million of Garlock's
contingent liabilities for asbestos product liability damage claims (neither of the
events necessary to establish the fact of the liability had occurred, i.e., the filing
of a lawsuit asserting a claim and an adjudication of liability). Shortly thereafter,
Garlock sold a significant number of the shares of Garrison and claimed
approximately $370 million of losses, having determined the basis of the
Garrison stock with reference to an exchanged basis under § 358 that was not
reduced to reflect the assumption of the contingent asbestos liabilities. Since the
liabilities were contingent and the liabilities would have been deductible by the
transferor upon payment, the court held that the liabilities were within those
described in §§ 357(c)(3)(A) and 358(d)(2), and thus neither § 357(c)(1),
requiring the recognition of gain to the extent that the amount of liabilities
exceed the basis of the contributed assets, nor § 358(d)(1), requiring the
reduction of the transferred basis assigned to the stock, applied. Therefore,
Garlock's basis in Garrison properly was the exchanged based of the transferred
property, unreduced by the amount of liabilities assumed by Garrison, and the
loss was allowed.
4. The third taxpayer victory in thirteen days, in a
self-liquidating partnership note transaction in which the lion's share of
income was allocated to a tax-indifferent party. Satisfaction of the
mechanical rules of the regulations under § 704(b) transcends both an
intent to avoid tax and the avoidance of significant tax through agreed
upon partnership allocations So far, this lease stripping transaction
works for a burned-out tax shelter. TIFD III-E. Inc. v. United States, 342
F. Supp. 2d 94 (D. Conn. 11/1/04), Government appeal pending. This case
involved a tax shelter partnership in which 2 percent of both operating and
taxable income was allocated to GECC, a United States partner, and 98
percent of both book and taxable income was allocated to partners who were
Dutch banks, foreign partners who were not liable for U.S. taxes and thus
were indifferent to the U.S. tax consequences of their participation in the
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partnership. Because the partnership had very large book depreciation
deductions and no tax depreciation, most of the partnership's taxable
operating income, which was substantially in excess of book income, was
allocated to the tax-indifferent foreign partners, even though a large portion
of the cash receipts reflected in that income was devoted to repaying the
principal of loans secured by property that GECC had contributed to the
partnership. The overall partnership transaction saved GECC approximately
$62 million in income taxes, and the court found that "it appears likely that
one of GECC's principal motivations in entering into this transaction -
though certainly not its only motivation - was to avoid that substantial tax
burden." The court understood the effects of the allocations and concluded
that "by allocating 98 percent of the income from fully tax-depreciated
aircraft to the Dutch Banks, GECC avoided an enormous tax burden, while
shifting very little book income. Put another way, by allocating income less
depreciation to tax-neutral parties, GECC was able to 're-depreciate' the
assets for tax purposes. The tax-neutrals absorbed the tax consequences of all
the income allocated to them, but actually received only the income in excess
of book depreciation." Nevertheless, the court upheld the allocations.
The tax benefits of the ... transaction were the result of the
allocation of large amounts of book income to a tax-neutral
entity, offset by a large depreciation expense, with a
corresponding allocation of a large amount of taxable
income, but no corresponding allocation of depreciation
deductions. This resulted in an enormous tax savings, but the
simple allocation of a large percentage of income violates no
rule. The government does not - and cannot - dispute that
partners may allocate their partnership's income as they
choose. Neither does the government dispute that the taxable
income allocated to the Dutch Banks could not be offset by
the allocation of non-existent depreciation deductions to the
banks. And . . . the bare allocation of a large interest in
income does not violate the overall tax effect rule.
0 Because the partnership had very
large book depreciation deductions and no tax depreciation, most of the
partnership's taxable operating income, which was substantially in excess of
book taxable income, was allocated to the tax-indifferent foreign partners, even
though a large portion of the cash receipts reflected in that income was devoted
to repaying the principal of loans secured by property that GECC had
contributed to the partnership. The overall partnership transaction saved GECC
approximately $62 million in income taxes, and the court found that "it appears
likely that one of GECC's principal motivations in entering into this transaction
- though certainly not its only motivation - was to avoid that substantial tax
burden." The court understood the effects of the allocations and concluded that
[Vol 8:SI
Recent Developments in Federal Income Taxation
"by allocating 98 percent of the income from fully tax-depreciated aircraft to the
Dutch Banks, GECC avoided an enormous tax burden, while shifting very little
book income. Put another way, by allocating income less depreciation to
tax-neutral parties, GECC was able to 're-depreciate' the assets for tax
purposes."
* The court found that the creation of
Castle Harbour, a Nevada LLC, by General Electric Capital Corp. subsidiaries
was not designed solely to avoid taxes, but to spread the risk of their investment
in fully-depreciated commercial airplanes used in their leasing operations.
GECC subsidiaries put the following assets into Castle Harbor: $530 million
worth of fully-depreciated aircraft subject to a $258 million non-recourse debt,
$22 million of rents receivable, $296 million of cash, and all the stock of
another GECC subsidiary that had a value of $0. Two tax-indifferent Dutch
Banks invested $117.5 million in Castle Harbour under the LLC agreement, and
the tax-indifferent partners were allocated 98 percent of the book income and 98
percent of the tax income.
* The book income was net of
depreciation and the tax income did not take depreciation into account [because
the airplanes were fully depreciated]. Depreciation deductions for book
purposes were on the order of 60 percent of the rental income for any given
year.
* Query whether § 704(b) was properly
applied to this transaction?
* The court (Judge Underhill) held that
satisfaction of the mechanical rules of the regulations under § 704(b)
transcended both an intent to avoid tax and the avoidance of significant tax
through agreed upon partnership allocations. In this partnership, 2 percent of
both operating and taxable income was allocated to GECC, a United States
partner, and 98 percent of both book and taxable income was allocated to
partners who were Dutch banks. The Dutch banks were foreign partners who
were not liable for United States taxes and thus were indifferent to the U.S. tax
consequences of their participation in the partnership.
* Judge Underhill concluded:
The government is understandably concerned that the Castle
Harbour transaction deprived the public fisc of some $62
million in tax revenue. Moreover, it appears likely that one
of GECC's principal motivations in entering into this
transaction - though certainly not its only motivation - was
to avoid that substantial tax burden. Nevertheless, the Castle
Harbour transaction was an economically real transaction,
undertaken, at least in part, for a non-tax business purpose;
the transaction resulted in the creation of a true partnership
with all participants holding valid partnership interests; and
the income was allocated among the partners in accordance
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with the Internal Revenue Code and Treasury Regulations.
In short, the transaction, though it sheltered a great deal of
income from taxes, was legally permissible. Under such
circumstances, the I.R.S. should address its concerns to those
who write the tax laws.
The Castle Harbour case has
generated significant commentary suggesting that the court erred in its
determination that the allocations had substantial economic effect. See, e.g.,
Karen C. Burke, Castle Harbour: Economic Effect and the Overall-Tax-Effect
Test, 107 Tax Notes 1163 (May 30, 2005). Although the allocations might have
had economic effect under Treas. Reg. §1.704-1(b)(2)(ii), the allocations were
not substantial under Treas. Reg. § 1.704-1(b)(2)(iii). The factual analysis is
quite complex. Because the income stream was completely predictable and
under the partnership agreement the end result was that the Dutch banks merely
recouped their investment plus a guaranteed 8.5 percent return, the allocations
were not substantial under Treas. Reg. § 1.704-1 (b)(2)(iii)(a) because as a result
of the allocations, when compared to an allocation of book income that simply
reflected the amounts actually to be ultimately distributed to the partners under
the agreement, that the after-tax economic consequences of the other partners
were enhanced, and there was a strong likelihood that the after-tax
consequences to the Dutch banks would not be diminished.
5. Santa Monica Pictures, LLC v. Commissioner, T.C.
Memo. 2005-104 (5/11/05). The Tax Court (Judge Thornton) held that an
LLC formed to purchase the high-basis, low-value assets of the former
parent company of MGM, was not entitled to capital losses on the order of
$380 million because the transactions it undertook lacked economic
substance and cannot be respected for Federal tax purposes, and that the LLC
lacked basis in any of the assets it sold. Judge Thornton also imposed the 40
percent gross valuation misstatement and the 20 percent substantial
understatement penalties.
6. Deductions for interest on policy loans under
Winn-Dixie's pre-1996 HIPAA leveraged COLI program were denied by
both the Tax Court and Eleventh Circuit. Winn-Dixie Stores, Inc. v.
Commissioner, 113 T.C. 254 (10/19/99). In 1993, taxpayer entered into a
broad-based leveraged corporate-owned life insurance group plan covering
approximately 36,000 of its employees. The decision to shift from its
existing "key-person" COLI program of individual policies [covering 615
managers] was made pursuant to a proposal that emphasized the "tax
arbitrage created when deductible policy loan interest is paid to finance non-
taxable policy gains." The proposal indicated that taxpayer would have a pre-
tax loss totaling $755 million for its 1993-2052 years, but would have total
after-tax earnings of more than $2.2 billion for the same period (as the result
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of total projected income tax savings of more than $3 billion). The COLI
policies were terminated in 1997, following 1996 legislation that impacted
the plan.
Judge Ruwe held that the COLI
program lacked substance and business purpose, and thus was a sham. He
rejected taxpayer's argument that the policies could conceivably produce pre-tax
benefits if some catastrophe were to occur that would produce large, unexpected
death benefits. "We are convinced that this was so improbable as to be
unrealistic and therefore had no economic significance." The court further found
that the possible use of projected after-tax earnings to fund employee benefit
plans would not cause the COLI plan to have economic substance, noting that, if
so, "every sham tax-shelter device might succeed." In light of the $3,000 per
year premium paid to insure each employee or former employee, it was
irrelevant that there was a relatively small death benefit of $5,000 paid with
respect to each dead employee or former employee. Judge Ruwe rejected
taxpayer's position that the § 264 safe-harbor test protected its interest
deductions. He noted that the right to an interest deduction is governed by § 163
[and not § 264], citing Knetsch v. United States, 364 U.S. 361 (1960). He
further quoted, "But we do not agree with [taxpayer's] assertion that the
legislative history should be turned into an open-ended license applicable
without regard to the substance of the transaction ... Knetsch ... involved
transactions without substance. Congress, in enacting section 264(a)(3), struck
at transactions with substance. It is a reductio ad absurdum to reason, as
[taxpayer] does, that Congress simultaneously struck down a warm body and
breathed life into [taxpayer's] cadaver."
a. Affirmed by the Eleventh Circuit, which
holds that - even though the UPS insurance scheme has business reality
- the COLI tax shelter is a sham. Winn-Dixie Stores, Inc. v.
Commissioner, 254 F.3d 1313 (1 Ith Cir. 6/28/01) (per curiam). The Eleventh
Circuit rejected taxpayer's primary argument that Congress specifically
authorized the interest deduction in the 4-out-of-7 rule of § 264. It concluded
that in Knetsch the Supreme Court clearly "rejected an argument based on
section 264 that is at least a cousin of Winn-Dixies's present contention ...
that Congress's failure to close a loophole in section 264 equated to blessing
the loophole." The Eleventh Circuit concluded that Knetsch stood for the
proposition that "that the sham-transaction doctrine does apply to
indebtedness that generates interest sought to be deducted under section
163(a), even if the interest deduction is not yet prohibited by section 264."
0 The Eleventh Circuit held that the
Tax Court properly applied the sham transaction doctrine:
That doctrine provides that a transaction is not entitled to tax
respect if it lacks economic effects or substance other than
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the generation of tax benefits, or if the transaction serves no
business purpose .... The doctrine has few bright lines, but
"[i]t is clear that transactions whose sole function is to
produce tax deductions are substantive shams." [Kirchman
v. Comm'r, 862 F.2d 1486, 1492 (1lth Cir. 1989)]. That
was, as we read the tax court's opinion, the rule the tax court
followed. Nor did the court misapply the rule in concluding
that the broad-based COLI program had no "function" other
than generating interest deductions.
The tax court found, without challenge here, that the
program could never generate a pretax profit. That was what
Winn- Dixie thought as it set up the program, and it is the
most plausible explanation for Winn-Dixie's withdrawal
after the 1996 changes to the tax law threatened the tax
benefits Winn-Dixie was receiving. No finding of the tax
court suggests, furthermore, that the broad-based COLI
program answered any business need of Winn-Dixie, such as
indemnifying it for loss of key employees .... [T]herefore,
the broad- based COLI program lacked sufficient economic
substance to be respected for tax purposes, and the tax court
did not err in so concluding.
b. Third Circuit comes down hard on COLI,
with lots of language the government will love. Internal Revenue Service
v. CM Holdinas Inc. (In re CM Holdings, Inc.), 301 F.3d 96 (3d Cir.
8/16/02), afJ'g 254 B.R. 578 (D. Del. 10/16/00). In CMI's bankruptcy, the
IRS filed proofs of claim for taxes based on the disallowance of interest
deductions that CMI claimed for its COLI plan (involving policies on 1400
employees).
* The district court held no interest
deduction was allowable under § 163(a) because the entire transaction was a
"sham in substance" that lacked subjective business purpose. Apart from tax
savings from the interest deduction, CMI could not reasonably expect a positive
cash flow from the COLI plan in any year and could not expect to benefit from
the inside cash value build-up [which continuously remained at zero throughout
the plan] or profit from the death benefits on covered employees. Interest
deductions were disallowed, and § 6662 substantial understatement penalties
were imposed because the transaction lacked economic substance. The
transaction was entered into without a reasonable expectation of profit - in the
absence of the interest deductions - over the life of the 40-year transaction from
either the inside build-up or mortality components of the plan.
* The Third Circuit Court of Appeals
(Judge Ambro) affirmed on the ground that the "COLI policies lacked economic
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substance and therefore were economic shams." [The court did not reach the
issue of whether the transactions were factual shams.] The court dismissed out
of hand the need to examine the "intersection of... statutory details."
[P]ursuant to Gregory v. Helvering, 293 U.S. 465 (1935),
and Knetsch v. United States, 364 U.S. 361 (1960), courts
have looked beyond taxpayers' formal compliance with the
Code and analyzed the fundamental substance of
transactions. Economic substance is a prerequisite to the
application of any Code provision allowing deductions....
It is the Government's trump card; even if a transaction
complies precisely with all requirements for obtaining a
deduction, if it lacks economic substance it "simply is not
recognized for federal taxation purposes, for better or for
worse."
In holding for the government, the
court rejected the taxpayer's argument that [based on Gregory, Knetsch, ACM
Partnership and other cases] the application of the economic sham doctrine
properly hinges on the "'fleeting and inconsequential' nature" of the transaction
under scrutiny. Rather, the court concluded that "[d]uration alone cannot
sanctify a transaction that lacks economic substance. The appropriate
examination is of the net financial effect to the taxpayer, be it short or long term.
The point of our analysis in ACMPartnership is that the transactions 'offset one
another with no net effect on ACM's financial position."' In any event, the court
found the COLI transactions bore "striking similarities" to Knetsch. The court
further rejected the argument that for analytical purposes the pre-tax profit
should have been "grossed-up" by the anticipated tax benefits because,
[t]he point of the analysis is to remove from consideration
the challenged tax deduction, and evaluate the transaction on
its merits, to see if it makes sense economically or is mere
tax arbitrage. Courts use "pre-tax" as shorthand for this, but
they do not imply that the court must imagine a world
without taxes, and evaluate the transaction accordingly.
Instead they focus on the abuse of the deductions claimed:
"[w]here a transaction has no substance other than to create
deductions, the transaction is disregarded for tax purposes."
[citation omitted] Choosing a tax-favored investment vehicle
is fine, but engaging in an empty transaction that shuffles
payments for the sole purpose of generating a deduction is
not.
Finally, the court rejected the
taxpayer's argument that because "the transaction had objective non-tax
economic effects.., the Court must not look further," and that the district court
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improperly applied a subjective analysis. Rather, the Court of Appeals read
Gregory to permit an inquiry into motive. "If Congress intends to encourage an
activity, and to use taxpayers' desire to avoid taxes as a means to do it, then a
subjective motive of tax avoidance is permissible. But to engage in an activity
solely for the purpose of avoiding taxes where that is not the statute's goal is to
conduct an economic sham." Because the court found nothing in the statute to
indicate that Congress intended to encourage leveraged COLI investments, the
inquiry into motive was proper. In this regard, it was significant that "the plan
was marketed as a tax-driven investment." Because the COLI "plan had no net
effect on Camelot's economic position, . . . it fails the objective prong of the
economic sham analysis." Because there was no "legitimate business purpose
behind the plan, . . . it fails the subjective prong as well." Penalties were also
upheld.
c. But a District Court finds for the
taxpayer in an incredible opinion. Dow Chemical Co. v. United States, 250
F. Supp. 2d 748 (E.D. Mich. 3/31/03). In a carefully-detailed opinion Judge
Lawson finds that Dow did correctly almost everything that Camelot and
AEP did incorrectly. The interest rate on policy loans was not unreasonably
high, and a positive pre-tax cash flow was expected. The court found that
there was a business purpose for the COLI arrangements, i.e., to provide
retiree benefits. The premiums for the first three years were payable with
policy loans and the premiums for years four through seven were payable 90
percent with partial [cash] withdrawals (from policies whose cash value had
been previously borrowed) and 10 percent with cash from the taxpayer.
Judge Lawson found that the partial withdrawals were "shams in fact"
because there was no cash value left in the policies to borrow, but that the
§ 264(c)(1) test was met because of the payments of 10 percent of the
premiums by taxpayer with its own cash in years four through seven. The
court found that the § 264(c)(1) safe harbor did not require level premiums
over the first seven years and that the "premium" for each of years four to
seven was the 10 percent paid in cash. Judge Lawson found that Reg.
§ 1.264-4(c)(1)(ii) (which required level premiums) was invalid, and he
rejected the holding in both CMHoldings and AEP that the four-out-of-seven
test required level premiums.
0 In finding that taxpayer expected a
positive pre-tax cash flow, Judge Lawson refused to admit into evidence a
statement in taxpayer's protest that could have led to a contrary conclusion on
the ground that Rule 408 of the Federal Rules of Evidence provides that
statements made during settlement negotiations are inadmissible at trial.
d. There's no harm in asking? Not from
asking Judge Lawson! Dow Chemical Co. v. United States, 278 F.Supp.2d
844 (E.D. Mich. 8/12/03). The government's motion to amend the court's
judgment was granted in part and denied in part, but left intact the same
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judgment and basic result. Ironically, since the motion opened up all findings
of fact, Judge Lawson reversed his earlier finding that the partial withdrawals
in years four through seven were "shams in fact," thus making moot the
government's argument relating to the logical consequences of this earlier
finding, i.e., that taxpayer did not meet the four-of-seven test because it did
not pay the entire premium in each of years four through seven from its own
funds.
e. The circuit to which Dow is appealable
(Sixth Circuit) holds for the government in a COLI case. American
Electric Power Co., Inc. v. United States, 326 F.3d 737 (6th Cir. 4/28/03).
The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the District Court finding that
taxpayer's COLI plan was an economic sham because it would lose a
substantial amount of money absent the policy-loan interest deductions. The
court declined to decide whether the dividends in years four through seven,
generated by circular cashless netting transactions, were factual shams.
f. Dow is reversed by the Sixth Circuit. Dow
Chemical Co. v. United States, 435 F.3d 594 (6th Cir. 1/23/06) (2-1). The
Sixth Circuit reversed and held that the Dow COLI plans were "economic
shams" because there was little likelihood that Dow would make substantial
cash infusions in the future, so the pre-tax cash flows would at all times be
negative, following Knetsch v. United States, 364 U.S. 361 (1960). This
holding eliminates the court's need to decide the proper discount rate, as well
as the issue of the exclusion of Dow's tax protest letters under Rule 408 of
the Federal Rules of Evidence [inadmissibility of statements made during
settlement negotiations]. The court further held that there would be little or
no inside build-up and that Dow's possible mortality gains were limited
under the plans.
Judge Ryan dissented on the ground
that the majority opinion improperly read Knetsch to hold as "a general
principle of law that future profits are not even relevant to the economic
substance inquiry when the taxpayer's projected future investment in a
particular plan is greater than its past investment in the plan, regardless whether
the projected future investment is feasible and there is evidence that it is likely
to occur;" instead, Judge Ryan states that Knetsch indicated only that the Court
made a credibility assessment and determined that Mr. Knetsch did not intend to
make the $4 million future investment necessary to pay off the loan. Judge Ryan
would also have found that the Dow plans transferred mortality risk to the
insurers so mortality gains were possible.
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B. Identified "tax avoidance transactions."
1. SILO transactions. Interestingly enough, sale-in,
lease-out (SILO) deals [under which a tax-exempt or foreign entity sells
property to the taxpayer and leases it back, with the lessee depositing
collateral in defeasance of its obligation] were not made "listed transactions,"
although President Bush's budget proposal seeks a legislative remedy for this
widespread perceived abuse. See 2004 TNT 19-3.
a. SILO transactions were closed retroactive
to 3/12/04. Section 848 of the Jobs Act of 2004 adds new § 470 to disallow
losses on leases of property for tax-exempt use that were entered into after
3/12/04. The disallowed losses would be carried over to the following year
much as disallowed passive activity losses are carried over. There is a safe
harbor provision contained in § 470(d).
b. SILOs are now listed transactions even
though the door was closed after 3/12/04. Notice 2005-13, 2005-9 I.R.B.
630 (2/11/05). This notice distinguishes the SILO transaction from the one in
FrankLyon Co. v. UnitedStates, 435 U.S. 561 (1978).
c. Relief for partnerships and pass-thru
entities who looked like they fed from "SILOs" in 2004 but really didn't.
Notice 2005-29, 2005-13 I.R.B. 796 (3/10/05). The Service will not apply
§ 470 to partnerships and pass-thru entities described in § 168(h)(6)(E) for
taxable years that begin before 1/1/05 in order to disallow losses associated
with property that is treated as tax-exempt use property solely as a result of
the application of § 168(h)(6) (describing property owned by a partnership
that has both tax-exempt and non-tax-exempt partners).
2. Transactions involving significant book-tax
differences are removed from the list of reportable transactions because
they are covered by Schedule M-3. Notice 2006-6, 2006-5 I.R.B. 385
(1/6/06). Transactions involving significant book-tax differences are
removed from the list of reportable transactions.
3. Accrual over the term of the notional principal
contract of the noncontingent component of the nonperiodic payment to
be received at the end of the term is required. Rev. Rul. 2002-30, 2002-21
I.R.B. 971 (5/6/02). When a notional principal contract provides for payment
comprised of noncontingent and contingent components, the appropriate
method for the inclusion in income or deduction of the noncontingent
component of the nonperiodic payment is over the term of the NPC. Interest
must also be accounted for in a manner consistent with Reg. §§ 1.446-3(f)(2)
(ii) or (iii), and 1.446-3(g)(4).
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0 Taxpayer agrees to make quarterly
payments to counterparty based on the three-month LIBOR multiplied by a
notional principal amount of $100,000,000. In return, at the end of eighteen
months, the counterparty will pay taxpayer 6 percent per year multiplied by a
notional principal amount of $92,000,000 [or, $8,280,000], and, in addition, the
counterparty will either pay taxpayer $8 million times the percentage increase in
the stock index, or taxpayer will pay the counterparty $8 million times the
percentage decrease in the stock index. The ruling holds that, to offset the
taxpayer's deductible quarterly payments, the taxpayer must ratably accrue over
the eighteen-month term the $8,280,000 that taxpayer will receive from the
counterparty at the end of the term.
a. An arrangement similar to that of Rev.
Rul. 2002-30 is identified as a listed tax shelter. Notice 2002-35, 2002-21
I.R.B. 992 (5/6/02). The transaction in this notice involves the use of a
notional principal contract to claim current deductions for periodic payments
made by a taxpayer, while disregarding the accrual of a right to receive
offsetting payments in the future. Under the NPC, taxpayer is required to
make periodic payments to a counterparty at regular intervals of one year or
less based on a fixed or floating rate index. In return, the counterparty is
required to make a single payment at the end of the term of the NPC that
consists of a noncontingent component and a contingent component. The
noncontingent component, which is relatively large in comparison to the
contingent component, may be based upon a fixed or floating interest rate;
the contingent component may reflect changes in the value of a stock index
or currency.
* This transaction may be entered into
without any initial cash investment by the taxpayer. The counterparty may lend
the money to the taxpayer, who pays it back in installments as purportedly
deductible payments. The taxpayer may engage in other transactions, such as
interest rate collars, for purposes of limiting risk with respect to the NPC
transaction.
* Taxpayer seeks to deduct the ratable
daily portion of each periodic payment to which that portion relates, but
taxpayer does not accrue income with respect to the nonperiodic payment until
the year the payment is received.
* The proper treatment of the payments
is that the nonperiodic payment to be received by the taxpayer at the end of the
term of the NPC must be accrued ratably over the term of the NPC, as set forth
in Rev. Rul. 2002-30.
* Transactions that are the same as, or
substantially similar to, the transaction described are identified as "listed
transactions" for purposes of Temp. Reg. §§ 1.6011-4T(b)(2) and 301.6011-
2T(b)(2).
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b. Certain notional principal contracts are
no longer listed transactions. Notice 2006-16, 2006-9 I.R.B. 538 (2/13/06),
clarifying and modifying Notice 2002-35, 2002-21 I.R.B. 992. "This notice
clarifies Notice 2002-35, 2002-1 C.B. 992, by illustrating certain transactions
that are not the same as or substantially similar to the transaction described in
Notice 2002-35, and thus are not "listed transactions."
C. Disclosure and Settlement
1. The Big Four settle with the IRS on tax shelters.
Deloitte settled with the IRS and agreed to a penalty to be determined after
the IRS settled with the other three.
a. The PwC deal. IR-2002-82 (6/27/02). The
IRS announced in a news release that it cut a deal with
PricewaterhouseCoopers (PwC) "to resolve issues relating to tax shelter
registration and list maintenance." The IRS news release, which is similar to
one issued last August regarding Merrill Lynch, says that without admitting
or denying liability, PwC has "agreed to make a 'substantial payment' to the
IRS to resolve issues in connection with advice rendered to clients dating
back to 1995." Under the agreement, PwC will provide to the IRS certain
client information in response to summonses. It will also work with the IRS
to develop processes to ensure ongoing compliance with the shelter
registration and investor list maintenance requirements, according to the
release.
b. The EY deal. IR-2003-84 (7/2/03). The IRS
announced in a news release that it has settled Ernst & Young's potential
liability under the tax shelter registration and list maintenance penalty
provisions for a nondeductible payment of $15 million. See 2003 TNT 128-
1.
c. The KPMG deal: the price of settling goes
up dramatically. IR-2005-83 (8/29/05). The IRS and the Justice Department
announced in a news release that KPMG LLP has admitted to criminal
wrongdoing and agreed to pay $456 million in fines, restitution and penalties
as part of an agreement to defer prosecution of the firm. Nineteen
individuals, chiefly former KPMG partners including the former deputy
chairman of the firm [Jeffrey Stein], as well as a New York lawyer [R.J.
Ruble], were indicted in the Southern District of New York in relation to the
"multi-billion dollar criminal tax fraud conspiracy"; three of those indicted
[Richard Smith, Philip Wiesner and Mark Watson] were partners in KPMG's
Washington National Tax group.
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2. Is this really the last chance global settlement
initiative? Announcement 2005-80, 2005-46 I.R.B. 967 (10/28/05).
Settlement initiative for twenty-one transactions, not all of them listed as
"abusive tax shelters," together with the accuracy-related penalty that will be
imposed [varying from 5 percent and 20 percent] unless the transaction was
disclosed under Announcement 2002-2, 2002-1 C.B. 304, or the taxpayer
relied upon a more-likely-than-not opinion from a non-disqualified tax
advisor that considered all the relevant facts and did not assume any
unreasonable facts. The terms of the settlement require that improperly-
claimed tax benefits be disallowed, but transaction costs will generally be
allowed as an ordinary loss. Promoters and related persons are not normally
eligible for the settlement initiative, and persons engaged in a transaction that
had been designated for litigation, persons in litigation, persons against
whom the fraud penalty was imposed or considered and persons under
criminal investigation are ineligible for the settlement initiative. Taxpayers
must notify the IRS of their intent to participate by 1/23/06 by making an
election on Form 13750 ("Election to Participate in Announcement 2005-80
Settlement Initiative"), and sending it, together with all required attachments,
to the Service.
a. Frequently Asked Questions. ("FAQs") on
the Announcement 2005-80 Settlement Initiative (Rev. 12/12/05), 2005 TNT
239-8 and the IRS web site.
0 Son-of-Boss transactions are
ineligible for the settlement initiative.
b. Strong encouragement for taxpayers to
use Announcement 2005-80 global settlement initiative. Section 303 of
the GO Zone Act of 2005 amends § 903 of the Jobs Act of 2004 to provide
that the § 6404(g) post-18-month interest suspension will not apply at all to
reportable and listed transactions that are still open on 12/14/05 unless the
taxpayer is participating in a settlement initiative described in Announcement
2005-80 or the IRS has determined that the taxpayer "has acted reasonably
and in good faith." Section 903 of the Jobs Act of 2004 provided that the
interest suspension for reportable and listed transactions would not apply
after 10/3/04.
3. Proposed revisions to Circular 230 related to tax
shelters require disclosures in tax shelter opinions of relationship
between practitioner and promoter, etc. REG-122379-02, Regulations
Governing Practice Before the Internal Revenue Service, 68 F.R. 75186
(12/30/03). New proposed amendments, which differ from the 1/12/01
proposed amendments in several ways: (1) § 10.33 prescribes best practices
for all tax advisors; (2) § 10.35 combines and modifies the standards
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applicable to "marketed" and "more likely than not" tax shelter opinions
from former §§ 10.33 and 10.35; (3) § 10.36 contains the revised procedures
for ensuring compliance with §§ 10.33 and 10.35; and (4) new § 10.37
contains provisions relating to advisory committees to the Office of
Professional Responsibility.
* Under § 10.33 "best practices"
include: (1) communicating clearly with the client regarding the terms of the
engagement and the form and scope of the advice or assistance to be rendered;
(2) establishing the relevant facts, including evaluating the reasonableness of
any assumptions or representations; (3) relating applicable law, including
potentially applicable judicial doctrines, to the relevant facts; (4) arriving at a
conclusion supported by the law and the facts; (5) advising the client regarding
the import of the conclusions reached; and (6) acting fairly and with integrity in
practice before the IRS.
* Tax shelter opinions covered by
§ 10.35 are more-likely-than-not and marketed tax shelter opinions; they,
however, do not include preliminary advice provided pursuant to an
engagement in which the practitioner is expected subsequently to provide an
opinion that satisfies § 10.35. The definition of "tax shelter," tracking the one
found in § 6662 which was contained in the 2001 proposed regulations, remains
the same. The requirements for tax shelter opinions include: (1) identifying and
considering all relevant facts and not relying on any unreasonable factual
assumptions or representations; (2) relating the applicable law to the relevant
facts in a reasonable manner; (3) considering all material Federal tax issues and
reaching a conclusion supported by the facts and the law with respect to each
issue; and (4) providing an overall conclusion as to the Federal tax treatment of
each tax shelter item, and the reasons for that conclusion and providing an
overall conclusion as to the Federal tax treatment of each tax shelter item and
the reasons for that conclusion.
* Under § 10.35(d), a practitioner must
disclose any compensation arrangement he may have with any person (other
than the client for whom the opinion is prepared) with respect to the tax shelter
discussed in the opinion, as well as any other referral arrangement relating
thereto. The practitioner must also disclose that a marketed opinion may not be
sufficient for a taxpayer to use for the purpose of avoiding penalties under
§ 6662(d), and must also state that taxpayers should seek advice from their own
tax advisors. A limited scope opinion must also disclose that additional issues
may exist and that the opinion cannot be used for penalty-avoidance purposes.
0 Under § 10.36 procedures to ensure
compliance are required to be followed by tax advisors with responsibility for
overseeing a firm's practice before the IRS. These include ensuring that the firm
has adequate procedures in effect for purposes of complying with § 10.35.
0 Under § 10.37 the Director of the
Office of Professional Responsibility is authorized to establish advisory
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committees to review and make recommendations regarding professional
standards or best practices for tax advisors. They may also, more particularly,
advise the Director whether a practitioner may have violated §§ 10.35 or 10.36.
a. Extended statutory authority granted to
Treasury with respect to Circular 230. Section 822 of the Jobs Act of
2004 amends 31 U.S.C. § 330(b) to permit the imposition of censures and
monetary penalties for Circular 230 violations. It also clarifies the Treasury's
authority to impose standards applicable to written tax shelter opinions.
b. Tax shelter revisions to Circular 230 are
made final. To paraphrase President Clinton, oral opinions are not real
opinions. T.D. 9165, Regulations Governing Practice Before the Internal
Revenue Service, 69 F.R. 75839 (12/20/04).
(1) Best practices for tax advisors. As
to final § 10.33, the preamble states:
The final regulations adopt the best practices set forth in the
proposed regulations with modifications. These best
practices are aspirational. A practitioner who fails to comply
with best practices will not be subject to discipline under
these regulations. Similarly, the provision relating to steps to
ensure that a firm's procedures are consistent with best
practices, now set forth in § 10.33(b), is aspirational.
Although best practices are solely aspirational, tax
professionals are expected to observe these practices to
preserve public confidence in the tax system.
0 These best practices are
(1) communicating clearly with the client regarding the terms of the
engagement; (2) establishing the facts, determining which facts are relevant,
evaluating the reasonableness of any assumptions or representations, relating the
applicable law (including potentially applicable judicial doctrines) to the
relevant facts, and arriving at a conclusion supported by the law and the facts;
(3) advising the client regarding the import of the conclusions reached,
including, e.g., whether the client may avoid accuracy-related penalties; and
(4) acting fairly and with integrity in practice before the IRS. Practitioners
responsible for overseeing a firm's tax practice must take reasonable steps to
ensure that firm's procedures applicable to all personnel in the firm are
consistent with these best practices.
(2) Requirements for covered opin-
ions. As to final § 10.35, the preamble states:
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Under the final regulations, the definition of a covered
opinion [i.e., one subject to § 10.35] includes written advice
(including electronic communications) that concerns one or
more Federal tax issue(s) arising from: (1) a listed
transaction; (2) any plan or arrangement, the principal
purpose of which is the avoidance or evasion of any tax; or
(3) any plan or arrangement, a significant purpose of which
is the avoidance or evasion of tax if the written advice (A) is
a reliance opinion, (B) is a marketed opinion, (C) is subject
to conditions of confidentiality, or (D) is subject to
contractual protection. A reliance opinion is written advice
that concludes at a confidence level of at least more likely
than not that one or more significant Federal tax issues
would be resolved in the taxpayer's favor.
Written advice will not be treated as a reliance opinion if the
practitioner prominently discloses in the written advice that
it was not written to be used and cannot be used for the
purpose of avoiding penalties. Similarly, written advice
generally will not be treated as a marketed opinion if it does
not concern a listed transaction or a plan or arrangement
having the principal purpose of avoidance or evasion of tax
and the written advice contains this disclosure. The Treasury
Department and the IRS intend to amend 26 CFR 1.6664-4
to clarify that a taxpayer may not rely upon written advice
that contains this disclosure to establish the reasonable cause
and good faith defense to the accuracy-related penalties.
Written advice regarding a plan or arrangement having a
significant purpose of tax avoidance or evasion is excluded
from the definition of a covered opinion if the written advice
concerns the qualification of a qualified plan or is included
in documents required to be filed with the Securities and
Exchange Commission. The final regulations also adopt an
exclusion for preliminary advice if the practitioner is
reasonably expected to provide subsequent advice that
satisfies the requirements of the regulations.
Written advice that is not a covered opinion for purposes of
§ 10.35 is subject to the standards set forth in new § 10.37.
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• There are substantial due diligence
requirements for covered opinions.2 All written opinions at the more-likely-
than-not (or higher) level for listed transactions or transactions with a principal
purpose of tax avoidance or evasion are covered opinions. For other non-
excluded tax shelter opinions, the requirements of § 10.35 can be avoided with a
statement that the opinion cannot be relied upon to avoid penalties- prominently
disclosed "in a separate section at the beginning of the written advice in a
bolded typeface that is larger than any other typeface used in the written
advice."
To ensure compliance with requirements imposed by the U.S. Internal
Revenue Service, we inform you that any tax advice contained in this
communication (including any attachments) was not intended or written
to be used, and cannot be used, by any taxpayer for the purpose of (1)
avoiding tax-related penalties under the U.S. Internal Revenue Code or
(2) promoting, marketing or recommending to another party any
transaction or tax-related matters addressed herein.3
(3) Procedures to ensure compliance.
As to final § 10.36, the preamble was silent.
* Practitioners responsible for
overseeing a firm's tax practice must take reasonable steps to ensure that the
firm has adequate procedures in effect for all personnel to comply with § 10.35.
(4) Requirements for other written
advice. As to final § 10.37, the preamble states:
The final regulations also set forth requirements for written
advice that is not a covered opinion. Under § 10.37 a
practitioner must not give written advice if the practitioner:
(1) Bases the written advice on unreasonable factual or legal
assumptions; (2) unreasonably relies upon representations,
statements, findings or agreements of the taxpayer or any
other person; (3) fails to consider all relevant facts; or (4)
takes into account the possibility that a tax return will not be
audited, that an issue will not be raised on audit, or that an
issue will be settled. Section 10.37, unlike § 10.35, does not
2. If you have to ask the requirements for a covered opinion, then you
probably shouldn't be writing one. Cf., "J.P. Morgan famously said that if you have
to ask the cost of a yacht, you probably can't afford one." David Taylor in "A
Strange Downeaster," Forbes, 6/20/05.
3. In other words, nothing in this outline may be used to save taxes for any
of your clients.
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require that the practitioner describe in the written advice the
relevant facts (including assumptions and representations),
the application of the law to those facts, or the practitioner's
conclusion with respect to the law and the facts. The scope
of the engagement and the type and specificity of the advice
sought by the client, in addition to all other facts and
circumstances, will be considered in determining whether a
practitioner has failed to comply with the requirements of §
10.37.
* Practitioners may not give written
advice based on (1) unreasonable factual or legal assumptions; (2) unreasonable
reliance upon representations of the client or any other person; (3) consideration
of less than all relevant facts; or (4) the possibility that a return may not be
audited, that an issue is not raised on audit, or that an issue will be resolved
through settlement.
(5) Establishment of advisory com-
mittees. As to final § 10.38 [§ 10.37 in the proposed regulations], the
preamble states:
Newly designated § 10.38, formerly § 10.37 in the proposed
regulations, is adopted as proposed with the following
modifications. Section 10.38 is modified to clarify that an
advisory committee may not make recommendations about
actual practitioner cases, or have access to information
pertaining to actual cases. The section also is modified to
clarify that the Director of the Office of Professional
Responsibility should ensure that membership of these
committees is balanced among those individuals who
practice as attorneys, accountants and enrolled agents.
(6) The provisions contained in the
final regulations will generally become applicable on 6/21/05.
c. Announcement 2005-31; 2005-18 I.R.B.
996 (5/2/05). Minor corrections to § 10.35(b)(2)(ii)(B) and § 10.35(b)(4)(i).
d. Pre-summer solstice changes to § 10.35
expand the definition of "excluded advice," modify the definition of
"prominently disclosed" and revise the definition of "the principal
purpose [of tax avoidance]." T.D. 9201, Regulations Governing Practice
Before the Internal Revenue Service. 70 F.R. 28824 (5/19/05).
0 Post-return advice. Excludes from
the definition of a covered opinion advice given after a tax return is filed -
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unless the practitioner knows or has reason to know that the taxpayer will rely
on the advice to claim benefits in a subsequently-filed amended return.
* In-house advice. Excludes from the
definition of a covered opinion written advice provided to an employer in the
practitioner's capacity as an employee solely for the purposes of determining the
tax liability of the employer.
0 How about "almost more likely
than not"? Excludes from the definition of a covered opinion negative advice
unless the written advice also reaches a conclusion favorable to the taxpayer at
any confidence level, e.g., not frivolous, realistic possibility of success,
reasonable basis or substantial authority.
0 Need not come first to be
"prominently disclosed." Modifies the definition of "prominently disclosed" to
a subjective facts-and-circumstances test of whether the item is "readily
apparent" to the particular taxpayer in the context of the opinion. The item must
be set forth in a separate section (and not in a footnote) in a typeface that is the
same size or larger than the typeface of any discussion of the facts or law.
* When is a tax avoidance purpose
"consistent with the statute and Congressional purpose"? Revises the
definition of "principal purpose" to be similar to that of Reg. § 1.6662-
4(g)(2)(ii), i.e., that the purpose is not to avoid or evade Federal tax if the
purpose is "the claiming of tax benefits in a manner consistent with the statute
and Congressional purpose."
e. Proposed Circular 230 changes that do
not relate to tax shelters are nevertheless controversial, what with new
restrictions on the use of contingent fees, monetary penalties for
practitioners and their firms, and public hearings before ALJs. REG-
122380-02, Regulations Governing Practice Before the Internal Revenue
Service, 71 F.R. 6421 (2/8/06). Proposed regulations have been issued based
upon consideration of comments received in response to questions posed in
an advance notice of proposed rulemaking (ANPRM) at 67 F.R. 77724
(12/19/02), as well as amendments made to 31 U.S.C. § 330 by the Jobs Act
of 2004. Changes include: (1) changing references to the office of the
Director of Practice to the Office of Professional Responsibility; (2) adding
to the definition of "practice before the [IRS]" in § 10.2(d) "rendering
written advice with respect to any entity, transaction plan or arrangement, or
other plan or arrangement having a potential for tax avoidance or evasion;"
(3) revoking the authorization of an unenrolled return preparer to represent a
taxpayer during an examination of a return that he or she prepared;
(4) eliminating the ability of a practitioner to charge a contingent fee for
services rendered in connection with the preparation or filing of an amended
tax return or claim for refund or credit, although contingent fees are
permissible for services rendered in connection with the IRS's examination
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of, or challenge to, an amended return or claim for refund or credit filed prior
to the taxpayer receiving notice of the examination of, or challenge to the
original tax return, § 10.27; (5) adding to the standards applicable with
respect to tax return positions in § 10.34, the requirement that a practitioner
may not advise a client to submit "a document, affidavit or other paper ... to
the [IRS]" if (a) its purpose is to delay or impede the administration of the
Federal tax laws, (b) it is frivolous or groundless, or (c) it contains or omits
information in a manner that demonstrates an intentional disregard of a rule
or regulation; (6) adding to the sanctions in § 10.50 the authority to impose a
monetary penalty on the practitioner who engages in conduct subject to
sanction, as well as the authority to impose a monetary penalty on the
"employer, firm or entity" of a practitioner acting on its behalf provided that
the employer, firm or entity knew of reasonable should have known of such
conduct; and (7) modifying the definition of disreputable conduct in § 10.51
to include willful failure to sign a tax return the practitioner prepared or
unauthorized disclosure of returns or return information.
0 The most controversial proposed
change is a provision in § 10.72(d) that all hearings, reports, evidence and
decisions in a disciplinary proceeding be available for public inspection, with
protection of the identities of any third party taxpayers contained in returns and
return information for use in the hearing.
4. IRS settlement terms for executive stock option
shelters. Announcement 2005-19, 2005-11 I.R.B. 744 (2/22/05). Executive
Stock Options Settlement Initiative. The offer, which extends until 5/23/05,
is for payment of tax on the full amount of compensation received, plus
interest and a 10 percent penalty (which is half of the 20 percent penalty).
The parties must pay employment taxes, but they will be allowed to deduct
their out of pocket transaction costs; the corporations will be permitted a
deduction for the compensation expense when reported by the executive.
Employment taxes are also due. The IRS has identified forty-two
corporations, close to 200 executives and more than $700 million of
unreported income involved in the scheme, and will ask that the matter be
referred to the audit committee of the board of directors for appropriate
review. This transaction was listed in Notice 2003-47, 2003-30 I.R.B. 132.
* In IR-2005-17 (2/22/05), the
transaction is described as follows:
The transaction first involves the transfer of stock options by
the executive to a related entity, such as a family limited
partnership, under terms of an agreement to defer payment to
the executive. Next, the partnership exercises the options
and sells the stock in the marketplace. The executive then
takes the position that tax is not owed until the date of the
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deferred payment, typically 15 to 30 years later, although the
executive has access to the partnership assets undiminished
by taxes. Tax laws require executives to include in income
and pay tax on the difference between the amount they pay
for the stock and its value when the option is exercised.
Corporations are entitled to a deduction for the
compensation when the options are exercised.
D. Tax Shelter Penalties, etc.
1. A non-reviewable penalty for failure to disclose a
reportable transaction that applies even if the courts uphold taxpayer's
position. Section 811 of the Jobs Act of 2004 adds new § 6707A which
provides a new penalty for any taxpayer who fails to include on his tax return
any required information on a reportable transaction "of a type which the
Secretary determines as having a potential for tax avoidance or evasion." The
penalty would apply regardless of whether there is an understatement of tax
and would apply in addition to any accuracy related penalty. The penalty
would be $10,000 for a natural person and $50,000 for other taxpayers; for a
listed transaction the penalty would increase to $100,000 for a natural person
and $200,000 for other taxpayers.
0 The Commissioner could rescind any
portion of the penalty if it did not involve a listed transaction and rescinding
would promote compliance and effective tax administration. A decision not to
rescind may not be reviewed in any judicial proceeding.
a. Doesn't the Commissioner trust his own
Appeals Officers? Notice 2005-11, 2005-7 I.R.B. 493 (1/19/05). This notice
provides guidance on § 6707A, including a statement that the
Commissioner's determination whether to rescind a § 6707A penalty "is not
reviewable by the IRS Appeals Division or any court." Notice 2005-11,
2005-7 I.R.B. 493 (interim guidance regarding application of § 6707A
pending issuance of regulations; a single penalty will be assessed for: (1)
failure to attach a reportable transaction disclosure statement to an original or
amended return; or (2) the failure to provide a copy of a disclosure statement
to the Office of Tax Shelter Analysis (OTSA), if required).
2. Modified accuracy-related penalty for reportable
transactions. Section 812 of the Jobs Act of 2004 adds new § 6662A which
would provide a modified accuracy related penalty on understatements with
respect to reportable transactions. It would replace the § 6662 accuracy
related penalty for tax shelters and would be in the amount of 20 percent -
30 percent if the transaction is not properly disclosed. Taxpayers could not
rely on an opinion of a tax advisor to establish reasonable cause under new
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§ 6664(d) [applicable to reportable transaction understatements] for any
opinion: (a) provided by a "disqualified tax advisor" or (b) which is a
"disqualified opinion."
3. Notice 2005-12, 2005-7 I.R.B. 494 (1/19/05). This
notice provides further guidance, including a statement that the new
§ 6664(d) defense is not available for the 30 percent penalty. It also provides
guidance on when a material tax advisor participates in a transaction:
Consistent with the legislative history, a tax advisor,
including a material advisor, will not be treated as
participating in the organization, management, promotion or
sale of a transaction if the tax advisor's only involvement is
rendering an opinion regarding the tax consequences of the
transaction. In the course of preparing a tax opinion, a tax
advisor is permitted to suggest modifications to the
transaction, but the tax advisor may not suggest material
modifications to the transaction that assist the taxpayer in
obtaining the anticipated tax benefits. Merely performing
support services or ministerial functions such as typing,
photocopying, or printing will not be considered
participation in the organization, management, promotion or
sale of a transaction.
Or, in other words, a "disqualified tax
advisor" is any advisor who (a) is a material advisor under § 6111 (as defined in
Reg. § 301.6112-1) and who participates in the organization, management,
promotion or sale of the transaction, or is related (within the meaning of §
267(b) or § 707(b)(1)) to any person who so participates, (b) has a disqualified
compensation arrangement (as defined in the Notice), or (c) has a disqualifying
financial interest identified by the IRS; however, a tax advisor, including a
material advisor, is not treated as participating in the organization, management,
promotion or sale of a transaction if the tax advisor's only involvement is
rendering an opinion regarding the tax consequences of the transaction).
4. The audit lottery that can never be won and
taxpayer can never get repose! The statute of limitations never expires
on listed transactions that are not disclosed. Section 814 of the Jobs Act
of 2004 adds new § 6501(c)(10) to extend the statute of limitations for listed
transactions which a taxpayer fails to disclose until one year after the
transaction is disclosed by the taxpayer or by a material advisor's satisfying
the list maintenance requirement in connection with a request from Treasury.
5. Rev. Proc. 2005-26, 2005-17 I.R.B. 965 (4/8/05).
Guidance on the procedures to be followed by taxpayers and material
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advisors to disclose previously unreported listed transactions for purposes of
the extended statute of limitations. Rev. Proc. 2005-26, 2005-17 I.R.B. 965
(procedures for disclosing a previously undisclosed listed transaction;
taxpayer must submit a Form 8886, with appropriate cover letter, to the IRS
Service Center at which the original return was filed; an amended return with
the Form 8886 and cover letter is permitted but not required; a copy of the
Form 8886 and cover letter also must be sent simultaneously to OTSA; date
of disclosure of a previously undisclosed listed transaction is the first date
upon which all of the following events have occurred: (1) original Form
8886 is received by the appropriate Internal Revenue Service Center, (2) a
copy of the disclosure statement is received by OTSA and, (3) if applicable,
a copy of the disclosure statement is received by the IRS examiner or
Appeals officer).
6. Material advisors are subject to increased
disclosure. Section 815 of the Jobs Act of 2004 amends §§ 6111 and 6112
to require increased disclosure on an information return for each reportable
transaction by any material advisor [in lieu of tax shelter registration].
"Material advisor" is defined more broadly to encompass any person who
"provides any material aid, assistance, or advice with respect to organizing,
managing, promoting, selling, implementing, insuring, or carrying out any
reportable transaction" and derives fees in excess of $50,000 for tax shelters
for natural persons ($250,000 for tax shelters for other taxpayers).
0 Notice 2005-17, 2005-8 I.R.B. 606
(2/28/05). This notice grants an extension of time for material advisors to
comply with the new filing requirements under § 6111. This notice was clarified
and modified by Notice 2005-22, 2005-12 I.R.B. 756.
7. Section 816 of the Jobs Act of 2004 amends
§§ 6707 and 6708 to increase the penalty for failure to file a return under
§ 6111 to $50,000 - for listed transactions, the greater of $200,000 or 50
percent of the gross income derived by the person required to file the return
[75 percent if the failure was intentional].
8. Section 817 of the Jobs Act of 2004 amends § 6708
to provide a penalty of $10,000 per day on any material advisor for failure to
make available to the IRS within 20 business days any investor list required
to be maintained under the provisions of § 6112.
9. Section 818 of the Jobs Act of 2004 amends § 6707
to increase the penalty on tax shelter promoters to 50 percent of the gross
income to be derived from the activity on which the penalty is imposed.
2006]
Florida Tax Review
10. Section 820 of the Jobs Act of 2004 amends § 7408
to allow injunctions (a) against material advisors for violating reporting
requirements and (b) for violating any of the Circular 230 rules.
a. Interim guidance for material advisors.
Notice 2004-80, 2004-50 I.R.B. 963 (11/16/04). This notice provides interim
guidance for the disclosure requirements for material advisors under § 6111
by defining the terms "reportable transaction" and "material advisor," and
specifying the applicable forms and filing dates. The form is Form 8264, as
modified by instructions in the notice.
(1) Several revenue procedures were
issued on 10/16/04 to give "angels' list" status to transactions that need
not be reported. They are Rev. Proc. 2004-65 [transactions with contractual
protection], Rev. Proc. 2005-66 [loss transactions], Rev Proc. 2004-67
[transactions with book-tax differences],
and Rev. Proc. 2005-68 [transactions with brief asset holding periods]. They may be
found at 2004-50 I.R.B. 965, 966, 967 and 969, respectively.
(2) Notice 2005-17, 2005-8 I.R.B. 606
(1/28/05). Extension for compliance with the reporting provisions to 3/1/05.
(3) Notice 2005-22, 2005-12 I.R.B. 756
(2/24/05). Additional guidance, and a further extension for compliance with
the reporting provisions to 4/30/05.
11. Rev. Proc. 2005-51, 2005-33 I.R.B. 296 (8/15/05).
Guidance for persons required to pay penalties under §§ 6662(h), 6662A or
6707A, who are required under § 6707A(e) to disclose those penalties on
reports filed with the SEC. A failure to disclose shall be treated as a failure to
disclose a listed transaction and will be subject to an additional penalty.
E. Tax Shelters Miscellaneous
There were no significant developments regarding this topic
during 2005.
IX. ExEMPT ORGANIZATIONS AND CHARITABLE GIVING
A. Exempt Organizations
1. If intermediate sanctions apply, is revocation far
behind? REG-1 11257-05, Standards for Recognition of Tax-Exempt Status
if Private Benefit Exists or If an Applicable Tax-Exempt Organization Has
Engaged in Excess Benefit Transaction(s), 70 F.R. 53599 (9/9/05). The
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provisions of these proposed regulations clarify the relationship between the
substantive requirements for tax exemption under § 501(c)(3) and the
imposition of § 4958 excise taxes, i.e., intermediate sanctions - particular
with respect to excess benefit transactions. Prop. Reg. §§ 1.501(c)(3)-
1 (g)(2)(ii) and (iii) read:
(ii) Determining whether revocation of tax-exempt status is
appropriate when section 4958 excise taxes also apply. In
determining whether to continue to recognize the tax-exempt
status of an applicable tax-exempt organization (as defined
in section 4958(e) and § 53.4958-2 of this chapter) described
in section 501(c)(3) that engages in one or more excess
benefit transactions (as defined in section 4958(c) and §
53.4958-4 of this chapter) that violate the prohibition on
inurement under this section, the Commissioner will
consider all relevant facts and circumstances, including, but
not limited to, the following -
(A) The size and scope of the organization's regular and
ongoing activities that further exempt purposes before and
after the excess benefit transaction or transactions occurred;
(B) The size and scope of the excess benefit transaction or
transactions (collectively, if more than one) in relation to the
size and scope of the organization's regular and ongoing
activities that further exempt purposes;
(C) Whether the organization has been involved in repeated
excess benefit transactions;
(D) Whether the organization has implemented safeguards
that are reasonably calculated to prevent future violations;
and
(E) Whether the excess benefit transaction has been
corrected (within the meaning of section 4958(f)(6) and §
53.4958-7 of this chapter), or the organization has made
good faith efforts to seek correction from the disqualified
persons who benefited from the excess benefit transaction.
(iii) All factors will be considered in combination with each
other. Depending on the particular situation, the
Commissioner may assign greater or lesser weight to some
factors than to others. The factors listed in paragraphs
(g)(2)(ii)(D) and (E) of this section will weigh more strongly
in favor of continuing to recognize exemption where the
organization discovers the excess benefit transaction or
transactions and takes action before the Commissioner
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discovers the excess benefit transaction or transactions.
Further, with respect to the factor listed in paragraph
(g)(2)(ii)(E) of this section, correction after the excess
benefit transaction or transactions are discovered by the
Commissioner, by itself, is never a sufficient basis for
continuing to recognize exemption.
B. Charitable Giving
1. Section 882 of the Jobs Act of 2004 amends
§§ 170(e)(1) and 6050L which limits the amount of the deduction to the
lesser of fair market value or the donor's basis in the property. This
limitation was enacted because Congress was concerned that "taxpayers with
intellectual property are taking advantage of the inherent difficulties in
valuing such property and are preparing or obtaining erroneous valuations. In
such cases, the charity receives an asset of questionable value, while the
taxpayer receives a significant tax benefit." H.R. Rep. No. 108-548, pt. 1,
108th Cong., 2d Sess. 351 (2004).
0 Because intellectual property often
has no basis in the hands of its creator, to retain an incentive for donations of
valuable intellectual property, Congress added new § 170(m), which allows the
donor an additional deduction equal to a portion of the income recognized by
the donee with respect to the donated intellectual property, reduced by the
amount allowable as a deduction in the year the property was donated. The
amount of the additional deduction is based on a sliding scale that allows a
tentative deduction equal to 100 percent of the income attributable to the
donated property in the first two years after the contribution. In the third year
and every year thereafter the percentage of the income eligible for the additional
deduction is reduced by 10 percent each year, but remains at 10 percent for the
twelfth taxable year ending after the contribution. However, § 170(m)(4)
provides that no additional deduction is allowed with respect to income received
or accrued by the donee after the tenth anniversary of the donation, which
renders the additional deduction for the twelfth taxable year illusory except in
very narrow circumstances in which the donor and donee have different taxable
years. The additional deduction based on the donee's income from the property
is allowed only to the extent the aggregate tentative deductions calculated under
the formula exceed the amount of the initial deduction claimed in the year the
property was contributed. Assume that the donor properly claimed a deduction
of $500,000 with respect to a contribution of intellectual property, and the
property generates $400,000 of income in the first year. The donor's deduction
will be limited to the $500,000 basis and no additional deduction attributable to
the income generated by the property will be allowed. If in the second year the
property generates $300,000 of income, the donor will be able to deduct an
additional $200,000 as a result of that income, because $200,000 is the amount
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by which the total income generated by the property ($700,000) exceeds the
amount the donor previously deducted ($500,000). As a result of the sliding
scale, if in the third year the property generates income of $100,000, the donor
will be able to deduct only an additional $90,000 (90 percent).
0 The intellectual property with respect
to which the additional deduction under § 170(m) is allowed generally includes
patents, certain copyrights, trademarks, trade names, trade secrets, know-how,
some software and applications or registrations for such property but excludes
property donated to many private foundations. The donor must inform the
donee at the time of the contribution that she intends to use this provision.
2. T.D. 9206, Information Returns by Donees Relating
to Qualified Intellectual Property Contributions, 70 F.R. 29450 (5/23/05).
The Treasury has promulgated temporary regulations on qualified
intellectual property contributions. REG-158138-04, 70 F.R. 29460 provides
identical proposed regulations.
(1) Notice 2005-41, 2005-23 I.R.B.
1203. Related guidance including notification requirements.
3. Does new § 170(0(12) close the door to inflated
deductions for motor vehicle contributions? Or, is the door left open
wide enough to drive a truck for other vehicle] through it? Section 884 of
the Jobs Act of 2004 amends § 170(f) by adding new paragraph twelve that
requires written acknowledgment of contributions of motor vehicles, boats
and airplanes that include the amount of the gross proceeds from any arm's
length sale and a statement that the deduction may not exceed such amount.
Its enactment was prompted by congressional concern that taxpayers who
were donating used cars to charities were claiming deductions that far
exceeded the amounts that the charities were receiving following the sale,
often at auction, of the cars. Section 170(d)(12) applies if the claimed
deduction is more than $500 and provides different rules depending on what
the donee charity does with the vehicle. If the donee uses the vehicle or
materially improves it, the taxpayer must obtain from the donee, and include
with the tax return, a contemporaneous written acknowledgment that
provides certain identifying information and certifies the intended use or
material improvement of the vehicle, states the intended duration of the use,
and certifies that the vehicle will not be transferred or exchanged for money
before the termination of such use or improvement. In this case the amount
of the deduction is not affected. However, if the donee sells the vehicle
without any significant intervening use or material improvement, the
deduction cannot be more than the gross proceeds received from the sale, and
other substantiation requirements apply. In addition to the other
requirements, the donee's contemporaneous written acknowledgment must
2006]
Florida Tax Review
certify that the vehicle was sold in an arms-length transaction to unrelated
parties, state the gross proceeds from the sale, and inform the donor taxpayer
that the deductible amount may not exceed the gross proceeds.
0 Donees that fail to furnish the
required acknowledgment or furnish a false or fraudulent acknowledgment are
subject to a penalty under § 6720, which was also added in 2004. For vehicles
sold without intervening use or improvement the penalty is at least the gross
proceeds from the sale but could be as much as the sales price on the
acknowledgment multiplied by the highest marginal rate under § 1 if that is
higher. For other vehicles the penalty is the greater of $5,000 or the claimed
value of the vehicle multiplied by the highest marginal rate under § 1.
a. How much use is "substantial" when a
charity uses a donated vehicle in its own endeavors? Notice 2005-44,
2005-25 I.R.B. 1287 (6/3/05). The Notice provides interim guidance under
the new rules for motor vehicle charitable contribution deductions. The most
interesting examples are those where the charity puts the vehicle to use in
delivering meals on wheels, where the question is whether the use is a
"significant intervening use." Example 6 says use of the vehicle to deliver
meals only a few times is not. Example 7 says that use of the vehicle to
deliver meals every day for one year is. Example 8 says that driving the
vehicle to deliver meals a total of 10,000 miles over a one-year period is.
* The gross sales proceeds limitation
does not apply to a sale to a needy individual at a price significantly below fair
market value, or a gratuitous transfer to a needy individual, in direct furtherance
of a charitable purpose of the donee organization of relieving the poor and
distressed or the underprivileged who are in need of a means of transportation.
4. Glass v. Commissioner, 124 T.C. 258 (5/25/05),
held that the contribution of a perpetual conservation easement that restricted
development of certain portions of the taxpayers' lakefront residential lot,
but which did not otherwise affect the taxpayers' use or enjoyment of the
property, was a qualified conservation contribution under § 170(h) because it
protected a relatively natural habitat of specifically identified wildlife,
including bald eagles, and plants.
5. Eight revenue procedures that contain sample
CRUT declarations of various sorts make it just a little bit easier to give.
Revenue Procedures 2005-52 through 2005-59, 2005-34 I.R.B. 326, 339,
353, 367, 383, 392, 402 & 412, respectively (8/22/05). Sample charitable
remainder unitrust declarations that meet the requirements of § 664.
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6. Under the Katrina Tax Act, "qualified disaster
contributions" made between 8/28/05 and 12/31/05 will be deductible
without regard to the 50-percent-of-AGI limit.
7. Under the Katrina Tax Act, charitable deductions
for contributions of food inventory would be permitted up to the lesser of (i)
fair market value or (ii) twice basis; the same permitted deduction would
apply to contribution of book inventory to public schools. Effective for
contributions made between 8/28/05 and 12/31/05.
8. Sklar v.Commissioner, 125 T.C. 281 (12/21/05), as
amended, 2/7/06. Another context in which taxpayers have repeatedly and
unsuccessfully sought to claim charitable contribution deductions for
payments with respect to which they have received a quidpro quo is tuition
payments to religious schools that provide both secular and religious
education. Even if tuition can be mathematically prorated between the
portion attributable to the secular education and the portion attributable to
religious education, or the taxpayer can demonstrate that the tuition exceeds
the value of the secular education, the deduction has been disallowed
because taxpayers have been unable to demonstrate any charitable intent in
paying the tuition. The special exception for religious benefits does not apply
to payments to religious schools.
X. Tax Procedure
A. Interest, Penalties and Prosecutions
1. The "common law" rule that one country does
not prosecute for violation of another country's tax law was not violated
here. Practitioners should have a level of concern that is "somewhere
between Chicken Little and Pollyanna." Pasquantino v. United States, 544
U.S. 349 (4/26/05) (5-4). Criminal convictions for wire fraud in connection
with the transportation of liquor from the United States into Canada without
paying Canadian excise taxes were affirmed. The majority opinion by Justice
Thomas held that the "common law revenue rule" [as it existed when the
wire fraud statute was enacted in 1952] under which the tax liabilities of one
sovereign will not be enforced by those of another sovereign, i.e. the rule
bars "collection of tax obligations of foreign nations," is not violated by this
prosecution for wire fraud because the dominant characteristic of the case
was the prosecution of fraud, and not foreign tax collection.
* The suggestion has been made that a
practitioner's reaction to this case should be "somewhere between Chicken
Little and Pollyanna."
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2. T.D. 9186, Qualified Amended Returns, 70 F.R.
10037 (3/2/05). Temp. Reg. § 1.6664-2T(c) provides that the amount
reported on a "qualified amended return" will be treated as an amount shown
as tax on the taxpayer's return for purposes of determining whether there is
an underpayment of tax subject to an accuracy-related penalty. Generally
speaking, an amended return is a "qualified amended return" if it is filed
before the IRS first contacts the taxpayer concerning an examination of the
return. Temp. Reg. § 1.6664-2T(c)(3).
3. Rev. Proc. 2005-34, 2005-24 I.R.B. 1233 (5/20/05).
This revenue procedure sets forth procedures for appeals of proposed trust
fund recovery penalty assessments arising under § 6672, updated to reflect
amendments made by the Taxpayer Bill of Rights, P.L. 104-168. Effective
for penalties proposed on or after 5/20/05.
4. But will he be a "survivor" in the U.S. Court for
the District of Rhode Island? A Justice Department news release, dated
9/8/05, announced that Richard Hatch was indicted on charges of tax evasion
for failing to report about $1,037,000 dollars of income from the television
reality series and about $391,000 of income from other sources.
http://www.usdoj.gov/opa/pr/2005/September/05_tax463.htm. He was con-
victed on 1/25/06. See 2006 TNT 17-6.
5. When is disclosure adequate? There are different
rules for disclosure of a tax shelter, of transactions that lack reasonable
basis and supporting records, and for preparer penalty purposes. Rev.
Proc. 2005-75, 2005-50 I.R.B. 1137 (12/12/05). Updates guidance on
whether disclosure of a position taken on a tax return is adequate for
purposes of the § 3332(d) accuracy-related penalty and the § 6694(a)
preparer penalty.
* There is a new paragraph in § 4.01(5)
cautioning that the entry of an amount on a line will not provide adequate
disclosure if it is attributable to a tax shelter or "if it does not have a reasonable
basis and supporting records," as well as a limitation on its effectiveness for
preparer penalty purposes.
* There is also a requirement in
§ 4.02(l)(d) that the contemporaneous written acknowledgment required under
§ 170(f)(12) for charitable contributions of motor vehicles be attached to the
return.
6. United Statel v. Hempflin , 96 A.F.T.R.2d 2005-
6578, 2006-1 U.S.T.C. 50,205, (E.D. Cal. 9/23/05). In as lawsuit seeking
an injunction under §§ 6700 and 7408 against a promoter of scheme: (1)
purporting to demonstrate that there is no law requiring individuals to file
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federal income tax returns or pay income taxes, and (2) insulating purchasers
who stopped filing tax returns from any charge of willful failure to file a tax
return, the court denied the promoter's motion to dismiss, holding that the
First Amendment does not protect such "false or fraudulent commercial
speech." On 2/22/06 at 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 41582, the court again
refused to dismiss on defendant's contention that he had new evidence that
the Sixteenth Amendment was never properly ratified.
7. Lewis v. United States, 96 A.F.T.R.2d 2005-6301
(W.D. Tenn. 9/12/05). CEO/president who was aware of financial strains on
corporation was informed by concerned subordinates on more than one
occasion that the payroll taxes were not being paid, and whose "apparent
choice to turn a blind eye and a deaf ear to these warnings," while shifting
the blame to the CFO was liable for § 6672 penalty. Note that both CEO and
CFO were responsible persons.
8. Sentence of 360 months for torching the
Colorado Springs IRS office was upheld. United States v. Dowell, 430
F.3d 1100 (10th Cir. 12/6/05). The court upheld a conviction under § 7212(a)
and 18 U.S.C. § 2 for forcibly interfering with IRS employees and
administration by setting fire to an IRS office.
9. Bo v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2005-150
(6/23/05). With respect to request for interest abatement under § 6404 (which
is available for delays resulting only from ministerial acts), Judge Colvin
held that erroneous advice to taxpayer from IRS agent, failure to reassign
case while agent was on maternity leave, sending agent to on-the-job
training, and agent taking annual leave while case was pending were not
ministerial acts. However, losing file for over four months and erroneous
failure to code file as released from collection due process hearing status
were ministerial acts.
B. Discovery: Summonses and FOIA
1. Honi soit qui mal y pense. United States v. BDO
Seidman, LLP, 95 A.F.T.R. 2d 2005-1725, 2005-1 U.S.T.C. 50,264 (N.D.
Ill. 3/30/05). The district court ruled that only one of 267 documents
withheld from IRS scrutiny by the intervenors was unprotected by privilege
or work produce, or both.4 In ruling that the crime-fraud exception did not
apply, Judge Holderman found that neither the existence of cookie-cutter tax
opinions nor the IRS listing of substantially similar transactions as abusive
tax shelters by the IRS was determinative because "the tax code and
underlying regulations is [sic] full of complexities and uncertainties." He
4. The unprotected document was an e-mail sent by a BDO employee.
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further stated that "just because one of BDO's consulting agreements has
been found to have [been] fraudulent does not mean that all consulting
agreements entered into by BDO were fraudulent."
* Judge Holderman found the test for
the § 7525(b) tax shelter exception to be the same as for the crime-fraud
exception.
* Footnote 2 of the opinion sets forth
the categories of information contained in the privilege log. Inasmuch as the
adequacy of another privilege log in this litigation was questioned, the
categories in this privilege log might be a useful guide.
a. The attorney-client privilege does not
attach to communications relating to planning to commit tax fraud.
Subsequently, at 95 A.F.T.R.2d 2005-2835, 2005-2, U.S.T.C. 50,447 (N.D.
Ill. 5/17/05), Judge Holderman found that the remaining document examined
in camera presented a prima facie case for being not privileged by reason of
the crime-fraud exception, and the intervenors failed to present sufficient
explanation to rebut that presumption. The document involved an investment
in distressed debt with the sole motive of obtaining a loss for tax purposes.
* The government had argued that
"document A-40 is not part of legitimate year-end tax planning, but instead is
part of the overall abusive sham tax shelter transaction perpetrated by BDO and
invested in by Intervenor Cullio and others."
0 Judge Holderman refused to quash
the summons seeking production of document A-40, which he held related to
an "abusive sham tax shelter investment," because the IRS made a prima facie
case that the crime-fraud exception to the attorney-client privilege applied and
taxpayer failed to provide a satisfactory explanation of why the document
should not be disclosed under the crime-fraud exception; there were eight
indicators of potential fraud: (1) the marketing of pre-packaged transactions by
BDO; (2) the communication by the taxpayer to BDO with the purpose of
engaging in a pre-arranged transaction developed by BDO or a third party with
the sole purpose of reducing taxable income; (3) BDO and/or the taxpayer
attempting to conceal the true nature of the transaction; (4) actual or
constructive knowledge by BDO that the taxpayers lacked a legitimate business
purpose for entering into the transaction; (5) vaguely worded consulting
agreements; (6) failure by BDO to provide services under the consulting
agreement despite receipt of payment; (7) mention of a particular tax shelter that
had been identified by the IRS as a "listed transaction"; and (8) use of boiler-
plate documents.
2. Jade Trading, LLC v. United States, 95 A.F.T.R. 2d
2005-2067, 2005-1 U.S.T.C. 50,320 (Fed. Cl. 4/22/05). The court (Judge
Williams) held that any claim of executive privilege for background
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materials relating to the IRS's publication of Notice 2000-44 on 8/13/00
(relating to the Son-of-Boss transaction) and relating to Treasury's
publication of Reg. § 1.701-2 on 5/17/94 (in proposed form) and on 12/29/94
(in final form) had to be asserted only after personal consideration by the
Commissioner and the Secretary, respectively.
0 Note that Judge Williams uses the
appellation "IRS Code" in her opinion.
3. In another opinion on the same date, Judge Williams
denied BDO Seidman's motion to quash a subpoena requesting "all Form
1040 cover pages, Schedule D and Schedule K-1 for the years 1999-2000"
for forty-six BDO clients who are not parties to the Jade Trading case [in
order to ascertain the amount of capital gains and losses claimed by these
taxpayers and the dates on which they were incurred] because § 6103 only
prohibits disclosure of taxpayer return information "filed with" or "received
by, recorded by, prepared by, furnished to, or collected by" Treasury and the
IRS, and also because courts in tax cases have required brokers to produce
records of other customers who used the same broker. Copies of tax returns
given to BDO by its clients do not fall within the prohibition of § 6103.
4. United States v. Norwood, 420 F.3d 888 (8th Cir.
8/26/05). The court upholds enforcement of a summons seeking records of
offshore bank credit card accounts because the act of production was not
self-incriminatory. This is because, based on information obtained from
MasterCard, the government already knew the name and location of the bank
that created the records, the payment card numbers, and the details of a
number of discrete transactions involving the cards and the account. It held
that the "production of the records has no testimonial significance."
a. United States v. Elliot, 96 A.F.T.R.2d 2005-
550, 2005-2 U.S.T.C. 50,522 (W.D. N.C. 7/14/05). Summons to produce
"daily sheets" that recoded all receipts from taxpayer's dental practice was
enforced because the records of gross receipts are "voluntarily prepared
business records" that are not privileged under United States v. Doe, 465
U.S. 605 (1984), despite the record-keeping requirements of Reg. § 1.6601-
1. The act of production was not self-incriminatory because, based on the
testimony of taxpayer's accountant, "the existence, authenticity, and
[taxpayer's] possession of the documents is a foregone conclusion."
C. Litigation Costs
1. Blasius v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2005-214
(9/14/05). Advance notice of proposed rule making (ANPRM) and proposed
regulations are not "applicable published guidance" raising the presumption
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that the government's position was not justified; nor is the IRS Chief
Counsel's "priority guidance plan" to be considered "applicable published
guidance."
2. Moulton v. United States, 429 F.3d 352 (1st Cir.
11/21/05). Attorney's fees in case in which § 6672 penalty was upheld for
only one of five quarters were denied. The government's position was
substantially justified because case was a "close case" and "[t]he closeness..
. was compounded by the fact that, once the IRS assessed [penalties] under §
6672, the burden of proof was on [taxpayers] to prove that they were not
responsible persons (or that, if they were responsible, their failure to ensure
that the taxes were paid was not 'willful"').
D. Statutory Notice
1. A notice of determination gives the Tax Court
jurisdiction, even if the notice is invalid. Myong Soo Kim v.
Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2005-96 (5/3/05). The IRS erroneously issued
an invalid notice of determination on a collection action under § 6330, when
it should have issued a decision letter. The Tax Court (Judge Marvel) denied
the Commissioner's motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction, but did grant
the Commissioner summary judgment because the § 6330 hearing request
was not made within the thirty-day period following the issuance of the
notice of intent to levy.
2. Rev. Rul. 2005-51, 2005-31 I.R.B. 163 (7/12/05).
IRS may not use the summary assessment procedures under § 6213(b) when
taxpayer filed a return reporting an amount of wages and a tax liability, but
attached a Form W-2 reflecting a different amount of wages; IRS must issue
a deficiency notice under § 6212(a). Nor is the failure to report wages that
were shown on a Form W-2 attached to the return a "mathematical or clerical
error." In such a case the IRS must follow the normal deficiency procedures.
3. Freije v. Commissioner, 125 T.C. 14 (7/14/05). That
a taxpayer has an opportunity to dispute the underlying tax liability in an
appeal to the Tax Court in a § 6330 collection due process proceeding does
not cure an assessment made in derogation of the taxpayer's rights under
§ 6213(a) to a deficiency proceeding in the Tax Court. Where taxpayer's
appeal from a determination that a levy should proceed is grounded on a
claim that the IRS improperly applied a remittance for the year with respect
to which the determination was made to an outstanding liability for a prior
year, the Tax Court has jurisdiction to redetermine the deficiency for the year
to which the remittance was applied by the IRS because it is relevant to
computing the unpaid tax for which the taxpayer made the remittance. The
[Vol 8:SI
Recent Developments in Federal Income Taxation
IRS may not collect erroneous nonrebate refund by summarily applying
remittances for a subsequent year to recoup the erroneous refund.
E. Statute of Limitations
1. The statute of limitations when taxpayers litigate
identity privilege issues in lawsuits against their tax advisers. John Doe 1
v. KPMG LLP, 93 A.F.T.R.2d 2004-1808, 2004-1 U.S.T.C. 50,270 (N.D.
Tex. 4/2/04). Judge Barefoot Sanders denied the government's motion to
require the John Doe taxpayers to sign consents to extend the statute of
limitations, but found instead that the statute was suspended.
0 Query why the court did not dismiss
taxpayers' lawsuit unless they filed consents to extend the statute of limitations.
a. United States v. KPMG LLP, 316 F. Supp.
2d 30 (D. D.C. 5/4/04). Judge Hogan adopted the rationale of KMPG (N.D.
Texas), and finds that the statute of limitations was similarly suspended
during the pendency of the action.
b. John Doe 1 reversed on appeal by the
Fifth Circuit; equitable tolling is inapplicable as an exception to the
statute of limitations. John Doe I v. KPMG, LLP, 398 F.3d 686 (5th Cir.
3/28/05). Judge Jones held that equitable tolling is unavailable to extend the
§ 6501 statute of limitations. She further held that the general jurisdiction
granted by § 7402(a) to district courts to issue appropriate orders to enforce
the internal revenue laws does not "authorize[] a court to inject an equitable
tolling provision into a detailed, highly specific provision (Section 6501)."
2. Bacigalupo v. United States, 399 F. Supp. 2d 835
(M.D. Tenn. 11/15/05). Twelve-month limitation period governing claims
filed in probate proceedings pursuant to state law did not bar claim for
unpaid income taxes filed by the IRS against the estate in the probate
proceeding; citing United States v. Summerlin, 310 U.S. 414 (1940), and
United States v. John Hancock Mutual Life Ins. Co., 364 U.S. 301 (1960).
The statutes of limitations provided in the Internal Revenue Code pre-empt
any state law statutes of limitations. The United States is not bound by any
state law statutes of limitations that might require a claim to be asserted
within a period shorter than the period provided by the Internal Revenue
Code.
3. Pacific Gas & Electric Co. v. United States, 417
F.3d 1375 (Fed. Cir. 8/10/05), rev'g 55 Fed. Cl. 271 (2003), rehearing en
banc denied on 1/13/06. Erroneous overpayment of interest on overpayment
of taxes could be setoff against subsequent refund claim. In addition, the
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government can setoff the erroneous refund against other refunds due to the
taxpayer, but the IRS cannot set off erroneously paid interest against a
taxpayer's timely refund claim with respect to the same year, if the statute of
limitations on bringing suit for the erroneous payment of interest has expired.
F. Liens and Collections
1. Tax Court makes it easier to find abuse of
discretion in collection due process hearings. Robinette v. Commissioner,
123 T.C. 85 (7/20/04) (reviewed, 14-3). In 1995, the taxpayer had entered
into an offer in compromise (based on doubts as to collectibility) relating to
years prior to 1992, which required that he file timely returns for 1995
through 1999. The returns for 1995 through 1997 were timely filed, but the
1998 return was never received. The taxpayer and his accountant claimed
that on the day the 1998 return was due, his accountant prepared it, the
taxpayer signed it, and the accountant mailed it using a private postage meter
[Uh-oh]. The IRS declared the compromise in default. After a due process
hearing in which the taxpayer claimed good faith compliance and offered
alternative proof of mailing, including a copy of the 1998 return, the Appeals
Officer issued a notice of determination to proceed with collection, because
the Appeals Officer would accept only a certified or registered mail receipt
as proof of mailing. Even though the Tax Court's review of collection due
process hearings is for abuse of discretion, in a reviewed opinion by Judge
Vasquez (in which 5 judges joined), the Tax Court held that it may consider
evidence presented at trial that was not in the administrative record (but not
new issues). The court held that the Administrative Procedures Act review
provisions do not apply to § 6330(d) proceedings, and admitted taxpayer's
testimony that he signed and delivered returns to his accountant for mailing,
the accountant's testimony regarding the procedures used to mail the return,
and other evidence not in the administrative record indicating that the return
was mailed. Although the testimony was admitted, it did not prove timely
mailing because the accountant used a private meter and the return was not
received until several years later when the copy was delivered to Appeals.
Nevertheless, the court held that the taxpayer did not materially breach the
offer in compromise and that the Appeals Officer abused his discretion in
declaring the compromise in default. There were an indescribable number of
overlapping concurrences by an additional nine judges, in some of which the
five "majority" judges joined, and one of which concurring opinions was
supported by more judges than supported the "majority" opinion; there were
three dissents.
a. Chief Counsel's response. Chief Counsel
Notice CC-2004-031 (9/1/04). Deborah Butler provides guidance to Chief
Counsel attorneys as to how to handle Collection Due Process cases in light
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of Robinette. The recommended course of action when such evidence is
presented to the court is to ask for a remand of the case to Appeals for a
supplemental determination.
b. Murphv v. Commissioner, 125 T.C. 301
(12/29/05). The Tax Court (Judge Halpern) declined to overrule Robinette,
but excluded taxpayer's proffered testimony as to the nature of his illness
which allegedly precluded him from making a larger offer in compromise
because taxpayer had "more than an adequate opportunity to provide [the
Appeals Officer] with all of the evidence" and declined to do so. The court
went on to state: "An appeals officer does not abuse her discretion when she
fails to take into account information that she requested and that was not
provided in a reasonable time."
c. Reversed because the case should have
been reviewed based upon the evidence presented to the Appeals Officer.
Robinette v. Commissioner, 439 F.3d 455 (8th Cir. 3/8/06). Inasmuch as the
Tax Court reviews the decision of an appeals officer under an "abuse of
discretion" standard of review, the record on review under both the
Administrative Procedure Act and general principles of administrative law is
"ordinarily limited to consideration of the decision of the agency ... and of
the evidence on which it was based."
0 Judge Colloton did not think that
because the Tax Court traditionally conducts de novo proceedings in deficiency
cases, Congress meant it to conduct such proceedings in collection due process
cases.
2. A trap for the unwary deprives Tax Court of
jurisdiction with respect to a petition for lien or levy action. Prevo v.
Commissioner, 123 T.C. 326 (12/14/04). The Tax Court held it lacked
jurisdiction with respect to a petition for lien or levy action filed by taxpayer
after she filed a voluntary bankruptcy petition because the Tax Court petition
for lien or levy action was filed in violation of the 11 U.S.C. § 362 automatic
stay. Judge Gerber stated:
Unfortunately here, where the petition in bankruptcy was
voluntary, petitioner has fallen victim to a trap for the
unwary. As the notice of determination was issued to
petitioner on February 23, 2004, petitioner normally would
have had 30 days - until March 24, 2004 - to file a timely
petition for lien or levy action with the Court. However,
upon the filing of the bankruptcy petition on March 1, 2004,
the automatic stay was invoked, and petitioner was barred
from commencing a proceeding in this Court. n4 Further, the
20061
Florida Tax Review
automatic stay remained in effect until March 31, 2004 - 7
days after the 30-day statutory filing period under sections
6320(c) and 6330(d) expired. Thus, but for the provisions of
section 11 U.S.C. section 362(a)(8) and the lack of a tolling
provision analogous to section 6213(f), this Court would
have jurisdiction over this case. n5
n4 Had petitioner first filed a petition with this
Court and then filed a bankruptcy petition, the
proceeding before this Court would have been
active and then stayed, thereby preserving
petitioner's ability to contest respondent's
determination.
n5 See, however, sec. 6330(d), which provides in
part: "If a court determines that the appeal was to
an incorrect court, a person shall have 30 days
after the court determination to file such appeal
with the correct court." We do not decide herein
whether our determination in this opinion that
we lacked jurisdiction over the petition filed
during the pendency of petitioner's bankruptcy
case means that we are or are not the "incorrect"
court for purposes of the above-quoted flush
language. If we were the "incorrect" court,
petitioner would have 30 days from the date
decision is entered in this case to refile in the
"correct" court. That issue, however, is not
currently before the Court and was not briefed by
the parties.
a. But the trap does not exist where the IRS
issued its notices after the taxpayer filed a bankruptcy petition. Smith v.
Commissioner, 124 T.C. 36 (2/8/05). Judge Gerber distinguished the Prevo
case, and held the Tax Court lacked jurisdiction because the IRS notices
were void because they violated the automatic stay under bankruptcy law.
3. Kendricks v. Commissioner, 124 T.C. 69 (3/9/05).
Held that taxpayer could not contest deficiency in a collection due process
hearing because she had the opportunity to contest tax liability in prior
bankruptcy proceeding.
4. Speltz v. Commissioner, 124 T.C. 165 (3/23/05), on
appeal to the Eighth Circuit. The Tax Court (Judge Cohen) held it was not an
abuse of discretion for the IRS to reject an offer in compromise based upon
"the unfair application of the alternative minimum tax (AMT) based on their
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exercise of incentive stock options (ISOs) where the stock acquired by
exercise of the ISOs has lost substantially all of its value subsequent to the
acquisition of the stock." Judge Cohen held that § 7122, which authorizes
compromise of any civil tax case, did not evince "an intent of Congress to
override application of specific provisions of the tax laws in every instance
in which the liability is perceived to be unfair or inequitable," and continued
the tax lien in effect.
5. Judge Wherry places limits on the use of CDP
hearings for delay by permitting continued collection and imposing a
penalty under § 6673. Burke v. Commissioner, 124 T.C. 189 (4/12/05). The
Tax Court (Judge Wherry) holds that the IRS may continue collecting by
levy an individual's unpaid taxes during the pendency of his hearings and
appeals. This is possible when the IRS shows good cause, which is satisfied
because taxpayer's liability was determined in previous litigation and
affirmed by the Ninth Circuit, and he used the collection review procedure to
espouse frivolous and groundless arguments to delay collection. If a
collection due process hearing has been timely requested, § 6330(e)(1)
generally prohibits the IRS from proceeding to collect unpaid taxes by levy
while any appeals from the hearing are pending. The Tax Court interprets §
6330(e)(1) to refer only to the pendency of the taxpayer's appeal in the Tax
Court (or district court, if that is the proper court) and not to extend to
appeals to higher courts.
0 Judge Wherry also imposed a $2,500
penalty under § 6673 for delay.
6. Living Care Alternatives of Utica, Inc. v. United
States, 411 F.3d 621 (6th Cir. 6/2/05). Since collection due process hearings
are not required to have a record and normal review of administrative
decisions requires the existence of a record, "Congress must have been
contemplating a more deferential review of [collection due process hearing]
appeals than of more formal agency decisions."
a. Olsen v. United States, 414 F.3d 144 (1st
Cir. 7/8/05). Follows Living Care Alternatives, supra, in applying an
especially more deferential than usual application of abuse of discretion
standard in reviewing IRS's determination in collection due process
hearings; because taxpayer did not cooperate fully in providing IRS with
information regarding assets, IRS did not abuse discretion in failure to grant
relief regarding offer in compromise.
7. Wetzel v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2005-211
(9/12/05). A $15,000 penalty was imposed under § 6673 for filing a
frivolous petition to review IRS's collection due process determination.
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8. REG-150091-02, Miscellaneous Changes to
Collection Due Process Procedures Relating to Notice and Opportunity for
Hearing Prior to Levy, 70 F.R. 54687 (9/16/05); REG-150088-02,
Miscellaneous Changes to Collection Due Process Procedures Relating to
Notice and Opportunity for Hearing Upon Filing of Notice of Federal Tax
Lien, 70 F.R. 54681 (9/16/05).
0 Prop. Reg. § 301.6320-1(c)(2), Q&A-
Cl. Written request must state the taxpayer's reason for disagreeing with the
lien filing. Taxpayers are encouraged to use Form 12153, Request for a
Collection Due Process Hearing. A taxpayer must request a hearing in writing.
* Reg. § 301.6320-1(d)(1), Q&A-D6;
see also Prop. Reg. § 301.6320-1(d)(2), Q&A-D8. Face-to-face conference
concerning a taxpayer's underlying liability will not be granted if the request or
other communication indicates that the taxpayer will only raise irrelevant or
frivolous issues. A face-to-face conference concerning a collection alternative,
such as an installment agreement or an offer to compromise liability, will not be
granted if the alternative would not be available to other taxpayers in similar
circumstances, for example, a face-to-face conference will not be offered to a
taxpayer who wishes to make an offer to compromise but has not filed a return.
A face-to-face conference need not be granted if the taxpayer does not provide
the required information. If, however, the taxpayer fails to provide the IRS with
information that he will raise substantive arguments that are not frivolous or tax-
protester type arguments, the IRS may deny the taxpayer a face-to-face hearing
and provide the hearing by correspondence or telephone.
0 Prop. Reg. § 301.6320-1(d)(2),
Q&A-D7. The proposed Regulations would clarify that a face-to-face meeting is
merely one aspect of a collection due process hearing, and that a review of
documentation and notes of oral conversations with the taxpayer can
supplement, or constitute in and of themselves, the "hearing."
0 Prop. Reg. § 301.6330-1(f)(2), Q&A-
F7. The proposed regulations would expressly limit judicial review to issues
(including a challenge to the underlying tax liability) that were properly raised
in the taxpayer's collection due process hearing.
9. Clark v. Commissioner, 125 T.C. 108 (9/26/05).
Taxpayer filed timely petition in Tax Court following receipt of notice of
intent to levy. Furthermore, the Tax Court has held that § 6330(d) confers on
it the jurisdiction to review an IRS determination to levy on the taxpayer's
state income tax refund, even though § 6330(t) permits the IRS to so levy
without first affording the taxpayer a pre-levy hearing.
10. Springer v. United States, 96 A.F.T.R.2d 2005-6846
(W.D. Okla. 10/6/05). The district court lacks jurisdiction to enjoin a levy for
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income tax liability because jurisdiction to review IRS's determination in
CDP hearing regarding income taxes lies to the Tax Court. In addition, §
6330(e)(1) authorizes the court to which jurisdiction to seek review of the
IRS's determination in a collection due process hearing under §§ 6320 and
6330 lies to enjoin any attempt by the IRS to levy on the taxpayer's property
during the period for which the administrative collection due process hearing
and judicial review thereof are pending.
11. Drake v. Commissioner, 125 T.C. 201 (10/12/05).
IRS abused its discretion by virtue of an ex parte communication from IRS
agent to Appeals Officer assigned to conduct the collection due process
hearing, because the communication revealed the IRS originating function's
perception of the taxpayer's credibility in contravention of the requirements
of Rev. Proc. 2000-43, 2002-2 CB 404; case remanded for a new collection
due process hearing.
12. Magee v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2005-263
(11/16/05). Levy based on tax liability reported on a joint return but which
was not paid may be contested in a collection due process hearing, but claim
that the taxpayer's signature on the joint return was forged does not
necessarily place the underlying liability in issue.
13. Aranda v. Commissioner, 432 F3d 1140 (10th Cir.
12/20/05). The IRS did not abuse its discretion in granting relief from the
fraud penalty and interest on the fraud penalty, but not from any portion of
the underlying tax deficiency liability, pursuant to § 6015(f), even though
taxpayer requested relief under § 6015(b), not § 6015(f), and the IRS notice
mistakenly referred to relief being granted under § 6015(b).
14. Greene-Thapedi v. Commissioner, 126 T.C. 1
(1/12/06). Tax Court is divested of jurisdiction where IRS applies
overpayment from another year to satisfy deficiency after issuing
determination in CDP hearing, even though taxpayer is contesting existence
of the liability on the asserted grounds that she had not received a deficiency
notice; because there was neither an unpaid liability nor a levy, there was no
action subject to review; taxpayer had "no independent basis to challenge"
the underlying tax liability in the Tax Court because it could not exercise
jurisdiction over a refund claim.
G. Innocent Spouse
1. The Commissioner cannot hide the ball in a
notice of offset, and then claim that the notice starts the two-year period
within which innocent spouse relief must be sought. McGee v.
Commissioner, 123 T.C. 314 (10/18/04). Section 6015(b)(1)(E) and (c)(3)(B)
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provides that requests for relief under each of these two subsections must be
made not later than two years after "the Secretary has begun collection
activities." The Commissioner sent notices to the taxpayer that refunds were
being offset against the joint tax liability, but such notices did not advise the
taxpayer of her right to seek relief under § 6015, and the taxpayer did not
learn of such rights until the statutory period expired for seeking such relief
after a collection activity. The Commissioner contended that the notices of
offset constituted collection activity which began the running of the
limitations period, but the offset notices were not collection-related and thus
did not require an advisement of § 6015 rights. The Tax Court (Judge Cohen)
held that the denial of innocent spouse relief as time-barred was an abuse of
discretion since the application of the time limitation was based on the
Commissioner's inconsistent meanings of collection. The offset was clearly a
collection action, and thus the notices of offset were collection-related
notices which required an advisement of the taxpayer's rights under § 6015.
The Commissioner's failure to provide the required notice therefore
precluded any finding that the limitations period began to run from the date
of the offsets.
a. Chief Counsel Notice CC-2005-010
(5/20/05). The IRS should not defend cases similar to McGee pending the
issuance of procedures to ensure that future refund offsets will include notice
to the taxpayer of the right to claim § 6015 relief.
b. Chief Counsel Notice CC-2005-011
(5/20/05). FAQs related to litigating § 6015 cases. Five topics are covered:
(1) the nonpetitioning spouse; (2) the suspension of the collection statute
when the taxpayer files a § 6015 claim; (3) the effect of agreements between
the IRS and the requesting spouse; (4) the actual knowledge defense to a
§ 6015(c) claim; and (5) procedures under Chief Counsel Notice CC-2004-
026.
2. Friday v. Commissioner, 124 T.C. 220 (5/12/05).
Judge Gerber denied the Commissioner's motion to remand to the IRS for
reconsideration of its denial of taxpayer's request for § 6015(b) relief. The
Tax Court held that a stand-alone petition for innocent spouse relief (other
than equitable relief under § 6015(f)) pursuant to § 6015(e) "is generally not
a 'review' of the Commissioner's determination in a hearing, but is instead
an action begun in [the Tax] Court." The clear inference of this holding is
that the hearing in the Tax Court is de novo and not governed by an abuse of
discretion standard.
3. No "plain language" limitation of the Tax
Court's jurisdiction in this case. Ewing v. Commissioner 118 T.C. 494
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(5/31/02). The taxpayer and her husband filed a joint return but did not pay
all of the tax shown on the return. Subsequently, before the IRS asserted any
deficiency, the taxpayer requested equitable relief from joint and several
liability under § 6015(f). The IRS denied relief and mailed a notice of
determination that was not mailed to the taxpayer's last known address, but
was actually received by the 88th day after it was mailed. The taxpayer's
petition for review was postmarked ninety-two days after the mailing of the
notice, and was received and filed seven days later. The Commissioner
moved to dismiss on the ground that the petition was not timely filed. The
Tax Court sua sponte raised the issue of whether it had jurisdiction under
§ 6015(e) to review the IRS's denial of § 6015(f) relief where no deficiency
had been asserted. [Section 6015(e), granting the Tax Court jurisdiction to
review denials of § 6015 relief, as amended by the Consolidated
Appropriations Act of 2001, begins, "In the case of an individual against
whom a deficiency has been asserted and who elects to have subsection (b)
or (c) apply. . ."]. In a reviewed opinion by Judge Ruwe, the majority (9-4)
held that the Tax Court has jurisdiction to review an denial of § 6015(f) relief
in a stand alone petition where the taxpayer is seeking relief from liability of
tax shown on the return, without a deficiency having been asserted. The
court further held that the petition was timely because it was filed more than
six months after the date she submitted her request for relief [see.
§ 6015(e)(1)(A)], the IRS failed to mail the notice of determination to
taxpayer's last known address, and the misaddressed notice prejudiced the
taxpayer's ability to file her petition within ninety days after the mailing of
the notice. The court concluded that:
[T]he language "against whom a deficiency has been
asserted" was inserted into section 6015(e) to ... to prevent
taxpayers from submitting premature requests to the
Commissioner for relief from potential deficiencies before
the Commissioner had asserted that additional taxes were
owed.... Congress was concerned with the proper timing of
a request for relief for underreported tax and intended that
taxpayers not be allowed to submit a request to the
Commissioner regarding underreported tax until after the
issue was raised by the IRS.
There is nothing in the legislative history indicating that the
amendment of section 6015(e). . ., was intended to eliminate
our jurisdiction regarding claims for equitable relief under
section 6015(f) over which we previously had jurisdiction.
The stated purpose for inserting the language "against whom
a deficiency has been asserted" into section 6015(e) was to
clarify the proper time for a taxpayer to submit a request to
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the Commissioner for relief under section 6015 regarding
underreported taxes. We conclude that the amendment of
section 6015(e) does not preclude our jurisdiction to review
the denial of equitable relief under section 6015(f) where a
deficiency has not been asserted. In the instant case,
petitioner filed a claim for relief from joint and several
liability for an amount of tax correctly shown on the return
but not paid with the return. Because respondent has not
challenged the tax reported on the return, no deficiency has
been asserted. In this situation, petitioner may be entitled to
relief under section 6015(f) because subsection (f) applies
where "it is inequitable to hold the individual liable for any
unpaid tax or any deficiency." [citations omitted].
0 Judge Laro's dissent argued that the
Tax Court lacked jurisdiction to review the denial of § 6015 relief in the absence
of a deficiency, because he considered § 6015(e)(1) to be a "clear statutory
mandate from Congress" limiting the Tax Court's jurisdiction to review denials
of § 6015 relief to deficiency cases.
a. Ewing v. Commissioner, 122 T.C. 32
(1/28/04). In a reviewed opinion by Judge Colvin, the Tax Court held that
even though the standard for reviewing the Commissioner's failure to grant
equitable relief under § 6015(f) is abuse of discretion, the Tax Court's review
is not necessarily limited to the facts that were in the administrative record.
Judges Halpern, Holmes, Chiechi, and Foley dissented.
b. Reversed because the Tax Court did not
have jurisdiction over taxpayer's petition in which she claimed innocent
spouse relief. Commissioner v. Ewing, 439 F.3d 1009 (9th Cir. 2/28/06).
Judge Tashima held that the Tax Court did not have jurisdiction to review
wife's petition for equitable relief under § 6015(f) because there was no
deficiency asserted against her and she did not elect relief under § 6015(b) or
(c), as is required by § 6015(e) in order for the Tax Court to have jurisdiction
on an innocent spouse claim. The phrase in § 6015(e) "against whom a
deficiency has been asserted" was added in 2001.
4. Rev. Rul. 2005-59, 2005-37 I.R.B. 505 (9/12/05).
Joint return prepared by revenue agent pursuant to § 6020(b) which was
signed by both spouses is a valid joint return. Form 870, Waiver of
Restrictions on Assessment and Collection of Deficiency in Tax and
Acceptance of Overassessment, prepared by revenue agent that was signed
by both spouses is a not a valid joint return because Form 870 is not verified
by a written declaration that it is made under the penalties of perjury.
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5. Estate of Canehart v. Commissioner, 125 T.C. 211
(11/14/05). Computation of the deficiency and penalty amounts allocable to
the innocent spouse/wife based upon disallowed losses and medical expenses
[erroneous items] is to be made under the proportionate allocation method
after the disallowed items were allocated equally between the two spouses.
The Tax Court (Judge Jacobs) held that § 6015(d) does not limit the portion
of the deficiency properly allocable to the wife to her proportionate share of
the taxable income properly reported on the joint return because her husband
received a tax benefit from the filing of a joint return; this which limits the
amount of the erroneous items that will be allocated to him (with the excess
to be allocated to the wife).
& Although items are allocated for this
purpose as if the spouses had filed separate returns, the allocation does not
require that the innocent spouse's ultimate tax liability be limited to the amount
that would have been her tax liability if separate returns actually had been filed.
The deficiency is not allocated in proportion to taxable income, but rather the
deficiency is allocated in proportion to the erroneous items giving rise to the
deficiency that are assigned to each spouse. Reg. § 1.6015-3(d)(4)(i)(A).
6. Aranda v. Commissioner, 432 F.3d 1140 (10th Cir.
12/20/05). IRS did not abuse discretion in granting relief from fraud penalty
and interest on the fraud penalty, but not from any portion of the underlying
tax deficiency liability, pursuant to § 6015(f), even though taxpayer
requested relief under § 6015(b), not § 6015(f), and the IRS notice
mistakenly referred to relief being granted under § 6015(b).
7. Ordlock v. Commissioner, 126 T.C. 47 (1/19/06)
(reviewed, 10-8). Taxpayer is not entitled to a refund of amounts from
community property used to pay her husband's tax liabilities understatements
because under California state law community property is subject to an
obligation of one spouse.
H. Miscellaneous
1. Burton Kanter in trouble again. Investment Research
Associates. Ltd. v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1999-407 (12/15/99). In a
600-page opinion Burton Kanter was held liable for the § 6653 fraud penalty
by reason of his being "the architect who planned and executed the elaborate
scheme with respect to the kickback income payments .... In our view, what
we have here, purely and simply, is a concerted effort by an experienced tax
lawyer [Kanter] and two corporate executives [Claude Ballard and Robert
Lisle] to defeat and evade the payments of taxes and to cover up their illegal
acts so that the corporations [employing the two corporate executives] and
the Federal Government would be unable to discover them."
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0 The taxpayers subsequently moved
to have access to the special trial judge's "reports, draft opinions, or similar
documents" prepared under Tax Court Rule 183(b). They based their motion
on conversations with two unnamed5 Tax Court judges that the original draft
opinion from the special trial judge was changed by Judge Dawson before he
adopted it. They were turned down because the Tax Court held that the
documents were related to its internal deliberative processes. See, Tax Court
Order denying motion, 2001 TNT 23-31 (4/26/00) and (on reconsideration)
2001 TNT 23-30 (8/30/00). Taxpayers sought mandamus from the Fifth,
Seventh and Eleventh Circuits, but were unsuccessful.
a. The Tax Court's procedures are
vindicated and taxpayer Ballard loses on appeal on the fraud issue in the
Eleventh Circuit. Ballard v. Commissioner, 321 F.3d 1037 (11th Cir.
2/13/03), affg T.C. Memo. 1999-407. The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the Tax
Court decision and rejected the taxpayers' argument that changes allegedly
made by the Tax Court Special Trial Judge were improper.
b. The Tax Court's procedures are
vindicated and taxpayer Kanter's Estate6 loses on appeal on the fraud
issue in the Eleventh Circuit Estate of Kanter v. Commissioner, 337 F.3d
833 (7th Cir. 7/24/03) (per curiam) (2-1), aff'g in part and rev'g in part T.C.
Memo. 1999-407.
c. The Tax Court's procedures are
vindicated but taxpayer Lisle's Estate wins on appeal on the fraud issue
in the Fifth Circuit. Estate of Lisle v. Commissioner, 341 F.3d 364 (5th Cir.
7/30/03), affg in part and rev'g in part T.C. Memo. 1999-407. The Fifth
Circuit (Judge Higginbotham) followed the Eleventh and Seventh Circuits on
the nondisclosure of the special trial judge's original report by the Tax Court.
d. Justice Ginsburg to Tax Court judges:
"You Article I judges don't understand your own rules, so let me tell you
what you meant when you adopted them in 1983." Ballard v.
Commissioner, 544 U.S. 40 (3/7/05) (7-2), reversing and remanding 337
F.3d 833 (7th Cir. 7/24/03) and 321 F.3d 1037 (1 1th Cir. 2/13/03). Justice
Ginsburg held that the Tax Court may not exclude from the record on appeal
nor conceal from the taxpayers the original draft reports of Special Trial
Judges under Tax Court Rule 183(b). Justice Ginsburg so held because no
5. Kanter's attorney revealed the names of the two judges when asked at
oral argument to the Seventh Circuit as Tax Court Judge Julian Jacobs and Chief
Special Trial Judge Peter J. Panuthos. See the text at footnote 1 of Judge Cudahy's
dissent in the Seventh Circuit Kanter Estate opinion, below.
6. Burton Kanter died on October 31, 2001.
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statute authorizes the concealment and the rule's "current text" does not
warrant it. Her reading of Tax Court Rule 183 is that it does not authorize the
Tax Court to treat the special trial judge's Rule 183(b) report as a draft
subject to collaborative revision. She held that it is particularly important that
the process be transparent in fraud cases such as this one.
0 Chief Justice Rehnquist's dissenting
opinion, joined in by Justice Thomas, states that the "Tax Court's compliance
with its own Rules is a matter on which we should defer to the interpretation of
that court." He concludes that "Seminole Rock deference" [Bowles v. Seminole
Rock & Sand Co., 325 U.S. 410 (1945)] should extend to an Article I court's
interpretation of its own rules as well as to an executive agency's interpretation
of its rules. He further notes that the issue of compliance with Rule 183 was not
presented to the Supreme Court, and that under Supreme Court Rule 14.1(a) the
"Court does not consider claims that are not included within a petitioner's
questions presented." He adds that, "Only by failing to abide by our own Rules
can the Court hold that the Tax Court failed to follow its Rules."
e. On remand from the Supreme Court, the
Seventh Circuit remands the case to the Tax Court. Estate of Kanter v.
Commissioner, 406 F.3d 933 (7th Cir. 5/9/05).
f. ... while the Eleventh Circuit orders that
the Special Trial Judge's report be added to the record. Ballard v.
Commissioner, 2005 TNT 99-26 (11th Cir. 5/17/05). The 300-page report
may be found at 2005 TNT 107-16.
g. Tax Court proposes new rule on Special
Trial Judges' reports. On 7/7/05 Tax Court Chief Judge Joel Gerber
announced that the court proposes to amend its rules to provide (in proposed
Rule 183) substantially the same procedure it had before the 1983 change,
which would allow parties to review and file objections to a special trial
judge's recommended findings of fact and conclusions of law before the case
is reassigned to a presidentially appointed judge for decision.
h. Tax Court releases judges' statements. In
an order dated 7/19/05, Chief Judge Gerber of the Tax Court released
statements from Chief Judge Cohen, Judge Dawson and Special Trial Judge
Couvillion outlining the procedures followed in the submission, review and
adoption of the memorandum opinion in Investment Research Associates,
Ltd. The statements were that the proposed report submitted by the Special
Trial Judge was deemed unsatisfactory by Judge Dawson and then-Chief
Judge Cohen in that the facts found did not support the proposed opinion.
After the Chief Judge's request that Judge Jacobs take charge of the matter
was declined because Kanter's lawyer was a close friend, Judge Couvillion
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withdrew the proposed report the day before a scheduled meeting with Judge
Dawson and Chief Judge Cohen. Following the withdrawal, Judge Dawson
and Special Trial Judge Couvillion collaborated on the report.
i. More fallout from the Ballard decision.
The Tax Court identified and located 117 initial opinions submitted by
Special Trial Judges under Tax Court Rule 183(b). 2005 TNT 175-2
(9/12/05). Four of the opinions were changed (other than that in Ballard),
with the changes resulting in taxpayer-favorable holdings in three of the four.
There is a dispute as to what happened in Johnson v. Commissioner, T.C.
Memo. 1992-369, with taxpayer's attorney recalling that Special Trial Judge
Goldberg congratulated him on his win in the case, and seemed surprised
when taxpayer's attorney responded that he had lost the case; Special Trial
Judge Goldberg disputes that the conversation took place.
j. Tax Court adopts amendments to its
rules. Tax Court press release, 9/21/05. Announces that the Tax Court has
adopted amendments to its Rules 182 and 183, relating to Special Trial
Judges' reports in cases other than small tax cases. The Special Trial Judge's
recommended findings of fact and conclusions of law are to be served on the
parties, who may file written objections and responses. After the case is
assigned to a regular Judge, any changes made shall be reflected in the
record and "[d]ue regard shall be given to the circumstance that the Special
Trial Judge had the opportunity to evaluate the credibility of witnesses, and
the finding of fact recommended by the Special Trial Judge shall be
presumed to be correct."
k. Chief Counsel Notice CC-2005-017
(9/27/05). Describes procedures for handling motions filed by previous Tax
Court petitioners "who now seek to vacate decisions based on Ballard-type
claims in which they argue that the special trial judge's draft opinion was
changed before the Tax Court issued it as a reported opinion."
1. The Eleventh Circuit remands the case to
the Tax Court - after reinstating the Special Trial Judge's report.
Ballard v. Commissioner, 429 F.3d 1026 (11th Cir. 11/2/05) (per curiam).
The case was remanded to the Tax Court with the following instructions:
(1) the "collaborative report and opinion" is ordered stricken; (2) the original
report of the special trial judge is ordered reinstated; (3) the Tax Court chief
judge is instructed to assign this case to a previously-uninvolved regular Tax
Court Judge; and (4) the Tax Court shall proceed to review this matter in
accordance with the Supreme Court's dictates and with its newly-revised
Rules 182 and 183, giving "due regard" to the credibility determinations of
the special trial judge and presuming correct fact findings of the trial judge.
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Specifically, the Eleventh Circuit ordered that former Chief Judge Cohen,
Judge Dawson and Judge Couvillion are not to be involved in the new
review.
m. As does the Fifth Circuit. Estate of Lisle v.
Commissioner, 431 F.3d 439 (5th Cir. 11/22/05) (per curiam). Remands the
case to the Tax Court with orders to: (1) strike the "collaborative report" that
formed the basis of the Tax Court's ultimate decision; (2) reinstate Judge
Couvillion's original report; (3) refer this case to a regular Tax Court judge
who had no involvement in the preparation of the aforementioned
"collaborative report" and who shall give "due regard" to the credibility
determinations of Judge Couvillion, presuming that his fact findings are
correct unless manifestly unreasonable, [in dealing with the remaining issues
of tax deficiency]; and (4) adhere strictly hereafter to the amended Tax Court
Rule in finalizing Tax Court opinions.
2. You have a choice of forum for review of the
Commissioner's refusal to abate interest. Beall v. United States, 336 F.3d
419 (5th Cir. 6/27/03). The Fifth Circuit (Judge Garwood) held that a district
court has jurisdiction in a refund suit to review for abuse of discretion the
Commissioner's refusal to abate interest. Judge Garwood reasoned that the
grant of jurisdiction to the Tax Court in § 6404(h) was not exclusive.
a. A district court disagrees with Beall.
Ballhaus v. IRS, 341 F. Supp. 2d 1145 (D. Nev. 9/29/04). The court refused
to follow Beall and held that it lacks jurisdiction to review Commissioner's
refusal to abate interest.
b. And the Court of Federal Claims holds
that Beall is not the "be all and end all" on this issue. Hinck v. United
States, 64 Fed. Cl. 71 (2/3/05). Judge Allegra held that the 1996 amendments
to § 6404 gave the Tax Court jurisdiction to review the failure to abate
interest under the "abuse of discretion" standard. Before 1996 the Federal
courts did not have jurisdiction to review abatement decisions, and the 1996
amendments to § 6404 did not do so.
3. Proposed regulations reject the mailbox rule and
hold that - absent actual delivery - only registered or certified mail will
suffice as proof. REG-138176-02, Timely Mailing Treated as Timely Filing,
69 F.R. 56377 (9/21/04). Proposed regulations under § 7502 would provide
that a registered or certified mail receipt is the only prima facie evidence of
delivery of documents that have a filing deadline prescribed by the internal
revenue laws - other than direct proof of actual delivery.
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a. But taxpayers can still prevail based upon
the mailbox rule. Why did taxpayers' lawyer play games with love by
not taking the petition to the post office? Grossman v. Commissioner, T.C.
Memo. 2005-164 (7/5/05). The envelope sent by certified mail that contained
taxpayer's petition to the Tax Court was timely postmarked by a private
postage meter but was received by the court after the ninety-day period for
filing prescribed by § 6213(a). Taxpayer submitted evidence of a delay in
delivery of this letter by reason of misdirection and irradiation to eliminate
anthrax spores, as well as the testimony of their lawyer's office manager that
she mailed the petition on the date it was postmarked by the private postage
meter. The Tax Court (Judge Goeke) held that taxpayers met their burden of
proof that their mailing was timely.
0 For a tax return or other document
mailed to the IRS, it is rumored that the IRS will accept the uncorroborated
word of a practitioner believed to be credible as to the date of mailing.
4. Speltz v. Commissioner, 124 T.C. 165 (3/23/05).
The IRS properly rejected taxpayer's offer in compromise of AMT liability
that resulted from incentive stock options even though tax liability exceeded
the amount for which the stock subsequently was sold later in the same year
the options were exercised. Nor will a tax liability be compromised on the
grounds that the statute as correctly applied produces a tax liability that is
unfair or inequitable.
5. Harriaill v. United States, 410 F.3d 786 (5th Cir.
3/31/05). Application of refund to subsequent year's tax liability is a
payment of estimated taxes, not a deposit, and pursuant to § 6513(b) is
deemed to have been made on the due date of the return, without extension.
A refund request filed within the three year period after late-filed return
crediting prior year's refund to tax liability shown on return was not timely.
6. "It is an ill wind...." Notice 2005-66, 2005-40
I.R.B. 620 (9/9/05). The IRS has postponed until 1/3/06 tax return filing and
payment deadlines for taxpayers affected by Hurricane Katrina, i.e.,
taxpayers in three counties in Florida, six counties in Alabama, fifty-two
counties in Mississippi and sixty-four parishes in Louisiana. The
postponement was granted pursuant to § 7508A, which grants the IRS
authority to postpone for a period of up to one year the time for performance
of the acts listed in § 7508(a) by taxpayers affected by a Presidentially-
declared disaster.
a. IR-2005-112 (8/28/05) and Notice 2005-73,
2005-42 I.R.B. 723 (9/22/05). Pursuant to the Katrina Tax Act, the
deadlines to file tax returns, pay taxes, and perform other time-sensitive acts
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is postponed until 2/28/06 for taxpayer affected by Hurricane Katrina. See
2005 TNT 188-13.
7. Service Employees International Union v. Commis-
sioner, 125 T.C. 63 (9/15/05). The Tax Court lacked jurisdiction to review
IRS's determination to collect § 6652(c)(1) penalties for exempt
organization's failure to file § 6033 annual return.
8. Mobil Corp. v. United States, 67 Fed. Cl. 708
(9/22/05). Claims on original tax return that were disallowed on audit,
combined with the parties' course of dealing during the audit of those claims
conducted prior to the expiration of the statute of limitations for filing an
administrative refund claim, established all of the elements of a valid
informal claim: (1) notice to Commissioner, (2) the factual and legal basis of
the claim, and (3) a written component.
9. The four-month automatic extension will now be
for six months. T.D. 9229, Extension of Time for Filing Returns, 70 F.R.
67356 (11/7/05), and REG-144898-04, Extension of Time for Filing Returns,
70 F.R. 67397 (11/7/05). Final, temporary and proposed regulations (Temp.
Reg. § 1.6081-4T; Prop. Reg. § 1.6081-4) that allow taxpayers required to
file an individual income tax return an automatic six-month extension if
taxpayers submit an application on Form 4868 ("Application for Automatic
Extension of Time To File a U.S. Individual Income Tax Return") on or
before the return due date.
* Will this mean that return preparers
will face a jam-up before October 15th because the former August 15th filers
will wait until October to assemble their data?
* Temp. Reg. § 1.6081-5T also allows
pass-through entities to file an automatic six-month extension of time to file on
new Form 7004 ("Application for Automatic 6-Month Extension of Time to
File Certain Business Income Tax, Information and Other Returns"). Effective
for applications for an automatic extension of time filed after 12/31/05. Treasury
requests comments as to whether pass-through entities should receive a shorter
extension of time.
10. User fees for rulings increase. IR-2005-144
(12/19/05). User fees for PLRs will increase from $7,000 to $10,000, with
lower fees for taxpayers earning less than $250,000 ($625) and taxpayers
earning from $250,000 to $1 million ($2,500). The fee for requests for
changes in accounting methods for businesses will increase from $1,500 to
$2,500. Other fees will also increase to be reflected in Rev. Procs. 2006-1
and 2006-8.
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11. In Re: John Ashton Wrav, Jr., 433 F.3d 376 (4th Cir.
12/29/05). This lawyer properly filed all his income tax returns but did not
pay all the taxes due, choosing instead to repay the lenders to his business.
He pleaded guilty to a misdemeanor count of willful failure to pay income
taxes. The opinion noted that it was not clear that the lawyer's conduct
involved deceit, and that deceit was not a necessary element of § 7203. There
was no deceit, as the liability was disclosed. The attorney, if anything, was
foolish for not simply requesting a payment arrangement. That's not to
excuse the failure to pay, but on the spectrum of offenses, from failure to file
and willful nondisclosure, this one isn't quite as bad as it sounds.
12. It's good to know that all is normal on the home
front despite our military serving in dangerous circumstances overseas.
In this CCA, the IRS denies relief to a reservist serving in a combat zone
by using an exact reading of the statute to arrive at the conclusion that a
partnership whose principal partner is serving in a combat zone is not
entitled to suspension of interest on delinquent payroll taxes. CCA
200613030 (12/15/05). Legal memorandum determining that a partnership is
not entitled to a § 7508 suspension of interest on delinquent payroll taxes
while its "principal partner" is serving in a combat zone.
XI. WITHHOLDING AND EXCISE TAXES
A. Employment Taxes
1. Section 251 of the Jobs Act of 2004 amends various
Code sections to provide that employment taxes (including withholding) are
not required with respect to the spread on the exercise of incentive stock
options and employee stock purchase plan stock options. This spread is
includable for AMT purposes, but not for regular income tax purposes.
* There has been for the past
several years a freeze in effect on the collection of employment taxes on the
exercise of qualified options.
2. Although the exercise of a statutory stock option
does not result in taxable income, it does result in wages for FICA /
FUTA purposes - but not until 2003. REG-142686-01, Application of the
Federal Insurance Contributions Act, Federal Unemployment Tax Act, and
Collection of Income Tax at Source to Statutory Stock Options, 66 F.R.
57023 (11/14/01), issued as provided in Notice 2001-14, 2001-6 I.R.B. 516.
Prop. Regs. §§ 31.3121(a)-l(k), 31.3306(b)-1(l), and 31.3401(a)-l(b)(15)
would provide that the holder of a statutory stock option [§ 422 ISO or § 423
ESPP] receives wages for FICA and FUTA purposes upon exercise of the
option, but no withholding is required because no gross income has been
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received. The amount of the wages received is the excess of the fair market
value of the stock over the amount paid. The IRS will develop "rules of
administrative convenience" permitting employers to deem the wages to
have been paid on a specific date or over a specific period of time.
a. Notice 2001-72, 2001-49 I.R.B. 548
(11/15/01). The IRS announced and requested comments on proposed rules
regarding the employer's income tax withholding and reporting obligations
on the sale by an employee of stock received pursuant to exercise of a
statutory stock option. The employer is not required to withhold, but is
required to report if the amount is at least $600, unless the employer has
made reasonable efforts to determine if reporting is necessary and has been
unable to do so.
b. Notice 2001-73, 2001-49 I.R.B. 549
(11/15/01). The IRS announced and requested comments on proposed "rules
of administrative convenience" permitting employers to deem the wages to
have been paid on a specific date for FICA and FUTA purposes. FICA and
FUTA wages could be treated as paid on a pay period, quarterly, semi-
annually, annually, or on another basis.
c. IRS extends moratorium on assessment of
employment taxes on stock options for two more years. Notice 2002-47,
2002-28 I.R.B. 97 (6/27/02). Pending the completion of its review and the
issuance of further guidance, the IRS will not assess FICA or FUTA taxes
(nor will it seek federal income tax withholding) upon the exercise of a
statutory stock option or disposition of stock acquired by an employee
pursuant to the exercise of a statutory stock option. The notice further
provides that it is contemplated that any final guidance that would apply
employment taxes to statutory stock options will not apply to exercises of
statutory stock options that occur before the January 1 of the year that
follows the second anniversary of the publication of the final guidance.
d. Congress makes the world safe for ISOs
and ESPP stock options (except for the AMT). Section 251 of the Jobs
Act of 2004 amends various Code sections to provide that employment taxes
(including withholding) are not required with respect to the spread on the
exercise of incentive stock options and employee stock purchase plan stock
options. This spread is includable for AMT purposes, but not for regular
income tax purposes.
e. When it's over, it should be over
completely. REG-142686-01, Withdrawal of Notice of Proposed
Rulemaking, Application of the Federal Insurance Contributions Act, Federal
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Unemployment Tax Act, and Collection of Income Tax at Source to
Statutory Stock Options, 70 F.R. 38057 (7/1/05). The IRS has withdrawn
proposed regulations that would have required FICA, FUTA and income tax
withholding on incentive stock options and employee stock purchase plan
stock options in view of the statutory amendment eliminating such
requirements that is applicable to stock options exercised after 10/22/04.
B. Excise Taxes
1. Telephone excise tax inapplicable to charges that
do not vary by distance, says the Eleventh Circuit in its latest
pronouncement on the "plain meaning" of the tax statutes. American
Bankers Insurance Group v. United States, 408 F.3d 1328 (11th Cir.
5/10/05). The long distance services provided by AT&T to taxpayer were not
within the "toll telephone service" to which § 4252(b)(1) applies because the
rates do not vary by "distance and elapsed transmission time" and the
unambiguous statute uses these terms conjunctively; the "plain meaning" of
the statute requires both the time and the distance to vary. Even though there
are separate charges for calls depending upon where they fall within one of
three toll bands used (intrastate, interstate and international), the rates do not
vary by distance per se because calls between places closer to one another
often cost more than calls between places further apart. The Eleventh Circuit
reversed the district court's grant of summary judgment for the government.
a. This one is the most fun to read because
of the interplay between majority and dissenting opinions as to the
meaning of "and." OfficeMax, Inc. v. United States, 428 F.3d 583 (6th Cir.
11/2/05) (2-1). Federal excise tax on long-distance calls does not apply
unless the charges vary based upon both time and distance. The majority
opinion held that "and" means "and" but the dissent argued that "and" could
also mean "or." When this three percent tax on toll telephone calls was
enacted in 1965, there was only one long-distance telephone provider and its
charges were based upon both the distance and time of the call [or on a flat
rate for unlimited calling on a WATS line, to which the tax also applied].
The majority held that a literal reading of the statute was required because a
tax should only apply to that which its language taxes. The dissent would
"not encourage lawyers to play word games at the expense of the public
fisc."
b. The IRS takes a hard line. Notice 2005-79,
2005-46 I.R.B. 952 (11/14/05). The IRS will continue to litigate this issue
and will continue to assess and collect the § 4251 tax on long distance
communications services.
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c. Amtrak's long-distance telephone service
is not subject to the excise tax on toll telephone services because the
payment was based solely on time. National Railroad Passenger Corp.
(Amtrak) v. United States, 431 F.3d 374 (D.C. Cir. 12/9/05). The court
affirmed the district court and concluded that the statute was unambiguous,
and the "and" in § 4252 was to be read conjunctively.
2. Taxpayer subject to tax on golden parachute
payments because statute covers the payment and proposed regulations
to the contrary have no legal force until them become final. Yocum v.
United States, 66 Fed. Cl. 579 (Fed. Cl. 7/1/05). On the issue of whether the
§ 4999 excise tax on "excess parachute payments" applies,
taxpayer/executive relied upon proposed regulations to assert the
inapplicability of the tax to the transaction in question. Judge Allegra held
that "proposed regulations have no legal force until they become final," and
that "these principles [do not] differ simply because the IRS allows a
proposed regulation to linger unadopted over a long period of time."
XII. TAX LEGISLATION
A. Enacted
1. The Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and
Consumer Protection Act of 2005 ("Bankruptcy Act of 2005"), P.L. 109-
8, was signed by President Bush on 4/20/05.
2. The Energy Policy Act of 2005, P.L. 109-58, was
signed by President Bush on 8/8/05. Title XIII (Energy Policy Tax
Incentives) of the Energy Policy Tax Act of 2005 may be cited as the
Energy Tax Incentives Act of 2005.
3. The Highway Reauthorization and Excise Tax
Simplification Act of 2005, P.L. 109-59, was signed by President Bush on
8/10/05.
4. Kiss Me Kate.7 Or, is it the powerful Katrin(k)a?'
The Katrina Emergency Tax Relief Act of 2005 ("KETRA" or "Katrina
Tax Act"), P.L. 109-73, was signed by President Bush on 9/23/05.
5. The Gulf Opportunity Zone Act of 2005 ("GO
Zone Act of 2005"), P.L. 109-135, was signed by President Bush on
12/21/05. The Act: (1) provides 50 percent bonus depreciation to businesses
7. For Cole Porter devotees.
8. For readers of the old Toonerville Trolley comic strip.
20061
Florida Tax Review
rebuilt in the newly created Gulf Opportunity (GO) Zone; (2) doubles the
amount that may be expensed under section 179 from $100,000 to $200,000
for investments made in the GO Zone and increase the phaseout floor from
$400,000 of annual investments to $ 1 million; (3) allows businesses a five-
year carryback of net operating losses attributable to investment in the GO
Zone; (4) increases the amount of expensing allowed for reforestation costs
of small timber owners within the GO Zone and within the areas affected by
Hurricane Rita; (5) increases and enhances low-income housing credits
within the GO Zone; (6) increases the rehabilitation tax credit for qualified
expenditures within the GO Zone; (7) increases the cap on new markets tax
credits and allocates the increased amounts to entities making low-income
community investments in the GO Zone; and (8) creates additional tax-
exempt bond authority for states and municipalities within the GO Zone and
allows those states to issue debt service tax credit bonds to help devastated
communities meet their debt service requirements as a result of the
hurricanes.
Casinos and other "sin facilities" [see
Code § 144(c)(6)(B), e.g., massage parlors, liquor stores] are carved out from
this bill but compromise language was added that would allow facilities
attached to casinos - such as parking lots, hotels, and restaurants - to claim the
tax relief.
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